Disciplinary Counsel v. Ulinski

106 Ohio St. 3d 53
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 3, 2005
DocketNo. 2004-2115
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 106 Ohio St. 3d 53 (Disciplinary Counsel v. Ulinski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ulinski, 106 Ohio St. 3d 53 (Ohio 2005).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Christopher Karl Ulinski of Akron, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0046731, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1990. On November 21, 2003, we suspended respondent from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(4) upon notice that he had been convicted of a felony. See In re Ulinski, 100 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2003-Ohio-6184, 799 N.E.2d 173.

{¶ 2} On February 5, 2004, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline heard the cause and, based on comprehensive stipulations, made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation, all of which the board adopted.

Misconduct

{¶ 3} On July 31, 2003, respondent pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud in violation of Section 371, Title 18, U.S.Code. He was sentenced to probation for a term of two years and ordered to participate in home confinement with electronic monitoring for six months. Respondent was also ordered to pay $137,511.50 in restitution, although this requirement was not made a condition of his probation.

{¶ 4} Respondent’s conviction followed his affiliation in 1992 with Andrew P. Bodnar, whom we disbarred for financial misdealing in Akron Bar Assn. v. Bodnar (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 399, 739 N.E.2d 297. In 1992, however, Bodnar was a practicing lawyer, securities salesman, financial planner, and tax preparer. Gregory J. Best, a broker-dealer registered with the United States Securities and [54]*54Exchange Commission, sold securities in Akron from 1992 through 1997, and in 1998, he bought and took over part of Bodnar’s operation.

{¶ 5} The parties stipulated that Bodnar, Best, and Ulinski engaged in activities from 1994 through April 1998 that led to Bodnar’s and Best’s indictment and to the information in which respondent was charged. According to the stipulations, the group conspired through a Ponzi scheme to defraud investors in Ohio and other states. A Ponzi scheme is perpetrated with fabricated investment deals in which investors are paid not with actual dividends and principal, but with money on loan from another source, usually new investors. See Cunningham v. Brown (1924), 265 U.S. 1, 7-9, 44 S.Ct. 424-425, 68 L.Ed. 873, for a discussion of the original Ponzi swindle.

{¶ 6} Bodnar organized and presented seminars on estate planning to attract potential investors. Ulinski assisted with the seminars and provided legal counsel, including the preparation of trusts, to interested attendees. Through their attorney-client relationships and services, Bodnar and Ulinski learned the extent and nature of unsuspecting clients’ assets. Afterward, Bodnar, Best, and agents other than respondent approached the seminar clients and persuaded them to invest in their fraudulent scheme, which eventually approached or exceeded $41 million. The parties stipulated to some details of this scheme:

{¶ 7} “The investments consisted of the following: (1) QuickStart Promissory Notes, supposedly to make bridge loans to QuickStart; (2) International Aerotech Promissory Notes, supposedly to make bridge loans to International Aerotech; (3) CBT and related entities; (4) [“The London Deal”]; and, (5) Hamilton-Larking, LLC and Laurex bridge loans.

{¶ 8} “From 1995 through 1998, Bodnar and Best * * * sold so-called ‘bridge loan’ investments, which they purported would use investors’ funds in order to form a pool of funds which would be advanced to various and mostly well-known companies, as [supposed] short-term loans. [Bodnar and Best] represented that payment of high interest rates would be made, and promissory notes were signed by investors, with Bodnar and Best representing that investments would be repaid with significant interest, usually within 30 to 90 days. Bodnar and Best would represent that the investments were safe and secure, because there were stocks which would be used as collateral to protect the investments.

{¶ 9} “In truth, Bodnar and Best knew, and, at some point, Ulinski knew there was a Ponzi scheme, and that investors were paid monies received from other bridge loan investors, done in a manner to conceal the fraudulent nature, and to lull investors into a false sense of security, so as to quiet any complaining investors, and to keep them from complaining to law enforcement authorities, and to induce investors to keep their principal] invested, and to have them increase investments. In fact, there was no collateral securing any of these investments, [55]*55except QuickStart Technologies, which was purportedly secured by QuickStart stock, purchased by Bodnar in his name, but purchased with investors’ money. Additionally, Bodnar and Best, and ultimately Ulinski, knew that, even this so-called collateral was grossly insufficient.

{¶ 10} “Bank accounts at Key Bank were opened with Ulinski listed as the escrow agent, causing a false impression to investors that Ulinski was acting as a fiduciary who was protecting the interests of the investors. On February 13, 1995, Ulinski began issuing large checks to Bodnar out of Ulinski’s Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”) account with Key Bank, into which Ulinski had deposited large amounts of investors’ funds, as escrow agent and fiduciary for said investors’ funds. A February 13, 1995 Ulinski check, payable to Bodnar for $50,000.00, was identified as ‘QuickStart overage,’ but the source of the check was entirely from investor funds. Additional checks were written from February 16, 1995 through December 31, 1997, with the source for all these checks coming from investors’ deposits, in violation of a fiduciary duty, all of which aided Bodnar in perpetrating the Ponzi scheme.

{¶ 11} “Ulinski also drafted a number of legal documents, including promissory notes and bridge loan agreements, which he knew [at some time] to be false and fictitious, and which were intended to be provided to investors by Bodnar and Best, and other securities salesmen and other co-conspirators.

{¶ 12} “On a few occasions, Ulinski engaged in a fee-splitting arrangement with Best and other salesmen, wherein he would split a portion of his legal fees in return for their referral of their securities customers. On some occasions, Best also paid a portion of his fees to the [respondent], Ulinski, in return for his referral of legal clients.”

{¶ 13} The parties stipulated and the board found that respondent’s involvement in this fraudulent investment scheme had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (barring illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (barring conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 5-101(A)(l) (barring a lawyer, except with a client’s consent after full disclosure, from accepting employment where the lawyer’s conflicting interests may reasonably affect the lawyer’s judgment on the client’s behalf), and 9-102(A) (requiring a lawyer to maintain client funds in a separate, identifiable bank account).

Sanction

{¶ 14} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board considered the mitigating and aggravating factors of respondent’s case.

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Bluebook (online)
106 Ohio St. 3d 53, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/disciplinary-counsel-v-ulinski-ohio-2005.