District of Columbia v. Catholic University of America

397 A.2d 915, 1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 292
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 17, 1979
Docket11580
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 397 A.2d 915 (District of Columbia v. Catholic University of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
District of Columbia v. Catholic University of America, 397 A.2d 915, 1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 292 (D.C. 1979).

Opinion

MACK, Associate Judge:

This appeal comes to us from the Tax Division of the Superior Court. The sole question presented is whether real property located on Lot 804, Square 3894 (Campus School) and Parcel 135/70 (Brady Hall) owned by appellee, Catholic University, is entitled to tax exempt status for the fiscal years 1975 and 1976 as buildings “belonging to and operated by” a university within the meaning of D.C. Code 1973, § 47-801a(j). 1 The trial court found that Campus School was so exempt for both years, and that Brady Hall was exempt at the rates of ninety percent and ninety-nine percent for the fiscal years 1975 and 1976 respectively. We affirm.

*917 The essential facts found by the trial court will be subdivided for purposes of clarity into separate sections pertaining to Campus School and Brady Hall. Initially, it should be noted that the trial court found that the appellee was a nonprofit corporation and school that embraced the generally recognized relationship of teacher and student. The taxable status of real property in the District of Columbia is determined by the use of that property on July 1 of the fiscal year involved. 2

CAMPUS SCHOOL

The taxes in controversy are real property taxes assessed against Campus School for the fiscal year 1975 in the amount of $4,231.48 and for the fiscal year 1976 in the amount of $4,240.76. The only tax which has been paid is the fiscal year tax for 1975.

Prior to 1969, the property was used and operated as an elementary school by teacher trainees who were students of the appellee. In 1969, the property was leased to a nonprofit educational institution (Campus School) which abandoned the premises in June of 1974. Subsequent to June of 1974 and up until the date of trial on October 29, 1975, the appellee used the Campus School as a storage facility for school and office supplies. 3 The supplies were formerly stored in a facility known as Butler Hall and were removed from Butler Hall because it was in need of repair.

The Campus School has 13,500 square feet of floor space consisting of three floors. The first and second floors contain classrooms and offices which have not been used since June of 1974. One-half of the basement space which is one-sixth of the total building space was used for storage. The trial court, in finding total exemption status, rejected appellant’s argument that the nonuse of five-sixths of this building was significant under the specific facts.

BRADY HALL

The taxes in controversy are real property taxes assessed for the fiscal year 1975 in the amount of $5,439.69 and for fiscal year 1976 in the amount of $5,361.44.

Brady Hall is a two-story residential building with a full basement. Prior to 1970, Brady Hall had been used and operated by appellee as a residence hall. Thereafter, and at the date of trial, appellee leased approximately eighty percent of the floor space to Gallaudet College for the operation of the Model Secondary School for the Deaf. Gallaudet used two floors as a residence for students in the Model School. The Model School was operated by Gallaudet under an agreement with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and was not operated for private gain. A portion of the basement or approximately ten percent of Brady Hall was rented to the American Language Academy from September 1973 until September of 1975. Since September of 1975 the Academy had moved its classes from Brady Hall and had maintained only two offices in the facility. The Academy is a profitmaking educational institution that is involved in assisting foreign students, who have been accepted as students in American schools, in learning the English language. The Academy paid the appellee rent in the amount of $13,600 for each school year until September of 1975 and then paid $3,000 a year. The appellee realized a profit of $700 a year in September of 1975 and $300 a year thereafter. The remaining space in Brady Hall was used by appellee for storage which encompassed approximately ten percent of the space prior to September of 1975 and nineteen percent of the space up until trial. On these facts the trial court, questioning only that portion of the property used by the Academy for private gain, used its authority to prorate the exemption. See D.C. Code 1973, § 47-801a(j).

*918 DISCUSSION

The basic issue for resolution is whether a concurrence of ownership and use of property is required for exemption under section 801a(j). The able trial court, dealing with what was purported to be full briefing and argument on the part of the parties, noted that appellant had cited no authority to support its position that property must be owned and used by the same entity. Drawing upon cases interpreting analogous sections, 4 the court ruled as a matter of law that section 801a(j) did not require a concurrence of ownership and use.

For the first time during oral argument in this court, however, appellant has advanced the existence of a regulation specifically addressed to this issue. Thus, Regulation No. 74-35 promulgated by the District of Columbia City Council and becoming law on December 12, 1974 states in pertinent part: 5

REGULATION ESTABLISHING ASSESSMENT AND REASSESSMENT REGULATIONS OF REAL PROPERTY AND RELATED MATTERS
******
Section 133. ELIGIBILITY FOR EXEMPTION
Real property must meet all of the following conditions to be eligible for exemption from taxation.
(a) Title to the real property for which exemption is sought must be recorded in the name of the organization, or institution requesting exemption from taxation on or prior to the effective date of the exemption; and
(b) Must be occupied by and used by the organization or institution seeking exemption for at least one of the types or categories of exempt purposes as defined in the real estate tax exemption act of December 24, 1974 (Section 47-801, D.C. Code). [Emphasis supplied.]

On supplemental briefing appellee has challenged generally the validity of section 133(b) of the regulation as being inconsistent with section 47-801(a) of the Code, relying primarily on the case law in existence at the time of the promulgation of the regulation. However disposed we may be to uphold the validity of section 133(b) of the regulation, we cannot do so if it is inconsistent with the enabling statute as interpreted and the legislative history thereof.

Although appellant has proffered little in the way of definitive argument supporting the validity of the regulation, we are told that it was drafted pursuant to authority granted by the Title IV of Pub. L. No. 93-407, 88 Stat. 1051 (codified at D.C. Code 1975 Supp., § 47-641 et seq.) known as the District of Columbia Real Property Tax Revision Act of 1974, effective September 3, 1974. The preamble to the regulation so states that Pub. L. No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

RUPSHA 2007, LLC v. Kellum
32 A.3d 402 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2011)
District of Columbia v. Brookstowne Community Development Co.
987 A.2d 442 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2010)
Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Ketchikan Indian Corp.
75 P.3d 1042 (Alaska Supreme Court, 2003)
Sisters of the Good Shepherd v. District of Columbia
746 A.2d 310 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2000)
United States Parole Commission v. Noble
693 A.2d 1084 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1997)
District of Columbia v. Willard Associates
655 A.2d 1237 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1995)
Davis v. University of the District of Columbia
603 A.2d 849 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1992)
Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission
590 A.2d 1043 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1991)
Hessey v. Burden
584 A.2d 1 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1990)
Tenants of 738 Longfellow Street, N.W. v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission
575 A.2d 1205 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1990)
Anderson v. William J. Davis, Inc.
553 A.2d 648 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1989)
District of Columbia v. Trustees of Amherst College
515 A.2d 1115 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1986)
District of Columbia v. Pierce Associates, Inc.
462 A.2d 1129 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1983)
Donahue v. District of Columbia
451 A.2d 85 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1982)
Dankman v. District of Columbia Board of Elections & Ethics
443 A.2d 507 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1981)
DeLevay v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission
411 A.2d 354 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1980)
Taylor v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commission
404 A.2d 173 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1979)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
397 A.2d 915, 1979 D.C. App. LEXIS 292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/district-of-columbia-v-catholic-university-of-america-dc-1979.