Dino Howard v. United States

73 F.3d 362, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 40737
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedDecember 12, 1995
Docket95-1092
StatusPublished

This text of 73 F.3d 362 (Dino Howard v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dino Howard v. United States, 73 F.3d 362, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 40737 (6th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

73 F.3d 362
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

Dino HOWARD, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 95-1092, 95-1095.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Dec. 12, 1995.

Before: KENNEDY, GUY and RYAN, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Dino Howard, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals a district court judgment denying his motion to vacate his sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. The cases have been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 9(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).

In February 1992, Howard pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess cocaine for distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. The district court sentenced him to 180 months of imprisonment. A panel of this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. United States v. Howard, No. 92-1566 (6th Cir. July 2, 1993).

In his motion to vacate, Howard argued that: 1) the district court improperly determined that an unconsummated sale of cocaine constituted relevant conduct; 2) the district court violated his due process rights when it placed the burden of proving "lack of ability" to consummate a drug transaction on him; 3) counsel rendered ineffective assistance; 4) the district court erred when it did not determine that he had personally reviewed his presentence investigation report (PSI); 5) the district court improperly determined the amount of cocaine attributable to him; 6) the district court should not have sentenced him pursuant to the sentencing guidelines; and 7) the district court did not make written findings regarding his objections to the PSI. The magistrate judge filed a report, recommending that the district court deny the motion as claim 4 had already been litigated, claims 1, 2 and 5-7 had not been presented on direct appeal, and claim 3 lacked merit. Over Howard's objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied the motion.

Howard has filed two notices of appeal from both the memorandum opinion and the final judgment. On appeal, he reasserts his same claims.

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly denied the motion to vacate. In order to obtain relief under Sec. 2255 on the basis of a constitutional error, the record must reflect an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the proceedings. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993); United States v. Ross, 40 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir.1994). In order to obtain relief on the basis of nonconstitutional error, the record must reflect a fundamental defect in the proceedings resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice or an error so egregious that it amounted to a violation of due process. See Reed v. Farley, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 2300 (1994). Technical violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the federal sentencing guidelines will not warrant relief. See United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979) (technical violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11); Scott v. United States, 997 F.2d 340, 342-43 (7th Cir.1993) (technical violation of sentencing guidelines).

Howard is barred from seeking relief on his claims enumerated 1, 2 and 5 through 7. These claims could have been but were not raised on direct appeal. Under these circumstances, in order to obtain review, Howard must demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his failure to raise these claims on appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982); Ratliff v. United States, 999 F.2d 1023, 1025 (6th Cir.1993). Howard has alleged no cause, and he can show no prejudice as his claims are without merit. (The cause and prejudice analysis does not apply to Howard's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as that claim was not cognizable on direct appeal. See United States v. Goodlett, 3 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir.1993).)

The district court properly determined that Howard was responsible for 15-50 kilograms of cocaine. See United States v. Oleson, 44 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir.1995). The record reflects that Howard had been paid to count money from a drug transaction involving four kilograms of cocaine, and that he had negotiated another drug transaction for approximately 10-15 kilograms of cocaine. Contrary to Howard's argument, the district court properly considered the amount of cocaine from the unconsummated drug transaction. See USSG Sec. 2D1.4 comment (n. 1); United States v. Ferguson, 23 F.3d 135, 142 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 259 (1994).

The district court also properly placed on Howard the burden to establish that he lacked the ability or intent to complete the negotiated drug transaction, as the government had established that Howard had negotiated a drug transaction. See United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 413 (6th Cir.1992).

The district court properly sentenced Howard pursuant to the sentencing guidelines because the guidelines apply to offenses occurring on or after November 1, 1987, including conspiracies that began before but continued past November 1, 1987. See United States v. Buckner, 9 F.3d 452, 454 (6th Cir.1993). Howard has not shown that he affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the effective date of the guidelines. See United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1269 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1112 and 503 U.S. 989 (1992).

The district court substantially complied with Fed.R.Civ.P. 32 when it stated its findings regarding Howard's objections to the PSI at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Rodriguez-Luna, 937 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (7th Cir.1991).

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Related

United States v. Timmreck
441 U.S. 780 (Supreme Court, 1979)
United States v. Frady
456 U.S. 152 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Hill v. Lockhart
474 U.S. 52 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Brecht v. Abrahamson
507 U.S. 619 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Reed v. Farley
512 U.S. 339 (Supreme Court, 1994)
United States v. Carl Emmitt Prichard
875 F.2d 789 (Tenth Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Angel Rodriguez-Luna
937 F.2d 1208 (Seventh Circuit, 1991)
United States v. Kenneth O. Nichols
979 F.2d 402 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
Phillip D. Scott v. United States
997 F.2d 340 (Seventh Circuit, 1993)
Daryl E. Ratliff v. United States
999 F.2d 1023 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Jeffrey T. Goodlett
3 F.3d 976 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Ellen Buckner
9 F.3d 452 (Sixth Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Ralph R. Ross
40 F.3d 144 (Seventh Circuit, 1994)
United States v. Robert Reggie Oleson
44 F.3d 381 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)
United States v. Chambers
944 F.2d 1253 (Sixth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
73 F.3d 362, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 40737, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dino-howard-v-united-states-ca6-1995.