Divine Grace Yoga Ashram Incorporated v. Yavapai, County of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 31, 2022
• Docket: 3:21-cv-08221
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Divine Grace Yoga Ashram Incorporated, No. CV-21-08221-PCT-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 County of Yavapai, et al.,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 6) 16 and its associated Motion for Summary Disposition (Doc. 19). Defendant has failed to 17 respond to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. However, Defendant has filed a 18 Response to the Motion for Summary Disposition (Doc. 22), and Plaintiff has filed a 19 corresponding Reply (Doc. 23). Also pending before the Court is Defendant’s Partial 20 Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Remand State Law Claim (Doc. 17). Plaintiff has filed 21 a Response (Doc. 20), and Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 21). 22 The Court has also requested additional briefing from the parties regarding the 23 interpretation of the Yavapai County’s Planning and Zoning Ordinance (Doc. 24). Plaintiff 24 filed a Supplemental Brief (Doc. 25), as did Defendant (Doc. 26). 25 For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 26 Injunction and its associated Motion for Summary Disposition. The Court also grants in 27 part and denies in part Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.1

28 1 The parties have requested oral argument. (Docs. 6; 17; 22). The Court denies these requests as the matters are sufficiently briefed and further argumentation will not assist the 1 I. Background 2 Plaintiff Divine Grace Yoga Ashram Incorporated filed its Complaint on 3 October 13, 2021. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff operates a church in Cornville, Arizona on an old 4 ranch property (the “Property”), which consists of 12.6 acres of land abutting the Coconino 5 National Forest. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 22, 24). About ten of Plaintiff’s members live on the 6 Property. (Id. at ¶ 37). The members begin their day early in the morning and “pray, serve, 7 meditate, sing breath properly, practice Yoga asanas, cook healthy meals, clean and other 8 activities, all as an offering to God.” (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff also offers a variety of week- 9 long and weekend retreats, such as a “week-long silent retreat and weekend motherhood 10 Yoga retreats.” (Id. at ¶ 33). Plaintiff alleges it does not conduct any commercial activity 11 on the Property and does not intend to do so in the future. (Id. at ¶ 34). 12 The Property itself is governed by Defendant Yavapai County’s Planning and 13 Zoning Ordinance (the “Ordinance”). (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 38). Under the Ordinance, the Property 14 is located in a residential, single-family district, referred to as a “R1L” zone. (Id. at ¶¶ 39– 15 40). In order for a religious institution to operate in permanent site-built buildings within 16 a R1L zone, the institution must first obtain an approved Conditional Use Permit (“CUP”). 17 (Id. at ¶ 41). 18 On October 29, 2020, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Development Services Director 19 for Yavapai County asserting that Plaintiff was exempt from the CUP requirement because 20 Yavapai County treats Plaintiff differently than non-religious institutions. (Id. at ¶ 86). 21 Around that same time, the Yavapai County Planning and Zoning Commission had been 22 discussing whether the Ordinance’s requirements for religious institutions complied with 23 Arizona law. (Id. at ¶¶ 52–82). Shortly after Plaintiff’s letter, the County Board of 24 Supervisors amended the Ordinance in such a way that private schools were also required 25 to obtain a CUP to operate in R1L properties. (Id. at ¶¶ 75, 88). Plaintiff alleges that 26 despite the amendment, the current Ordinance still permits public schools and charter 27 schools to operate in the R1L zoning district without an approved CUP. (Id. at ¶¶ 81, 82).

28 Court with its decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (stating that a court may decide motions without oral hearings); LRCiv 7.2(f) (same). 1 As it stands today, Section 410 of the Ordinance governing R1L districts permits a 2 range of uses including, but not limited to, single family homes, community centers that 3 are part of a community plan, and bed and breakfasts that are subject to administrative 4 review and comment. (Doc. 1-8 at 6–8). Religious institutions and privately funded 5 educational institutions are permitted uses “upon Conditional Use Permit approval.” (Id. 6 at 6). Section 410 does not explicitly mention public schools or charter schools. However, 7 section 201(A)(3) states that “publicly owned and operated facilities used for essential 8 government purposes” are exempt from all of the Ordinance’s provisions. (Doc. 25 at 2). 9 On or about January 20, 2021, the Senior Planner of Yavapai County’s 10 Development Services Department called Plaintiff and stated that Plaintiff must cease and 11 desist its operations unless it secured a CUP. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 90–93). Plaintiff ceased its 12 operations in response. (Id. at ¶ 98). Plaintiff alleges it has not been able to meet on the 13 Property for religious purposes since February 2021. (Id. at ¶ 102). Plaintiff does not wish 14 to apply for a CUP “due to the expense and delay associated with the Permit process.” (Id. 15 at ¶ 104). 16 Plaintiff brings four counts against Defendant. Count 1 alleges that the Ordinance 17 violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 18 113–25). Count 2 alleges that the Ordinance violates Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion 19 Act (“FERA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 126–37). Count 3 alleges that the Ordinance violates the First 20 Amendment’s Establishment Clause, and Count 4 alleges that the Ordinance violates the 21 First Amendment’s Free-Exercise Clause. (Id. at ¶¶ 138–63). 22 II. Jurisdiction and Standing 23 Before proceeding, the Court will address the parties’ arguments regarding standing 24 and jurisdiction, as these relate the Court’s power to hear this matter. The Court will first 25 address whether it should retain supplemental jurisdiction over the FERA claim, and then 26 it will address whether Plaintiff has standing to bring a RLUIPA claim. 27 a. Supplemental Jurisdiction over FERA Claim 28 Because the Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims, it may 1 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FERA claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 2 Federal courts, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law 3 claim if it “raises a novel or complex issue of State law . . . .” Id. § 1367(c)(1). A court’s 4 decision on whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is informed by consideration of 5 judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. United Mine Workers of Am. v. 6 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 7 FERA is a unique statute whose land use provisions sorely lack interpretation and 8 application from Arizona courts. The statute was originally passed in 1999 as defiant 9 expression of Arizona’s departure from federal jurisprudence on the issue of what 10 constitutes a religious burden. See Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 448 P.3d 11 890, 919 (Ariz. 2019); State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004, 1006 (Ariz. 2009). FERA’s land 12 use provisions, A.R.S. § 41-1493.03, were passed in 2010, and no Arizona Court has yet 13 interpreted or applied them. 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 323 (H.B. 2596). This Court 14 recently held in a separate matter that there are many unresolved issues related to FERA 15 land use claims such as whether a party’s FERA claims may be tried by a jury and what 16 specific type of relief is appropriate for such claims. Henry v. City of Somerton, 2021 U.S. 17 Dist. LEXIS 243162, at *10 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2021). 18 Because FERA’s land use claims represent a novel and complex area of Arizona 19 law, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count 2 and dismiss 20 it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). 21 b. Standing for RLUIPA Claim 22 Plaintiff brings a claim under RLUIPA’s “equal terms” provision, which states that 23 no “government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a 24 religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 25 institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s equal terms claim 26 is not yet ripe because it has not made a bona fide attempt to obtain a CUP. (Doc. 17 at 1). 27 Federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction over matters that are ripe. Guatay 28 Christian Fellowship v. Cty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 980 (9th Cir. 2011). Ripeness is 1 a question of timing designed to ensure courts only address live cases or controversies. 2 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 3 U.S. Const. art. III). For some RLUIPA claims, a party challenging zoning permit 4 requirements must apply for a permit and obtain a final decision to determine if the party 5 has suffered a substantial burden. Guatay, 670 F.3d at 876. 6 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim is not ripe because it has not 7 applied for a CUP or obtained a final decision. For support, Defendant relies primarily on 8 Guatay, a case where a church claimed that its religious exercise had been substantially 9 burdened by a zoning ordinance. 670 F.3d at 965. The Ninth Circuit held the claim was 10 not ripe because the church had not applied for a “Use Permit” and, therefore, the court 11 could not determine if the Church had suffered a substantial burden under RLUIPA until 12 at least one application had been made. Id. at 976. The court’s conclusion drew upon the 13 “final decision requirement” in the Supreme Court’s landmark takings case Williamson 14 County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 15 (1985). Id. “[T]he Church’s failure to complete even one full Use Permit application 16 leaves us unable to discern whether there is a true case or controversy, and any resulting 17 injury.” Id. at 980. Defendant also cites to this Court’s decision in Henry v. City of 18 Somerton, 2021 WL 2514686, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2021), in which the Court dismissed 19 a claim for damages resulting from the allegedly substantial burden of a zoning ordinance 20 because plaintiffs failed to apply for a CUP as required by Guatay. (Doc. 17 at 6). 21 Plaintiff argues this matter is distinguishable from Guatay and Henry because it 22 brings a facial challenge to the Ordinance, rather than an as applied challenge. (Doc. 20 23 at 3, 6). Plaintiff cites to Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992) for the 24 proposition that facial challenges to ordinances need not await a final decision because the 25 nature of a facial challenge does not rely on any decision. (Doc. 20); see also Hacienda 26 Valley Mobile Ests. v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Facial 27 challenges are exempt from the first prong of the Williamson ripeness analysis because a 28 facial challenge by its nature does not involve a decision applying the statute or 1 regulation.”). Plaintiff also cites to Calvary Chapel Bible Fellowship v. Cty. of Riverside, 2 2017 WL 11631506, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2017), where a court in this Circuit held that 3 facial challenges under RLUIPA are exempt from the final decision rule because of Yee. 4 (Doc. 20 at 3). 5 The Court finds that the present matter is distinguishable from both Guatay and 6 Henry. In Guatay, the church had abandoned its equal terms claim. 670 F.3d at 968 at n.4. 7 Instead, the particular RLUIPA claim brought by the church was for a substantial burden 8 of its rights. See id. at 976 (“We cannot determine if the Church has suffered a ‘substantial 9 burden’ under RLUIPA until at least one Use Permit application has been submitted.”). 10 Furthermore, the Guatay zoning ordinance was described by the Ninth Circuit as “facially 11 neutral . . . .” Id. at 982. In Henry, the plaintiffs brought what amounted to an as applied 12 claim because the damages plaintiff sought were rooted in the application of a zoning 13 ordinance. 2021 WL 2514686, at *5, *9. Therefore, both Guatay and Henry are not 14 comparable to the present facial challenge. 15 The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s facial challenge is ripe. Because the alleged 16 injury under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision may be present upon a facial reading of the 17 Ordinance, it would not matter whether Plaintiff applied for the CUP. See Yee, 503 U.S. 18 at 534. Therefore, the Court finds it has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim and 19 will proceed to evaluate Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 20 III. Motion for Preliminary Injunction 21 Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 22 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To obtain a preliminary 23 injunction, a plaintiff must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a likelihood 24 of irreparable harm if injunctive relief were denied, (3) that the equities weigh in the 25 plaintiff’s favor, and (4) that the public interest favors injunctive relief. Id. at 20. Having 26 dismissed the FERA claim, the Court focuses its analysis on Plaintiff’s likelihood of a 27 successful RLUIPA claim. 28 a. Likelihood of Success 1 RLUIPA is to be broadly construed in favor of the protection of religious exercise. 2 Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 3 2011). Under RLUIPA, to establish a prima facie equal terms claim, a plaintiff must show 4 (1) the imposition of a land-use regulation, (2) by a government, (3) on a religious 5 institution, and (4) that the regulation treats the religious institution “on less than equal 6 terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” Id. at 1171. 7 The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has demonstrated the first three elements of its 8 prima facie claim. Defendant, a government entity, has imposed the Zoning Ordinance, a 9 land-use regulation, on Plaintiff, a religious institution. The question then is whether the 10 Ordinance treats Plaintiff on less than equal terms with a similarly situated nonreligious 11 entity. Whether an entity is being treated on less than equal terms heavily depends on 12 context. “Equality, ‘except when used of mathematical or scientific relations, signifies not 13 equivalence or identity, but proper relation to relevant concerns.’” Id. at 1172 (quoting 14 River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 (7th Cir. 15 2010) (en banc)). Generally, courts compare how an ordinance treats religious institutions 16 with secular comparators who are “similarly situated with respect to an accepted zoning 17 criteria.” Id. at 1173. Entities may be similarly situated when they share accepted zoning 18 criteria such as “such as parking, vehicular traffic, and generation of tax revenue.” Id. 19 Plaintiff argues that it is similarly situated to public schools and private charter 20 schools, and that the Ordinance treats Plaintiff on less than equal terms than those 21 educational institutions because the Ordinance does not apply to them. (Doc. 6 at 5). 22 Plaintiff cites Section 201(A)(3) of the ordinance, which states that “publicly owned and 23 operated facilities used for essential government purposes” are exempt from all of the 24 Ordinance’s provisions. (Doc. 25 at 2). Therefore, Plaintiff argues, public or charter 25 schools may operate in an R1L district, not because they are permitted uses, but because 26 the Ordinance has exempted them from its requirements. (Id. at 4). 27 Section 201(A)(3) exempts public and charter schools, Plaintiff argues, because 28 Arizona case law “specifically exempts public schools and charter schools from zoning 1 regulation.” (Id.) Indeed, caselaw from the Arizona Supreme Court strongly suggests 2 school districts acting in their governmental capacity are not subject to zoning restrictions, 3 although no court has ever explicitly held this proposition. City of Scottsdale v. Mun. Ct. 4 of City of Tempe, 368 P.2d 637, 639 (Ariz. 1962) (holding that political subdivisions acting 5 in governmental capacity are not subject to zoning laws); Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist. 6 No. 10 v. Harte, 624 P.2d 1281, 1282 (1981) (holding that school districts are political 7 subdivisions of the state). In addition, Arizona law treats charter schools similarly to public 8 schools. A.R.S. § 15-181(A) (“Charter schools are public schools that serve as alternatives 9 to traditional public schools . . . .”). Charters schools may also be publicly funded. See 10 A.R.S. § 15-185. 11 Defendant agrees with Plaintiff that, as a matter of Arizona law, Arizona public and 12 charter schools are not subject to zoning ordinances. (Docs. 25 at 2; 26 at 2). And, to be 13 clear, Plaintiff nowhere poses a challenge to Arizona zoning law. Instead, Plaintiff 14 challenges the Ordinance, which Plaintiff itself argues abides by Arizona law to the extent 15 that it does not claim to exercise zoning authority over public and charter schools. 16 This legal exemption of public and charter schools from zoning regulation raises the 17 question of whether they really are similarly situated to Plaintiff. Assuming the parties’ 18 interpretation of Arizona law is correct,2 Defendant could not legally impose any zoning 19 restrictions on public and charter schools, even if it wanted to. The Court finds that whether 20 an entity is subject to zoning regulations is, by necessity, a key zoning criterion. And 21 because the Ordinance cannot apply to public or charter schools, those entities are not 22 similarly situated to Plaintiff. Instead, Plaintiff is more similarly situated to private 23 schools, which are also subject to zoning regulations and are also required to obtain a CUP 24 to operate in the R1L zone. 25 Plaintiff cites Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 26 28 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2014), for the proposition that it is similarly situated to 27 2 The Court does not necessarily decide that this is the correct interpretation. It is enough 28 to say that even accepting the parties’ interpretation as true, Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits. 1 public schools. (Doc. 6 at 8). There, a religious high school in Washington applied for, 2 and was denied, a variance so that it could install 70-foot-tall light poles on an athletic 3 field. 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1165. The zoning ordinance that required the religious high school 4 to apply for the variance also contained a special exemption for public schools that 5 permitted them to install light poles of up to 100 feet. Id. at 1166. The defendant defended 6 the zoning ordinance by arguing the public-school exception fostered “the provision of 7 public facilities by governmental agencies.” Id. at 1169. But the court rejected this 8 argument because the policy to foster public facilities was not an accepted zoning criterion. 9 Id. at 1169. 10 Corporation is distinguishable from the present matter on several grounds, most 11 notably because Washington public schools, unlike Arizona public schools, were subject 12 to the zoning ordinance. Here, the Ordinance’s exemption of public and charter schools 13 does not stem from Defendant’s policy. The distinction between Plaintiff and public 14 schools is, by Plaintiff’s own argument, a tenet of Arizona law. 15 The Court also notes that if it were to find that Plaintiff is similarly situated to an 16 entity that is legally exempt from all zoning regulations, that would lead to the untenable 17 conclusion that Plaintiff should be equally exempt from all zoning regulations. This is 18 certainly not what RLUIPA requires. See Messiah Baptist Church v. Cty. of Jefferson, 19 State of Colo., 859 F.2d 820, 826 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A church has no constitutional right 20 to be free from reasonable zoning regulations nor does a church have a constitutional right 21 to build its house of worship where it pleases.”). 22 Overall, Plaintiff does not show the Ordinance treats religious institutions on less 23 than equal terms with another similarly situated secular comparator, and the Court finds 24 Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood that it will succeed on the merits of its RLUIPA claim. 25 b. Conclusion 26 Because Plaintiff fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its case, the 27 Court denies its request for a preliminary injunction. The Court will likewise deny 28 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Disposition. IV. Motion to Dismiss 2 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss generally requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’ s || RLUIPA claim because it is not ripe and that the Court decline jurisdiction over the FERA claim. The Court has already declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over □□□□□□□□□□□ 5 || FERA claim because it is a novel and complex issue of Arizona law, and it has held that 6|| Plaintiffs facial attack of the Ordinance under RLUIPA is ripe. Defendant argues, in the 7\| event that this facial attack is ripe, the Court should dismiss any “as applied” challenge 8 || Plaintiff may bring. (Doc. 21 at 6). Plaintiff nowhere argues that it is making an as applied 9|| challenge, and under Guatay, it could not. 10 Accordingly, 11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint shall be 12 || dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 6) is DENIED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition (Doc. 19) is DENIED. 17 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is 18 |} GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 19 Dated this 31st day of January, 2022. 20 21 . Ho □ 22 norable' Diang4. Huretewa 3 United States District Fudge 24 25 26 27 28

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