Diondra Williams v. Dumaguindin

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMay 18, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-09042
StatusUnknown

This text of Diondra Williams v. Dumaguindin (Diondra Williams v. Dumaguindin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diondra Williams v. Dumaguindin, (C.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DIONDRA WILLIAMS as G.A.L for Case No. 2:20-CV-09042 VAP (ASx) “S.M.”, SOLEMULI AFAESE as Consol. w/ 2:20-CV-09350 VAP (ASx) 12 G.A.L. for “A.M.”, & IRENE Consol. w/ 5:20-CV-02252 VAP (ASx) 13 Plaintiffs. [Hon. Dist. Judge Virginia A. Phillips Mag. Judge Alka Sagar] 14 v. [DISCOVERY MATTER] 15 PASADENA P.D. OFC. EDWIN DUMAGUINDIN, OFC. C. ROSA PROTECTIVE ORDER 16 DUMAGUINDIN, CITY OF PASADENA, & CHIEF JOHN PEREZ, 17 individually and in their official capacities and DOES 1-10 inclusive, Complaint Filed: 11/26/19 18 Trial Date: Not Yet Set Defendants. 19 ARCHIE BARRY, individually and as successor-in-interest for Decedent, 20 Anthony McClain 21 Plaintiff. 22 v. 23 CITY OF PASADENA, OFFICER EDWIN DUMAGUINDIN, and DOES 24 1 through 10, inclusive, 25 Defendants. 26 BAM, a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem Kimberly Jenkins, 27 individually and as successor in interest to ANTHONY GUYDALE McCLAIN, 1 Plaintiffs. 2 v. 3 CITY OF PASADENA, PASADENA 4 POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHIEF OF POLICE JOHN PEREZ, OFFICERS 5 EDWIN DUMAGUINDIN, and DOES 1-10, 6 Defendants. 7 8 9 10 1. A. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS. 11 Discovery in this action are likely to involve production of confidential, 12 proprietary, or private information for which special protection frompublicdisclosure 13 and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting or defending this litigation may 14 be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 15 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. 16 The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on 17 all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords from public 18 disclosure and use extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled to 19 confidential treatment under the applicable legal principles. 20 The parties further acknowledge, as set forth below, that this Stipulated 21 Protective Order creates no entitlement to file confidential information under seal, 22 except to the extent specified herein; Central District Local Rules 79-5.1 and 79-5 23 set(s) forth theprocedures that must be followed and the standards that will be applied 24 when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal. 25 Nothing in this Stipulation or associated Order shall be construed so as to 26 require or mandate that any Party disclose or produce privileged information or 27 records that could be designated as Confidential Documents/Protected Material 1 2 B. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT. 3 Contentions re Harm from Disclosure of Confidential Materials. 4 This action is likely to involve law enforcement investigative files, other law 5 enforcement agency records, peace officer personnel records and medical records for 6 whichspecialprotectionfrompublicdisclosure,includingdisclosureorreleasetoany 7 news media, member of the press, website, or any other public forum (except as 8 permitted under section 12 regarding filings with the court in this action and under 9 seal) and from use for any purpose other than prosecution of this action is warranted. 10 Such confidential and proprietary materials and information consist of, among other 11 things, materials relating to the investigation of an incident involving decedent and 12 officers of the Pasadena Police Department, peace officer personnel files, medical 13 records including information implicating privacy rights of third parties, and 14 informationotherwisegenerallyunavailabletothepublic,orwhichmaybeprivileged 15 orotherwiseprotected fromdisclosureunder state orfederal statutes,court rules,case 16 decisions, or common law. Accordingly, to expedite the flow of information, to 17 facilitatethepromptresolutionofdisputesoverconfidentialityofdiscoverymaterials, 18 to adequately protect information the parties are entitled to keep confidential, to 19 ensure that the parties are permitted reasonable necessary uses of such material in 20 preparation for and in the conduct of trial, to address their handling at the end of the 21 litigation, and serve the ends of justice, a protective order for such information is 22 justified in this matter. It is the intent of the parties that information will not be 23 designated as confidential for tactical reasons and that nothing be so designated 24 without a good faith belief that it has been maintained in a confidential, non-public 25 manner, and there is good cause why it should not be part of the public record of this 26 case. 27 Defendants contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 1 personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records for the 2 following reasons. 3 Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of privacy in 4 their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein that is 5 underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective procedure 6 of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 1027, 1033-1034 7 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14665, *2-3, 12- 8 13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law applies to privilege based 9 discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state privilege law which is 10 consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in applying [federal] 11 privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 12 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have constitutionally-based “privacy rights 13 [that] are not inconsequential” in their police personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code 14 §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040-1047. Defendants further contend that 15 uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel file information can threaten the safety of 16 non-party witnesses, officers, and their families/associates. 17 Second, defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement agencies 18 have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official information 19 privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney-client privilege 20 (and/orattorneyworkproductprotection)interestsinthepersonnelfilesoftheirpeace 21 officers – particularlyas to those portions of peace officer personnel files that contain 22 critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision-making or evaluation/analysis, or 23 communications for the purposes of obtaining or rendering legal advice or analysis – 24 potentially including but not limited to evaluative/analytical portions of Internal 25 Affairs type records or reports, evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records 26 or reports, and/or reports prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of 27 obtaining or rendering legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa 1 1997); Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 2 668-671 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); 3 Hamstreet v. Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. 4 v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants 5 further contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the 6 public entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 7 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 8 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and 9 related legitimate lawenforcement investigations/interests; and achilling of open and 10 honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that can 11 erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial measures 12 that may be required.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles
710 P.2d 329 (California Supreme Court, 1985)
Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana
936 F.2d 1027 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Soto v. City of Concord
162 F.R.D. 603 (N.D. California, 1995)
Tuite v. Henry
181 F.R.D. 175 (District of Columbia, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Diondra Williams v. Dumaguindin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diondra-williams-v-dumaguindin-cacd-2021.