DiStefano v. Westminster Club

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 27, 2024
• Docket: N20C-09-016 SPL
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DOMINIC P. DISTEFANO, ) DOMINIC V. DISTEFANO, and ) DEBRA C. DISTEFANO, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N20C-09-016 SPL ) WESTMINSTER CLUB, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER

This 27th day of February 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiffs’, Dominic P.

DiStefano,1 Dominic V. DiStefano,2 and Debra C. DiStefano (the “DiStefanos”),

motion for summary judgment,3 Defendant’s, Westminster Club (“Westminster”),

motion for summary judgment,4 the parties’ responses to the cross-motions,5 and

their November 29, 2023, arguments,6 it appears to the Court that:

1 Plaintiffs note that “Dominic Sr.[’s] and Dominic Jr.[’s] names are misspelled ‘Dominic’ instead of ‘Domenic’ in the original deed to the DiStefano property and throughout the pleadings in this case. The spelling ‘Dominic’ is continued to be used herein to avoid confusion.” D.I. 39 (“Distefano Amend. Op. Brf.”) at 6, n.3. The Court continues to use this spelling here. 2 Id. 3 D.I. 39 (“DiStefano Mot.” and “DiStefano Amend. Op. Brf.”). 4 D.I. 36 (“Westminster Mot.” and “Westminster Op. Brf.”). 5 D.I. 45 (“Westminster Ans. Brf.”); D.I. 46 (“DiStefano Ans. Brf.”). 6 D.I. 49. Background

1. On September 1, 2020, the DiStefanos initiated this lawsuit against

Westminster, seeking adverse possession of a part of Westminster’s land where the

DiStefanos had installed a concrete pad and shed in 2006, and a declaratory

judgment asserting their rightful ownership of the land.7

2. Westminster answered the complaint8 and asserted a counterclaim

seeking a declaratory judgment “declar[ing] that [the DiStefanos] may not use [an

existing right of way] except for ingress and egress and not for parking.”9

Westminster asserts “that the Distefano property is subject to a 25-foot right of way

(“ROW”)”10 “to allow unrestricted and unobstructed access to Westminster’s

swimming complex.”11 Westminster contends “[p]arking on the ROW is not a

reasonable use of it[,]”12 and the DiStefanos “have been warned to not park cars in

the ROW but ignore/refuse to do so.”13

7 D.I. 1 (“Compl.”). 8 D.I. 16 (“Ans.”). 9 Id. ¶ 49. 10 Id. ¶ 36. 11 Id. ¶ 42. 12 Id. ¶ 41. 13 Id. ¶ 40. 3. The DiStefanos answered Westminster’s counterclaim, and asserted

their own counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment “to allow [the DiStefanos]

reasonable use of the ROW [and] prohibit [Westminster] from utilizing the ROW

for anything other than access.”14 The DiStefanos acknowledge that their “property

is subject to a 25-foot [ROW]”15 but argue that they “are permitted to use the ROW

on their property so long as such use does not inhibit use of the ROW by

[Westminster].”16 The DiStefanos seek permission “to continue to use the ROW as

historically used.”17

4. On December 15, 2022, the parties settled Plaintiffs’ claim for adverse

possession, leaving only the declaratory judgment counterclaims to be litigated.18

On September 22, 2023, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.19

Standard of Review

5. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 summary judgment will be granted

where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

14 D.I. 19 (“DiStefano Ans.) at 8. 15 Id. at 7, ¶ 6. 16 Id. at 7, ¶ 7. 17 Id. at 8, ¶9. 18 D.I. 24; D.I. 51. 19 D.I. 36 (“Westminster Mot.”); D.I. 37 (“DiStefanos Mot.”). material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”20

Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute or if it

“seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the

application of the law to the circumstances.”21 The Court will not “indulge in

speculation and conjecture; a motion for summary judgment is decided on the record

presented and not on evidence potentially possible.”22 “Where cross motions for

summary judgment are filed and neither party argues the existence of a genuine issue

of material fact, the Court shall deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation

for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with them.”23 The questions

before the Court “are questions of law not of fact, and the parties by filing cross

motions for summary judgement have in effect stipulated that the issues raised by

the motions are ripe for a decision on the merits.”24

20 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 21 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del. 1962). 22 In re. Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Del. Super. 1986), aff’d sub. nom. Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987). 23 Radulski v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2020 WL 8676027, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2020) (cleaned up). 24 Id. (cleaned up). Analysis

I. The Superior Court’s Jurisdiction To Address Easements On Real Property Through A Declaratory Judgment Action

6. The parties have framed their dispute as a declaratory judgment action

under Chapter 65 of Title 10 and contend that this Court is an appropriate forum for

addressing, and resolving, their dispute.25 “The decision to entertain an action for

declaratory judgment is discretionary with a trial court, the only limitation being that

the Court cannot abuse its discretion.”26 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides

“prospective, i.e., forward-looking relief,”27 but it neither broadens nor narrows the

jurisdiction of this court; “[j]urisdiction under the Act hinges upon whether law or

equity would independently have jurisdiction without reference to the Act.”28 And

where the declaratory judgement is sought “within a common law or statutorily

authorized cause of action,” this Court maintains jurisdiction.29 Within these

25 D.I. 27, 28. While the agreement of the parties, in and of itself, does not suffice to confer jurisdiction upon this Court, the Court is satisfied that it may enter a declaratory judgment as to the scope of the easement in the context of the cross claims presented here. 26 Burris v. Cross, 583 A.2d 1364, 1372 (Del. Super. 1990) (cleaned up). 27 Employers Insurance Co. of Wassau v. First State Orthopaedics, P.A., 2024 WL 74148, at *11 (Del. Jan 8, 2024) (internal citations omitted). 28 Burris, 583 A.2d at 1376-77. 29 Id. at 1377 (emphasis in original). established parameters, an action to establish the scope of an easement may be within

the Superior Court’s jurisdiction.30

7. Here, Westminster contends the DiStefanos “physically interfered with

their right to possession and use” of the easement and, thus, the scope of the

easement may be assessed within a trespass action.31 While this Court may be

authorized to address the scope of the easement within a cause of action within this

Court’s jurisdiction, it is unlikely this declaratory judgement will fully resolve the

parties’ concerns.32 In the absence of “mutual accommodation,” the parties may

need to seek to define the day-to-day contours of the easement; to the extent

additional prospective judicial guidance may be required, the Court of Chancery

instructs that “[a]n injunction is a proper way to prevent continued interference with

an easement.”33

30 Id. at 1377. 31 C.f. Burris, 583 A.2d at 1377. In Burris, this Court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the scope of the easement was not “determinable within a common law or statutorily authorized cause of action.” Id. at 1377-78. 32 Rather than dismissing this action and directing the parties to start anew in the Court of Chancery, the Court exercises its discretion to address the parties claims within the scope of its jurisdiction. “It is clear that one action in Chancery could resolve all the issues, formulate the proper equitable and legal remedies and enforce those remedies if necessary.” Burris, 583 A.2d at 1374. “In the case at hand, an action in Chancery appears to be not only ‘equally serviceable,’ but indeed superior to the remedy available in this Court.” Id. at 1376. 33 Bogia v. Kleiner, 2019 WL 3761647, at *9 (quoting Rowe v. Everett, 2001 WL 1019366, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug 22, 2001)). Tellingly, all Delaware cases cited as authority on this issue by both parties emanate from Court of Chancery actions, and II. A Retrospective Assessment of the Scope of the Easement Burdening 810 Cheltenham Road

8. The DiStefanos’ property is “[subject] to a twenty-five (25) foot right

of way along the northeasterly property line leading from Cheltenham Road to lands

of the Westminster Club.”34 “Deeds are specialized forms of contract, and like other

contracts are not subject to construction unless the language is ambiguous.”35 By its

terms, this easement permits access to and from the Westminster Club over the

property presently owned by the DiStefanos. The parties do not contend, and the

Court does not find, that further interpretation on this point is warranted.

no Superior Court authority is offered to support this Court prospectively defining the scope of an easement as it appears the parties’ desire. This Court may define the scope of an easement in the context of a matter at law. See, e.g., Pryde v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 2009 WL 388942 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2009) (addressing the scope of an easement within the context of claims of negligence, timber trespass (a statutory claim), trespass, and conversion). The Court of Chancery may address the scope of an easement prospectively through an injunction or declaratory judgment. See Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *9. This is so because “[j]urisdiction under the [Declaratory Judgment] Act hinges upon whether law or equity would independently have jurisdiction without reference to the Act.” Burris, 583 A.2d at 1376-77. 34 DiStefano Amend. Op. Brf., Ex. A. (2005 Deed, 1973 Deed). In the 1967 Deed transferring the parcel acquired by the DiStefanos from Eastern Developers of Delaware, Inc. to Independence Mall, Inc., provides for a perpetual “right of ingress over a 25 foot wide right of way, the Northeasterly side of which is the Northeasterly boundary line of the hereinabove described parcel.” To the extent there is an argument that the easement only permits ingress, the Court finds that egress is a necessary complement to that right and, thus, the extant right-of-way easement contemplates ingress and egress. 35 Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *6. 9. In its simplest terms, the issue before the Court is whether the

DiStefanos may park vehicles on a portion of the easement. And, the short answer

is, yes. The Delaware Supreme Court has explained:

Generally speaking, the owners of a servient estate burdened by an easement in favor of a dominant estate may use the premises as they choose, but may not interfere with the proper and reasonable use by the owner of the dominant estate of their dominant right. To determine what constitutes interference with one’s reasonable use of an easement, the court must consider the purposes for which the easement was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement and the manner in which it has been used and occupied.36

There is no record evidence that the DiStefanos’ parking along one side of the

easement with one side of the parked cars’ tires off the paved roadway unreasonably

interfered with Westminster’s ingress or egress. Westminster’s hypothetical

scenarios are not far-fetched, but there is no record evidence to support their

occurrence, and this Court must not engage in speculation or conjecture when

addressing a motion for summary judgment. Of course, what is reasonable under

varying circumstances may require a more nuanced prospective assessment beyond

what this Court may provide in this declaratory judgment action.

10. To resolve easement disputes, the Delaware Supreme Court has turned

to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 for guidance.37 The

36 Vandeleigh Industries v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, LLC, 901 A.2d 91, 96-97 (Del. 2006) (cleaned up). 37 Id. at 100-01. Restatement suggests “maximizing the aggregate utility of the servitude and the

servient estate . . . . Aggregate utility is generally produced by interpreting an

easement to strike a balance that maximizes its utility in serving the purpose intended

while minimizing the impact on the servient estate.”38 Further, “[t]he person who

holds the land burdened by a servitude is entitled to make all uses of the land that

are not prohibited by the servitude and that do not interfere unreasonably by the uses

authorized by the easement.”39 The Restatement also addresses situations where the

servient owner locates improvements upon an easement and instructs “[w]hether the

improvement is an unreasonable interference with the servitude depends on the

character of the improvement and the likelihood that it will make future development

of the easement difficult. If the improvement is temporary and easily removed, it is

generally not unreasonable.”40 The Court must not interpret a servitude in a manner

that would deprive the easement owner “that to which it was legally entitled.”41

11. Thus, the DiStefanos, owners of property burdened by an easement (the

“servient estate”), may use the property as they choose, provided they do not

unreasonably interfere with Westminster’s, the easement holder (the “dominant

38 Id. at 100 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. b). 39 Id. at 101 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. c). 40 Id. 41 Vandeleigh, 901 A.2d at 98. estate”), reasonable use.42 The Court will assess “the purposes for which the

easement was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement,

and the manner in which the easement has been used and occupied”43 in determining

whether the DiStefanos’ use of a portion of the easement for occasional parking

constituted an unreasonable interference.

12. Since 1964, Westminster, a seasonal swim and recreation club, has

owned the property located at 808 Cheltenham Road, and has used the easement

over the property at 810 Cheltenham Road for its members’ ingress and egress.44

During the summer months, club members use the easement every day of the week.45

While the pool is closed from October through April, members use the easement on

a more limited basis to access the tennis and basketball courts and occasional events

on Westminster’s grounds.46 Westminster also uses the easement during the “off

season” for mail delivery, maintenance, and to perform repairs to club grounds and

facilities.47

42 Id. at 96. 43 Id. at 96-97 (cleaned up). 44 Westminster Op. Brf. at 3-4. 45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. 13. In 1973, Dominic V. (“Dominic Sr.”) and Marie DiStefano purchased

the property at 810 Cheltenham Road encumbered by the “25 foot right of way along

the northeasterly property line leading from Cheltenham Road to lands of the

Westminster Club.”48 A 2005 deed conveyed the property to Dominic Sr., Domenic

P. (“Dominic Jr.”) and Debra C. DiStefano with the same express easement.49

14. A 21 to 22-foot-wide portion of the 25-foot-wide easement is paved

asphalt.50 The DiStefanos’ driveway connects their two-car garage to the easement;

the driveway can accommodate up to four parked cars.51 Neither the physical nature

and situation of the easement nor the manner it has been used or occupied have

changed in any material way throughout the DiStefanos’ ownership of the

property.52 Former Westminster Club President, Wayne Surles, testified that the

nature of easement is the same as it had been in 1984.53

15. Since acquiring the property at 810 Cheltenham Road in 1973, the

DiStefanos have on occasion parked, and permitted their guests to park, on the

48 Compl. at Exh. A (“Original Deed”); Westminster Mot. at 2. 49 Compl. at Exh. B (“2005 Deed”) at 2; Westminster Mot. at 4. 50 DiStefano Mot. at Exh. E (“Dominic Jr. Dep.”) at 24. 51 Dominic Jr. Dep. at 15-17. 52 DiStefano Mot. at Exh. K (“Surles Dep.”) at 13-15; see also, DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, Dominic Jr. October 11, 2004, Letter. 53 Surles Dep. at 13-14. easement between their driveway and the Westminster parking lot.54 Beginning in

the 1980s, Dominic Sr. often parked his pickup truck on the right side of the

easement.55 When the DiStefanos have room to park their vehicles in their driveway,

they do so.56 And when the DiStefanos park vehicles on the easement, they position

them in a single-file line with “a tire on the grass.”57 The easement is described as

sufficiently wide to accommodate three cars of ordinary size.58 No evidence has

been offered to establish the width or length of the DiStefanos’ occasional

interference with the easement or that the DiStefano’s occasional interference denied

Westminster club members access to the club.

16. The DiStefanos maintain that while they are entitled to park on the

easement, Westminster’s use is limited to ingress and egress,59 and Westminster does

54 Id. 55 Surles Dep. at 14-15, 20-21; see also Dominic Jr. Dep. at 39. 56 Dominic Jr. Dep at 18. 57 Dominic Jr. Dep. at 38-39. 58 Dominic Jr. Dep. at 40 (“[M]y math shows that you could have three other vehicles of standard width traverse up and down [the easement] simultaneously.”) In fact, the proffered calculation allows for the width of a parked vehicle in addition to the three “traversing” vehicles. Id. 59 Dominic Jr. Dep. at 9, 29; DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, Dominic Jr. October 11, 2004, Letter (“This should be nothing new to the Board or the Club membership since my late mother would periodically keep everyone aware of this and personally install no-parking signs during swim meets herself over thirty odd years of membership”). not contend that it is entitled to park on the property.60 In the years following the

DiStefanos’ acquisition of the burdened property, Westminster recognized the

DiStefanos’ assertion of “parking privileges,”61 and assisted in moving Westminster

member or guest vehicles off of the easement at the DiStefanos’ request.62 There

does not appear to be a change in circumstances in the use of either property; rather,

new ownership of the burdened property and new leadership of the Westminster

Club appear to have prompted the parties to seek guidance from the Court, in the

form of a declaratory judgment, as to the permitted use of the easement. As

discussed above, while the Court may speak to the general rights pertaining to this

easement, it is not jurisdictionally positioned to define the parties’ prospective rights

more granularly.

17. In 2004, Westminster informed the DiStefanos that their parking on the

easement during the summer season interfered with ingress and egress of traffic.63

60 Westminster Ans. Brf. at 7. 61 Surles Dep. at 14-15. 62 Dominic Jr. Dep at 29-30; see also DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, September 7, 2004, Letter (If someone parks on the road and it is brought to the attention of the club employees on duty, attempts will be made to have the vehicles removed”). 63 Compl. at Exh. F at 1; see DiStefano Mot. at Exh. G, September 7, 2004, Letter (“In addition, the Club requires that no one else (including residents and guests of the DiStefano household) park on the road for the Pool Season, Memorial Day weekend through Labor Day weekend, inclusive. This is necessary to provide room for emergency vehicle access and Club traffic”); see also Dominic Jr. Dep. at 41. But there is no record evidence of any vehicles or pedestrians being denied access

to the Westminster Club due to a DiStefano vehicle parked on a portion of the

easement.64 The Court does not minimize Westminster’s theoretical concerns, but

it finds no evidence of an actual interference with the easement (a denial of access

to the Westminster grounds) caused by the DiStefanos’ parking.65

18. The easement exists to provide access to the Club. The parties’

submissions establish that the easement has been consistently used by Westminster

for club access and occupied by the DiStefanos for parking vehicles. For over 30

years – from 1973 until 2004 – the record reveals the DiStefanos and Westminster

engaged in a “spirit of mutual accommodation.”66 That spirit has waned.

Nonetheless, no evidence exists that the DiStefanos’ limited parking has

unreasonably interfered with Westminster’s use of the easement. Returning to the

Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9, specifically comment c, the Court

likens the DiStefanos’ parking on a side of the easement to the erection of a

64 Dominic Jr. Dep. at 30 (“That right-of-way has never been obstructed either way. They have never obstructed it so I couldn’t use it. And I’ve never obstructed it so they couldn’t use it”). 65 Id.; Dominic Jr. Dep. at 42 (“There’s never been a problem accessing that. There has never been a vehicle or a pedestrian that could not get to the pool property”). 66 Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *9. “It is assumed that the owner of an easement and the possessor of the servient tenement are to exercise their respective rights and privileges in a spirt of mutual accommodation.” Id. (quoting Baer v. Dallas Theater Center, 330 S.W. 2d 214, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)). temporary improvement to the property.67 Motor vehicles, by their very nature, are

easily removed as circumstances require; periodic, high-volume pool events may

reasonably require removal of these temporary obstructions so as not to interfere

with Westminster’s ingress and egress.

Conclusion

In their motion for summary judgment, the DiStefanos ask this Court to

declare:

(1) that the Westminster Club’s use of the right-of-way on the DiStefano’s property is expressly limited to ingress and the Westminster Club is not permitted to park on the right-of-way on the DiStefano’s property, and (2) that the DiStefanos are permitted to use the right-of-way on their property the way they have historically used it, including parking, so long as they do not interference with ingress and egress to Westminster Club[.]68

Westminster, on the other hand, seeks a declaration that “parking on the [easement]

by the [DiStefanos] interferes with the reasonable use and enjoyment of the

[easement] by the [Westminster] Club and is not permitted according to the plain

terms of the [easement].”69 The record does not demonstrate that the DiStefanos’

parking on a portion of the easement unreasonably interferes with Westminster’s

ingress and egress to the pool property and they may continue to park on the

67 See, Vandeleigh Industries, 901 A.2d at 96-97 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 cmt. c). 68 DiStefano Amend. Op. Brf. at 18. 69 Westminster Op. Brf. at 17. easement, in the manner described, so long as they do not interfere with

Westminster’s ingress or egress. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED,70 and Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is DENIED.

To be sure, this Court’s declaration does not provide the DiStefanos unlimited

license to park as they wish on the easement. Rather, based on the undisputed facts

presented to the Court, the DiStefanos’ parking has not unreasonably interfered with

Westminster’s easement. Should the parties require additional, prospective, judicial

guidance, that must be sought in another forum. In the meantime, the Court

encourages the parties to engage in meaningful discussion in the spirit of mutual

accommodation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________ Sean P. Lugg, Judge

70 Westminster does not contend that it is permitted to use the easement for parking. Westminster Ans. Brf. at 7; but see, Bogia, 2019 WL 3761647, at *7. In Bogia, the Court of Chancery referenced secondary sources supporting the proposition that the owner of the dominant estate may have parking rights on an easement equivalent to those of the owner of land upon which the easement runs. Id. (quoting M.O. Regensteiner, Right To Park Vehicles On Private Way, 37 A.L.R. 2d 944 §2[b] (1954)). This proposition is not advanced by Westminster in this proceeding.