Dina Araneo and Kindra Knutson v. Security National Mortgage Company

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedMarch 5, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-00119
StatusUnknown

This text of Dina Araneo and Kindra Knutson v. Security National Mortgage Company (Dina Araneo and Kindra Knutson v. Security National Mortgage Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dina Araneo and Kindra Knutson v. Security National Mortgage Company, (D. Utah 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

DINA ARANEO and KINDRA KNUTSON, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER on behalf of themselves and all others GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR similarly situated, CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION

Plaintiffs, Case No. 2:25-cv-00119-JNP-CMR v. District Judge Jill N. Parrish SECURITY NATIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANY,

Defendant.

Dina Araneo and Kindra Knutson (collectively, the plaintiffs) sued their former employer, Security National Mortgage Company, for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Before the court is the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of a collective action on behalf of other employees of Security National that are similarly situated. ECF No. 14. The motion is GRANTED IN PART. The court conditionally certifies a collective action for non- exempt employees located in Arizona and Utah. BACKGROUND Security National is a mortgage lender with employees in 22 states. Araneo worked for Security National as an hourly employee in its Scottsdale, Arizona office. Knutson worked for the company as an hourly employee in Murray, Utah. Araneo and Knutson sued Security National, asserting a claim under the FLSA for its alleged failure to compensate them for overtime hours. They allege in their complaint that Security National had a policy forbidding employees from working more than 40 hours a week without preapproval, which was generally not given. They further claim that Security National assigned work to its hourly employees “that could not reasonably be completed in a 40-hour work week, such that these employees regularly worked more than 40 hours in a work week off-the-clock, without compensation for all of their overtime hours worked and appropriate overtime rate of pay.” ECF No. 7, ¶ 10. The plaintiffs also claimed

that Security National “failed to pay overtime at the lawfully required overtime rate of pay by failing to use the proper regular rate when calculating overtime pay.” Id., ¶ 31. The plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally certify the FLSA claim as a collective action on behalf of all other loan employees of Security National that are similarly situated. They argued that the proposed collective action should include all hourly loan employees of Security National across all of its branches in the 22 states where it operates. Both Araneo and Knutson provided declarations in support of their motion. They stated that due to Security National’s policies, they each worked approximately 50–55 hours per week but received wages for only 40 hours a week. The plaintiffs further averred that coworkers within their respective offices told the plaintiffs that they had also worked more than 40 hours per week without receiving overtime pay.1

LEGAL STANDARD The FLSA authorizes a plaintiff to bring a collective action on behalf of “other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The Tenth Circuit has approved a two-step approach to

1 In January 2026, the plaintiffs filed consent forms signed by individuals who purportedly worked for Security National in Alabama and Texas. These consent forms state that the individuals consent to be plaintiffs in this litigation and designate the plaintiffs’ attorneys to represent them. The plaintiffs suggest in their reply brief that these consent forms show that FLSA violations occurred in Alabama and Texas as well as Arizona and Utah. But the consent forms have no evidentiary value. They are not declarations and do not make any assertions of fact concerning the working conditions in the offices where the assignors worked. The court, therefore, disregards these consent forms in considering this motion for conditional certification. 2 determine whether proposed class members are similarly situated. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102–03, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001). First, the court “makes an initial ‘notice stage’ determination of whether plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated.’” Id. at 1102. “In doing so, a court ‘require[s] nothing more than substantial allegations that the putative class members were together

the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). This standard is “fairly lenient.” Id. at 1103. “At the notice stage, the scope of the Court’s similarity analysis is limited to ‘the substantial allegations of the complaint along with any supporting affidavits or declarations.’” Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., 252 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1118 (D.N.M. 2017) (citation omitted). Moreover, courts do not “weigh evidence, resolve factual disputes, or reach the merits of the pending claims at the conditional-certification stage.” Bowling v. DaVita, Inc., No. 21-cv-03033-NYW-KLM, 2023 WL 4364140, at *3 (D. Colo. July 6, 2023). If the court permits conditional certification under the first step, the parties are permitted to conduct discovery regarding the proposed collective action. See Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102–03. “At the conclusion of discovery (often prompted by a motion to decertify), the court then makes a

second determination, utilizing a stricter standard of ‘similarly situated.’” Id. ANALYSIS I. CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION Security National argues that the plaintiffs have not satisfied the standard for conditional certification of a collective action because they did not allege facts supporting the existence of a single overarching policy that required employees to perform off-the-clock work. They contend that the plaintiffs have asserted facts showing only that managers in the Scottsdale and Murray offices made isolated decisions that resulted in unpaid overtime hours in those offices. The plaintiffs counter that they have alleged sufficient facts to support an inference that Security 3 National fostered an environment that amounted to a single, de facto policy encouraging managers to require overtime work without pay. In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that Security National had a policy forbidding hourly loan employees from reporting more than 40 hours of work per week unless they received

preapproval, which was generally not granted. In support, the plaintiffs provided declarations asserting that managers in the Scottsdale and Murray offices required them to perform off-the- clock work in order to complete all of their mandatory tasks. Other employees in these offices reported to the plaintiffs that they had to perform overtime work without compensation in order to keep up with their workload. Managers told the plaintiffs that they received bonuses for closing loans in lieu of compensation for overtime hours. The similarities between the de facto overtime policies alleged in the Scottsdale and Murray offices are sufficient to satisfy the fairly lenient standard of showing that the plaintiffs’ coworkers were similarly situated under step one of the Thiessen test. The facts of this case are comparable to the facts of Brayman v. KeyPoint Government Solutions, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 3d 983

(D. Colo. 2022), rev’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 83 F.4th 823 (10th Cir. 2023). In that case, the district court analyzed whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of showing that certification of a collective action was appropriate under the more demanding step two of the Thiessen test: . . .

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Dina Araneo and Kindra Knutson v. Security National Mortgage Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dina-araneo-and-kindra-knutson-v-security-national-mortgage-company-utd-2026.