Director of Highways v. Caperton

8 Ohio App. 2d 128
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 29, 1965
DocketNo. 344
StatusPublished

This text of 8 Ohio App. 2d 128 (Director of Highways v. Caperton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Director of Highways v. Caperton, 8 Ohio App. 2d 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1965).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

The state of Ohio appropriated for highway purposes approximately 20 acres of land belonging to Robert T. Caperton and Elvetta L. Caperton. There was a large deposit of sand and gravel underlying this land, which, at the time of the appropriation, was being removed by a sublessee, M. S. [129]*129Worth, doing business as Lodi Sand and Gravel Company. ^ The Capertons had originally leased the land to W. W. McVicker and J. D. McVicker for the purpose of removing sand and gravel therefrom. These latter, or primary, lessees subleased the land to Worth, who began the extraction of sand and gravel by erecting various buildings and digging a settling pond on the premises. There were no buildings taken, or damaged, in this appropriation. The highway separates the principal building from a portion of the sand and gravel pit, and the highway appropriation caused this settling pond to become smaller in area.

After the filing of the intention to appropriate the land for highway purposes, the Capertons reached an agreement with the state of Ohio with reference to the value of the land taken, and the damage to the residue. That amount was fixed at $160,000, which sum of money was paid to the Clerk of Courts of Medina County, who holds such sum pending a determination as to the amount to which each of the claimants is entitled. The Court of Common Pleas of Medina County made the following distribution of this money: Worth, $86,349; Capertons, $41,354; and McVickers, $32,297.

It is from this distribution that an appeal on questions of law is lodged in this court by the Capertons; and a cross-appeal is lodged by the appellee Worth.

The rent fixed in both the primary lease, and the sublease, is as follows: The McVickers are obligated to pay the Caper-tons $500 per year as ground rent, and eight cents per cubic yard for the material extracted; Worth is obligated to pay the McVickers $750 per year, and twelve cents per cubic yard for the sand and gravel extracted. There is a provision for the removal of soil at a lesser royalty. No minimum amount of extraction is required in either lease. The leases are for a period of 20 years, with an option for ten additional years, although either lessee may terminate* without penalty, by not paying the yearly rent. The leases give only the right to remove the sand and gravel, and give no ownership in those materials in the ground. The Worth lease expires a few months before the Mc-Vicker lease.

There are certain fixed principles with respect to the rights of these parties in appropriation matters, and recent Ohio cases have carefully set them out,

[130]*130In paragraph one of the syllabus in the case of Sowers, Supt., v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, the Supreme Court said:

“A land appropriation proceeding is essentially one in rem; it is not the taking of the rights of persons in the ordinary sense but an appropriation of physical property. In the event there are several interests or estates in the parcel of real estate appropriated, the proper method of fixing the value of each interest or estate is to determine the value of the property as a whole, with a later apportionment of the amount awarded among the several owners according to their respective interests, rather than to take each interest or estate as a unit and fix the value thereof separately. The separate interests or estates as between the condemner and the owners are regarded as one estate. (In re Appropriation by Supt. of Public Works, 152 Ohio St. 65, approved and followed.)”

In the syllabus of the case of Queen City Realty Co. v. Linzell, Dir., 166 Ohio St. 249, the court said:

“1. In a proceeding to have a jury determine the amount to be paid as the value of real estate being appropriated for state highway purposes pursuant to the power of eminent domain, any evidence as to the value of an outstanding leasehold interest in such real estate is incompetent.
“2. In such a proceeding, evidence as to the reasonable rental value of such real estate may be admissible. ’ ’

It can be noted that there may be some situations where very little, if anything, is left for the owner of the fee. If the rental value has increased greatly, such lessee may obtain all, or the lion’s share, of the award.

What would a prospective purchaser of the McVickers lease pay to the McVickers for the right to receive a ground rent of $250 a year, plus a royalty of four cents a cubic yard for material removed from the premises, bearing in mind that the sublessee need not continue to take the material from the ground, and that such material will be exhausted prior to the expiration date of the lease? To determine this figure, we must know how much material is in that portion of the lands which was taken, and if, except for the highway, it is economically feasible to remove such material from that portion of the land. It is possible that this land would not be economically productive because of its location, or the lack of sufficieut material yj [131]*131the subspil, or the poor quality of such material. The witnesses herein assumed a steady market, a stable market and a continuing supply of material. We have, however, a highly speculative problem as to the economic value of this lease as compared to the rental value.

The royalty paid by an operator of a sand and gravel pit in this vicinity for the privilege of extracting such material is twelve cents a cubic yard, plus a nominal ground rent. Thus, the McVickers have an economic advantage in both respects, for they receive $250 a year more than they are required to pay, and a bonus of four cents a cubic yard for the material Worth takes out of the ground; and if he takes no material, neither the McVickers nor the Capertons receive such payment. Thus the payment to the McVickers, and to the Capertons, depends upon the willingness of Worth to continue his operation, as well as upon the quantity, and quality, of the material to be removed. In other words, if it remains economically feasible for Worth, or any other person similarly situated, to operate this sand and gravel pit, there is then the flow of royalty payments to those others who receive income.

As to the operator, Worth, his lease is made less valuable by the reduction in size of the settling pond, and by the separation of one part, from another part, of the productive lands.

In order for Worth now to use some of the facilities necessary to process the sand and gravel for sale, he is required to truck the material a considerable distance. This, too, makes his lease less valuable and less desirable economically. The appropriation has thus taken not only some material which Worth probably would remove, but it also has made it more difficult to process the material on a part of the remaining land.

The loss of the efficient use of the structures Worth erected is an injury that surely reduces the present value of his lease, as compared to its value before the highway appropriation. Worth said that the improvements made on the land cost bim about $200,000. Neither the McVickers nor the Capertons could receive any royalty payments unless such improvements, or facilities, were first erected. Worth has the right to remove all of these facilities at the expiration of his lease.

In paragraphs two and three of the syllabus of Frownfelter v. Graham, 169 Ohio St. 309, the court said:

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Related

Sowers v. Schaeffer
99 N.E.2d 313 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1951)
Sowers v. Schaeffer
87 N.E.2d 257 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1949)
Preston v. Pecsok
194 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1963)

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Bluebook (online)
8 Ohio App. 2d 128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/director-of-highways-v-caperton-ohioctapp-1965.