Disciplinary Counsel v. Dunn.

2018 Ohio 4283, 116 N.E.3d 1272, 154 Ohio St. 3d 580
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 24, 2018
Docket2018-0813
StatusPublished

This text of 2018 Ohio 4283 (Disciplinary Counsel v. Dunn.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Disciplinary Counsel v. Dunn., 2018 Ohio 4283, 116 N.E.3d 1272, 154 Ohio St. 3d 580 (Ohio 2018).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

*580 *1273 {¶ 1} Respondent, Howard Alan Dunn, of Solon, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0021621, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1978. In November 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that while serving as a magistrate in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Dunn violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to accurately report his work hours and leave on his time card.

{¶ 2} The parties entered into stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors and jointly recommended that Dunn be suspended from the practice of law for six months, all stayed. Based on those stipulations and the evidence adduced at the hearing, a panel of the Board of Professional Conduct agreed that Dunn had committed the charged misconduct and found that the parties' recommended sanction was reasonable and appropriate. The board adopted the panel's report and recommendation of a six-month suspension stayed in its entirety on the condition that Dunn engage in no further misconduct, and no objections have been filed.

{¶ 3} We accept the board's findings and recommended sanction.

Misconduct

{¶ 4} As a magistrate, Dunn was required to work eight hours per day, 40 hours per week. If he worked less than eight hours a day, he was required to use his accrued leave time to make up the difference. Pursuant to the juvenile court's flexible-schedule policy, Dunn submitted a request to work from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. beginning in December 2015. The court approved his request.

{¶ 5} Beginning on June 13, 2016, and continuing every two weeks thereafter, Dunn received an automated e-mail from Kronos, the court's electronic time-card program, stating:

*581 Please review and approve your time card; your signature indicates that you have verified and approved the accuracy of your time card. Please be advised that falsification of electronic time records is a work rule violation and may result in discipline including removal from employment.

The juvenile court audited the biweekly time cards that Dunn submitted from March 15 to September 2, 2016. The court compared the times he reported on his time cards to a record of his employee-identification-keycard swipes and video footage from courthouse security cameras. The audit showed that Dunn had falsely entered his start or end time into his Kronos time card on 90 of the 122 work days during that period and received $5,051.04 in pay for 121.8 hours that he had not worked.

{¶ 6} Dunn's time discrepancies ranged from a few minutes to over five hours and inflated his work time by an average of 1.35 hours per day. For example, on March 31, 2016, Dunn entered the parking garage at 8:18 a.m. and left the parking garage at 10:52 a.m. On his time card, however, Dunn falsely reported that he arrived at 7:30 a.m. and left at 3:30 p.m. that day, thereby inflating his work time by 5.43 hours. Despite the fact that he failed to accurately record the times that he commenced work, ended work, or used leave *1274 time, Dunn personally approved 10 of the 13 audited time cards.

{¶ 7} At a September 2016 disciplinary hearing conducted by his employer, Dunn submitted a written statement explaining that nausea and sleeplessness-the side effects of cancer treatment-had caused him to be late for work and to take longer breaks. He also testified that his absences had not affected his job performance and that he had kept current with his assignments.

{¶ 8} Following that hearing, Dunn was found to have violated seven workplace rules prohibiting (1) falsification of documents, (2) dishonesty and misrepresentation, (3) misuse or theft of county property, (4) conduct unbecoming a court employee, (5) job abandonment or failing to report for duty as scheduled, (6) leaving one's work area without permission, and (7) other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. He resigned from his employment effective October 3, 2016.

{¶ 9} Dunn attempted to make restitution in October 2016 by personally delivering a cashier's check to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Although the court initially returned the check to Dunn, it eventually accepted his payment.

{¶ 10} In accord with the parties' stipulations, the board found that Dunn had violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 (requiring a judge or magistrate to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of *582 impropriety) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).

{¶ 11} We accept these findings.

Sanction

{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.

{¶ 13} As aggravating factors, the parties and board agree that Dunn acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and engaged in a pattern of misconduct. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (3). Agreed mitigating factors include the absence of prior discipline; a timely, good faith effort to make restitution; full and free disclosure to the board and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings; and the imposition of other penalties or sanctions (i.e., Dunn's loss of employment as a magistrate). See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (3), (4), and (6). The board also found that Dunn submitted positive character evidence. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5).

{¶ 14} "Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety." Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, comment 1. For that reason, judges and other persons authorized to perform judicial functions-like magistrates-are subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct. See, e.g. , Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum , 133 Ohio St.3d 500 , 2012-Ohio-4700 ,

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Related

Disciplinary Counsel v. Elum
2012 Ohio 4700 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2012)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kramer
2016 Ohio 5734 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2016)

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Bluebook (online)
2018 Ohio 4283, 116 N.E.3d 1272, 154 Ohio St. 3d 580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/disciplinary-counsel-v-dunn-ohio-2018.