Division of Child Protective Services v. Doran

529 A.2d 765
CourtDelaware Family Court
DecidedMarch 27, 1987
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 529 A.2d 765 (Division of Child Protective Services v. Doran) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Delaware Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Division of Child Protective Services v. Doran, 529 A.2d 765 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987).

Opinion

CONNER, Judge.

The above parties are before the Court on the petition of the Division of Child Protective Services (hereinafter referred to as DCPS or the Division) to terminate the parental rights of Deborah C. Doran (sometimes hereinafter referred to as “Mother”) and Horace W. Cannon, III in their son, Adolph A. Cannon, born October 6, 1979. Horace W. Cannon has signed an affidavit consenting to the termination of his parental rights in his son, Adolph A. Cannon. Deborah C. Doran objects to the termination of her parental rights in Allen and requests that his custody be immediately returned to her.

The statutory grounds alleged by DCPS in their petition filed in this Court on June 17, 1986, are that Deborah C. Doran has failed to adequately plan for her son’s physical, mental and emotional needs, health and development and that the conditions which led to the placement of Allen with that agency still persist with little likelihood that the conditions will be remed- ■ ied at an early date. DCPS has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they have satisfied the above stated statutory requirements. (13 Del.C. § 1103(5)(a)).

The pertinent portions of the statute referred to above read as follows:

13 Del. C. § 1103(5)(a):
(5) The parent or parents of any child, or any person holding parental rights over such child, are not able, or have failed, to plan adequately for the child’s physical needs or his mental and emotional health and development and:
(a) In the case of a child in the care of an authorized agency:
1. The child has been in the care of an authorized agency for 1 year, or there is a history of previous placement or placements of this child, or a history of neglect, abuse or lack of care of other children by his parent; and
2. The conditions which led to the placement still persist, and there appears to be little likelihood that those *767 conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future.

As the petitioner alleging that termination of parental rights are justified, DCPS also has the burden of proving that it would be in the best interests of the child for the parental rights of his parents to be terminated. Daber v. Division of Child Protective Services, Del.Supr., 470 A.2d 723 (1983); Kline v. Hartzler, Del.Supr., 227 A.2d 210 (1967); Patricia A.F. v. James R.F., DeLSupr., 451 A.2d 830 (1982).

In addition, the Court must be satisfied that DCPS has complied with the mandate of 29 Del.C. § 9003(11) which commands the Department of Services for Children, Youth and Their Families as follows:

To establish, implement and follow procedures and standards compatible with due process of law with respect to the removal of a child from his home, a change in the placement of a child who is under the supervision of custody of the Department, and any other actions by the Department that may affect the legal rights of a child and his or her family.

This statute provides that the Division must comply with the basic principles of due process when removing a child from his home or changing his legal custody.

In a recent case, In the Matter of Derek W. Burns, a Minor Child, Del.Supr., 519 A.2d 638 (1986), the Supreme Court has charged this court with the responsibility of determining whether the Division has complied with the Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 608, 620-28, 670-76 (1982). Specifically, the Court must review the reunification efforts made by the Division and must be satisfied that the Divison has put forth its best efforts to unify the family prior to petitioning for the termination of the parental rights of the parents.

The legal history of the case at hand causes great concern as to whether Deborah Doran was afforded her basic due process rights at a most important stage in the proceeding, the time when legal custody was removed from her and transferred to the Division of Child Protective Services. What transpired and what did not transpire by way of reunification efforts after the initial transfer of custody raise even more serious questions. There have been three placements of Allen. The first placement occurred in August of 1983 when Deborah and John Doran were married and living together. They approached DCPS and requested that Agency to assist them in obtaining money to have tubes placed in Allen’s ears. There was an Order awarding temporary custody to D.C.P.S. entered by Judge Parrish on September 8, 1983, which Order was rescinded that same day. That Order involved Allen and his baby brother John L. Doran. The actual placement ended when the two boys were returned to Mr. and Mrs. Doran on November 3, 1983.

Allen and John L. were placed in foster care for a second time on December 27, 1983. This placement was also requested by Deborah Doran and was unquestionably voluntary. At that time the Doran home was without heat and water and Deborah Doran and her husband were fighting and drinking heavily. The children remained in DCPS placement until November of 1984 when they were returned to their mother who had separated from her husband. From a legal standpoint, no steps were taken until March 8, 1984, when Deborah Doran, pursuant to the request of Patricia Lee, the DCPS worker assigned to the case, signed a consent to transfer legal custody of Allen and John L. to that agency. Deborah Doran was not represented at the time. Her signature was witnessed solely by Patricia Lee, the DCPS case worker. This consent document provided in pertinent part:

“I understand a hearing will be held at the Family Court, 900 King Street, Wilmington, Delaware, on April 2, 1984, at 9:00 a.m., at which time I may appear represented by an attorney. This hearing will be for the purpose of allowing the Division of Child Protective Services to present their petition for custody of my children to the Court and for the Court to explain to me my rights and responsibilities.”

The only Court document relating to the removal of the Cannon boys from their *768 mother’s custody is a Petition and Order signed by a Family Court Master on April 4, 1984. The Order portion of the document states:

“the foregoing petition having been read and considered: It is the Order that custody of Adolph A. Cannon, born 10/6/79, be granted to the Division of Child Protective Services”.

The Master’s Order does not advise the parties that they had a right to a Review de Novo of this Order within fifteen days. Mrs. Doran did not appear before any Master.

Notwithstanding the possible invalidity of this Order, Mrs.

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Related

In Re Heller
669 A.2d 25 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1995)
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669 A.2d 25 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1995)

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529 A.2d 765, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/division-of-child-protective-services-v-doran-delfamct-1987.