Dininny v. Myers
This text of 68 F. 943 (Dininny v. Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The general principles contended for by the respondent are undoubted. But they seem to me not properly applicable to the present case. The libelant cannot, indeed, recover for a total loss of his yacht as against the insurers, except upon abandonment; nor can he abandon unless he has such title as authorizes him to abandon.
On the 3d of May previous to the accident he had made a contract for the purchase of the yacht from Mr. Loring for the price of $12,250, of which $5,000 was paid down, and the balance was to be paid in two notes, one dated on May 20, 1894, and the other .V ngnst 20, 1894, tlie last for $2,000; and the contract provided that in case of failure in payment of either of these notes the amount or amounts already paid were to be forfeited, and the yacht to be immediately returned to said owner. The owner also agreed to deliver the yacht on the 10th of May following “in perfect order ready for use.”
The contract further provided that the bill of sale of the yacht was to be delivered to Thomas Manning, yacht broker, and' held by him “in trust until the final payment shall be made, and shall then be delivered to said purchaser, and in case of default in said payment as above mentioned, said bill of sale is then to be returned to said owner and shall be null and void.”
[944]*944The proof shows that the $5,000 was paid down in cash; the two notes given; the bill of sale delivered to Mr. Manning; the note due on the 20th of May paid; the yacht delivered to the libelant May 10th, and in his sole possession thereafter; but that the seller did not put the yacht in “perfect order ready for use” as agreed, and that the libelant had expended a considerable sum in making good that breach of the contract; that the seller had paid no attention to the libelant’s demand for compensation for these expenditures, but on the 21st ó? May had sold and indorsed the nóte due on August 20th “without recourse”; and that the purchaser of the note had no knowledge of the bill of sale, or that the note was given for the yacht, or had any connection with the yacht; and that no reference was made to either in the sale of the note.
Upon these facts, I am of the opinion that Manning was not a trustee of the yacht, or of the title to the yacht; but was merely a trustee of the possession of the bill of sale for the benefit of Loring the seller, in case he should wish to call for the return of the bill of sale, upon default of payment; that Loring being himself in prior default in the performance of the agreement on his part, in not putting the yacht “in perfect order ready for use,” could not, in equity, recall the bill of sale from Manning, or annul it, until some default by 'the libelant after Loring had nlade good, or offered to make good, the expenditure which his default had occasioned the libelant; that the right to recall or annul the bill of sale was not a right inseparably attached to the note, but a personal right belonging to the seller, which he could waive or extinguish at his option, and that his sale of the note, without recourse, and without any reference to the bill of sale after his neglect to put the boat in order, or make any compensation therefor, is sufficient evidence of such an intended waiver and extinguishment, and that no interest in the yacht, or in the bill of sale, and no right to demand the bill of sale from Manning passed to the purchaser of the note; and that no interest in the contract, or in the yacht thereafter, remained to Loring, such interest having wholly ceased upon the sale of the note without recourse.
The dealings between the libelant and the insurers subsequent to the accident, seems to me to show a sufficient and timely abandonment, and sufficient proof of loss; and that any technical objections or defects in either that might possibly have existed. were waived by the insurers. Steinbach v. Insurance Co., 2 Caines, 129, 132; Bradlie v. Insurance Co., 12 Pet. 397.
In the conflict concerning the amount of the loss, the case should be sent to a commissioner- to ascertain and report whether the loss exceeded the sum of $6,000, so as to entitle the libelant to payment in full as upon a constructive total loss, the libel being sufficient, as it seems to me, in that regard.
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68 F. 943, 1895 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dininny-v-myers-nysd-1895.