Dime Savings Institution v. American Surety Co.

53 A. 217, 68 N.J.L. 440, 1902 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 13
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 10, 1902
StatusPublished

This text of 53 A. 217 (Dime Savings Institution v. American Surety Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dime Savings Institution v. American Surety Co., 53 A. 217, 68 N.J.L. 440, 1902 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 13 (N.J. 1902).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Van Syckel, J.

The declaration is upon an agreement by the defendant to make good and reimburse the plaintiff for all pecuniary loss sustained by it by reason of the fraud or dishonesty of one Charles R. Westervelt, an employe of the plaintiff.

The declaration sets out specifically the various sums of money lost by the fraud and embezzlement of said Westervelt within the insured period, and annexed thereto is a copy of said agreement, 'which is made part of the declaration.

The first plea of the defendant is non damnificatus, concluding with a verification.

The plaintiff replied to this plea, amplifying somewhat the statement of the breaches of the agreement on the part of Westervelt.

The defendant demurred to this replication to the first plea.

It is obvious that the plea of non damnificatus is no answer to a declaration which particularly specifies the breaches. The declaration clearly shows a breach, and the plaintiff’s injury thereby, and therefore the averment of this plea is, in substance, a declaration that the plaintiff was not injured by having various large sums of money embezzled by Westervelt. The plea is vicious.

The defendant has framed its pleas as if the agreement sued upon was a bond with condition to Save harmless.

On such bonds prior to the statute of 8 & 9 Wm. III., ch. 11, § 8, the plaintiff declared upon the obligation of the bond without setting forth the condition.

Then the defendant craved oyer of the condition of the bond, and if the condition was merely to indemnify and save harmless, he could plead non damnificatus, which is a general denial, and compel the plaintiff, in his replication, to assign breaches specifically.

[442]*442But- when the condition of the bond was to perform any particular act, it was necessary to plead performance of that act.

After the passage of 8 & 9 Wm. III., ch. 11, § 8, it was necessary for plaintiff, in his declaration on such bonds, and on all bonds with a few exceptions, to set out the condition and show breaches.

The defendant, in that ease, could not plead the general denial, non damnificatus, but was required to traverse the breaches assigned, and conclude to the country. 2 Chit. Pl. (ed. 1809) 481; Cutler v. Southern, 1 Saund. 116, note 1; Holmes v. Rhodes, 1 Bos. & P. 638, 640; 5 Went. Pl. 490.

The plea of non damnificatus is bad, and should be stricken out; and as that is the first error in pleading,'judgment must be rendered for plaintiff on this demurrer, with costs.

The fifth plea of the defendant is as follows:

“And the said defendant, by like leave of the court here for this purpose first had and obtained, says that the said plaintiff ought not to have or maintain its aforesaid action thereof against it, the defendant, because it says that the said plaintiff did not, with the said claim made by it upon the defendant for twenty thousand dollars for its alleged liability upon the said bond, or at any other time, furnish to the defendant, or accompany the said dawn with a written statement of such alleged loss, certified by the duly-authorized officer or representative of the said plaintiff, and based upon -the accounts of the plaintiff, as provided in and by the said bond, a copy of which is annexed to the declaration and made part thereof; and this the defendant is ready to verify; wherefore it prays judgment if the said plaintiff ought to have or maintain its aforesaid action thereof against the defendant.”

To this plea the plaintiff replied as follows, and the defendant demurred to this replication:

“And the said plaintiff, for a further replication to the said amended plea of the said defendant by it fifthly above pleaded, by leave of the court here for this purpose first had and obtained, saith that it, the said plaintiff, by reason of [443]*443anything by the said defendant in that plea alleged, ought not to be barred from having and maintaining its aforesaid action thereof against the said defendant, because it saith that it, the plaintiff, did, with the claim made by it upon the said defendant in the said plea mentioned, furnish to the defendant a written statement of the loss mentioned in the said claim and in the said declaration, as nearly as the same could then be ascertained and according to the best of the plaintiff’s Icnoweldge, information and belief, which said statement was certified by the duly-authorized officer or representative of the plaintiff, and was based upon the accounts of the plaintiff; and this it, the said plaintiff, is ready to verify; wherefore it prays judgment and its damages by reason of the non-payment of the said sum of twenty thousand dollars in said declaration mentioned to be adjudged to it,” &c.

There is no express or implied agreement that the plaintiff shall furnish to defendant a written statement of the alleged loss, certified by the duly-authorized officer, and based upon the accounts of the plaintiff. The agreement states what shall be prima facie evidence, but expressly requires satisfactory proof, which is averred in the declaration.

The fifth plea, therefore, is also bad; but if it was a good plea, the replication to it is sufficient.

The defendant had a right to plead that satisfactory proof was not furnished, and did so in its fourth plea, on which issue is joined.

On this demurrer there must also be judgment for the plaintiff, with costs.

The defendant pleaded a twelfth plea, as follows:

“And a further plea in this behalf, the said defendant, by like leave of the court'here for that purpose first had and obtained, says that the said plaintiff ought not to have or maintain its aforesaid action against the defendant, because it says that the defendant was induced to execute and deliver the said bond in consequence of a certain representation or certificate in writing made and executed by the plaintiff, through its duly-authorized officer, to wit, James D. Orton, its president, and bearing date on the twenty-fourth day of [444]*444May, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, and delivered to the defendant at the time of the delivery of said bond to the plaintiff, in and by which representation or certificate the plaintiff, among other things, represented and certified to the defendant that the accounts of said Westervelt had been examined on tire ninth day of May, eighteen hundred and ninety-three, and found correct in every respect; and the defendant avers that it executed and delivered said bond relying upon the truth of the statements contained in said certificate, and that the plaintiff then understood that the said bond was so executed and delivered by the defendant in reliance upon the truth of said certificate, and that the same was required by the defendant as a condition upon which said bond was delivered;

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Bluebook (online)
53 A. 217, 68 N.J.L. 440, 1902 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dime-savings-institution-v-american-surety-co-nj-1902.