IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED Dimanione Lovelace, Feb 27 2026, 9:16 am
CLERK Appellant-Defendant Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
February 27, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1353 Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D01-2304-MR-3
Opinion by Judge Bradford
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 1 of 18 Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary [1] Dimanione Lovelace was charged with several offenses after participating in a
string of robberies which ultimately ended with the murder of Anthony
Holdbrook. The trial court found Lovelace guilty of felony murder, Level 5
felony conspiracy to commit robbery against Pharrell Petty, and Level 5 felony
conspiracy to commit robbery against Tayshawn Anderson and imposed a
firearm enhancement. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of
seventy-two years of incarceration, with eight years suspended to probation.
[2] Lovelace contends that the trial court erred in failing to transfer the alleged
offenses which had occurred in Howard County and Grant County to their
respective counties. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support the firearm enhancement, the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him, and his sentence was inappropriate based on the nature of the
offense and his character. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] On January 1, 2023, while Shae Martin and Bailey Hensley were “hanging
out[,]” Hensley received a message from Lovelace or Amarion Alsup requesting
a ride in exchange for gas money. Tr. Vol. II p. 189. Hensley and Martin
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 2 of 18 drove to an apartment complex and picked up Lovelace, Alsup, and Corahn
Browner. Lovelace had two firearms in his possession, and Alsup had at least
one.
[4] Alsup directed Hensley to drive them to Kokomo Manor Apartments in
Kokomo. Alsup intended “to rob” Petty at Kokomo Manor and had been
texting Petty about a firearms transaction. Tr. Vol. II p. 80. When they arrived
at Petty’s location, Petty “c[a]me up to the car” with a firearm, Alsup said, “let
me see it[,]” and Alsup and Lovelace directed Hensley to “pull off.” Tr. Vol. II
pp. 81–82, 148. Hensley began driving away with Petty “still hanging onto the
side of [the] car,” and he was dragged with the vehicle until he let go. Tr. Vol.
II p. 149.
[5] Hensley and Martin dropped off the three men at Lovelace’s grandfather’s
house. Later, Alsup messaged Hensley again about another ride for gas money.
Hensley and Martin picked the men up from Lovelace’s grandfather’s house,
made a few stops, and drove to Marion to meet with Anderson for another
firearm transaction. Alsup sat in the front passenger seat while Lovelace,
Martin, and Browner sat in the back seat. Alsup and Lovelace were discussing
that they were “going to basically take the money from” Anderson. Tr. Vol. II
p. 184.
[6] At Anderson’s apartment complex in Marion, Anderson came outside to the
car, provided Alsup with money, partially in cash, for the weapon, and Alsup
again instructed Hensley to drive without giving Anderson the weapon.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 3 of 18 Hensley then dropped the men off, and Alsup later asked Hensley to drive them
to Lafayette. Hensley picked the men up in Kokomo and began driving to
Lafayette.
[7] Alsup had been texting Holdbrook “all day” about a firearms transaction and
arranged to meet Holdbrook in Lafayette. Tr. Vol. II p. 84. At some point into
the drive, Hensley stopped for gas, and Lovelace drove the rest of the way to
Lafayette. When they arrived, Hensley returned to the driver’s seat, Alsup sat
in the front passenger seat, and Lovelace sat in the back passenger seat. The
men referred to what was going to happen as “a play” which Martin
understood to mean “robbing people.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204.
[8] Holdbrook walked out to the vehicle. Both Alsup and Lovelace had firearms in
their hands. Lovelace indicated that they were not selling an ammunition
magazine attached to one of the firearms, and after Alsup removed the
magazine attached to the firearm and handed it to Lovelace, Lovelace
attempted to take the firearm that Holdbrook was holding. Someone said,
“nah, don’t do that” and two shots were fired. Tr. Vol. II p. 164. After the two
gunshots, Hensley “took off” and Alsup “reached out the window and shot his
gun.” Tr. Vol. II p. 164. Both Alsup and Lovelace admitted to shooting.
Lovelace “said he d[idn’t] know if he’s the one who killed him or, and then
[Alsup] was like, I think I did because when I shot the gun he fell down.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 165.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 4 of 18 [9] On April 13, 2023, the State charged Lovelace with Count I, felony murder;
Count II, felony murder; Count III, Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit
robbery resulting in serious bodily injury; Count IV, Level 2 felony attempted
robbery resulting in serious bodily injury; Count V, Class A misdemeanor
attempted theft; Count VI, Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit robbery; Count
VII, Level 5 felony robbery; Count VIII, Class A misdemeanor theft; Count IX,
Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit robbery; Count X, Level 5 felony robbery;
Count XI, Class A misdemeanor theft; Count XII, Class A misdemeanor
unlawful carrying of a handgun; and an enhancement for unlawful use of a
firearm during the commission of Counts I and II.
[10] A bench trial commenced in Tippecanoe County on March 4, 2025. The State
moved to dismiss Count XII, which motion the trial court granted. At the close
of trial, Lovelace argued:
With respect to count[s] six through [eleven], they all relate to Grant and Howard County. If the court would, we can brief this. […] Venue is not an element of the crime, but it must be established by preponderance of the evidence. […] We have absolutely several hours, several hours between event one, event two, event three here in Tippecanoe County. The counties are not contiguous to one another.
Tr. Vol. III p. 23. Lovelace and the State further briefed this issue, and others,
after trial.
[11] After vacating several convictions, the trial court found Lovelace guilty of:
Count I, felony murder; Count VI, Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 5 of 18 robbery; and Count IX, Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit robbery and
imposed the firearm sentencing enhancement. On May 28, 2025, the trial court
imposed consecutive sentences of fifty-six years for Count I, three years for
Count VI, four years for Count IX, and nine years for the firearm sentencing
enhancement. The trial court suspended one year of the sentence for Count I
and suspended the sentences for Counts VI and IX, resulting in an aggregate
sentence of seventy-two years of incarceration, with eight years suspended to
probation.
Discussion and Decision I. Venue [12] Lovelace contends that the trial court “erred in failing to transfer the offenses in
Howard County and Grant County to their respective counties.” Appellant’s
Br. p. 19. Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides that, “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an
impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed[.]”
Venue is typically “an issue for determination by the [fact-finder].” Alkhalidi v.
State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
“[v]enue is not an element of the offense. Accordingly, although the State is
required to prove venue, it may be established by a preponderance of the
evidence and need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation
omitted). The State’s burden of establishing venue is met if “the facts and
circumstances permit the trier of fact to infer that the crime occurred in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 6 of 18 given county.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation
omitted).
[13] The standard of review for a claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove
venue is the same as for other claims of insufficient evidence. Neff v. State, 915
N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted), trans. denied. “[W]e
do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility, but look to the
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which support the conclusion of
requisite venue.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Lovelace does not
dispute that the offenses charged involving Holdbrook occurred in Tippecanoe
County. Instead, he contends that nothing in his case “demonstrates that the
robbery in Howard County, or Grant County, continued into Tippecanoe
County.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21.
[14] “Venue is not limited to the place where the defendant acted.” Neff, 915 N.E.2d
at 1033 (quotation and citation omitted). “If all charges are integrally related—
in other words, if one thing led to another—then the crimes may be considered
a single chain of events for purposes of venue.” Abran v. State, 825 N.E.2d 384,
392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted), trans. denied. The facts and
circumstances in this case show that the robberies and murder were part of one
continuous chain of events that were integrally related. See Dudley v. State, 480
N.E.2d 881, 893 (Ind. 1985) (citation omitted) (providing that “cases have
shown that when the various acts which comprise the crime are part of a ‘single
chain of events,’ the charge may be brought in the county where the acts began
or ended” and concluding that criminal recklessness based on appellants’ acts of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 7 of 18 exacting escape from robbery was “clearly integrally related to the robbery”),
reversed and remand on habeas corpus review on other grounds by Dudley v. Duckworth,
854 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied.
[15] Here, Alsup, Lovelace, and their companions committed a spree of robberies,
one robbery after another; Alsup had been texting Holdbrook “all day” about a
firearms transaction and arranged to meet Holdbrook in Lafayette, and the
group brought the gun taken from Petty in Kokomo to Lafayette when they met
with Holdbrook. Tr. Vol. II p. 84. Furthermore, the robberies of Petty and
Anderson were committed on the same day, relatively close in time and in the
same manner, all the way until Holdbrook’s murder in Lafayette. That is,
Alsup had been messaging Petty and Anderson to arrange for a firearms
transaction just as he had been messaging Holdbrook. The same group drove to
each robbery victim, waited until each victim came to the vehicle for the
transactions, and robbed them, and in Holdbrook’s case, attempted to rob and
ultimately killed him, and drove off. Lovelace’s conspiracies to rob Petty and
Anderson were committed in a chain of criminal conduct that was integrally
related to the murder of Holdbrook. That Lovelace could have been tried in
Grant or Howard County for the conspiracies is irrelevant.
[16] We conclude that the trial court did not err in its determination that the State
had satisfied its burden to prove that venue was proper in Tippecanoe County
for all of Lovelace’s offenses. See, e.g., French v. State, 266 Ind. 276, 362 N.E.2d
834, 839 (1977) (providing that a robbery of a grocery store, abduction, sexual
attack, and murder were “all integrally related” and, “for purposes of venue,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 8 of 18 may be considered a single chain of events”); Sells v. State, 130 N.E.3d 1158,
1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), (concluding that venue was proper in Franklin
County where “Sells’ delivery of methamphetamine to Craig was part of a
single chain of events intended to culminate in the delivery of the
methamphetamine to Wagner, and in performing those acts Craig drove
through Franklin County”), trans. denied; Andrews v. State, 529 N.E.2d 360, 364
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that venue was proper in Noble County where
defendant’s actions in telling his daughter that he planned to give her a birthday
present the next day, and in driving her the following day “to a secluded locale,
where they had intercourse, comprise[d] a single chain of events. The
conversation that occurred in Noble County between Andrews and the victim
was integrally related to the incest that occurred the next day in Whitley
County”), trans. denied. Because we conclude that the State satisfied its burden
to prove that venue was proper in Tippecanoe County for Lovelace’s
convictions, we do not reach the issues presented related to the admission of
evidence of Counts VI and IX.
II. Firearm Enhancement [17] Lovelace contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the firearm
enhancement. Review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a sentencing
enhancement is the same as review of the evidence to sustain a conviction. See
Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “[W]e
neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, and will focus on the
evidence most favorable to the verdict together with the reasonable inferences
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 9 of 18 that may be drawn therefrom. We will affirm unless no reasonable factfinder
could find the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(citation omitted).
[18] Pursuant to the firearm enhancement statute, the State is permitted to seek “an
additional fixed term of imprisonment” if it “can show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the
commission of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(d). Under the statute, an
“offense” includes “a felony under IC 35-42 that resulted in death or serious
bodily injury[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(b)(1).
[19] Here, the evidence was sufficient to show that Lovelace used a firearm during
the attempted robbery and murder of Holdbrook. While Lovelace suggests that
he was merely in “possession” of the firearm during the offenses involving
Holdbrook, Appellant’s Br. p. 28, the evidence shows otherwise. When
Holdbrook approached the vehicle, Lovelace had a firearm in his hands.
Lovelace attempted to take the firearm that Holdbrook was holding, and two
shots were fired. Both Hensley and Martin testified that, immediately after the
incident, Lovelace admitted that he had fired a shot. Lovelace even “said he
d[idn’t] know if he’s the one who killed him[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 165. Based on
the foregoing, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to prove that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 10 of 18 Lovelace used a firearm during the commission of the offenses involving
Holdbrook.1
III. Sentencing—Abuse of Discretion [20] Lovelace contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.
2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic
and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,
probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation
[21] We review for an abuse of discretion the court’s finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by
1 To the extent that Lovelace contends that he is “ineligible for the use of a firearm sentencing enhancement because accessory liability does not apply to a sentencing enhancement[,]” Appellant’s Br. p. 27, he is misguided. We have previously concluded that an accomplice’s crime can be enhanced by the firearm enhancement. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 754 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“We find Parker’s admitted participation in the [robbery] in the form of providing the handgun was sufficient to constitute the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense. The fact that Parker was not the actual shooter is irrelevant under this statute.”). Nevertheless, the evidence is more than sufficient to prove that Lovelace actually shot his firearm during the attempted robbery and the murder of Holdbrook, therefore, supporting the imposition of the firearm enhancement pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11(d).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 11 of 18 the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.
Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation
and quotation omitted), trans. denied. “A single aggravating circumstance may
be sufficient to enhance a sentence.” Id. at 417. Lovelace argues that the trial
court improperly considered as an aggravating circumstance that “the harm,
injury, loss, or damage[] was substantial and greater than the elements
necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
28.
[22] The trial court’s corrected sentencing order provides as follows:
The Court finds as aggravating factors [Lovelace’s] juvenile and adult criminal history; repeated firearms offenses; on bond at the time of the commission of the instant offense; placed in segregation at the Tippecanoe County Jail; substance abuse history; previous attempts at rehabilitation have failed; and the harm, injury, loss, or damaged was substantial and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 28.
[23] “[W]hen a defendant challenges some, but not all, of the aggravating
circumstances found by the trial court, we will not remand for resentencing if
we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v.
State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 12 of 18 [24] Here, the trial court identified multiple aggravating circumstances that Lovelace
does not challenge, including Lovelace’s history of criminal and delinquent
behavior, commission of the instant offense while on pretrial release in another
case, misconduct while in jail, and history of illegal drug use. Given these
undisputed aggravating circumstances, we are convinced that the trial court
would have imposed the same sentence for each of Lovelace’s convictions and
the firearm enhancement even if it had omitted the circumstance that Lovelace
challenges. Any error in listing the “harm, injury, loss, or damage” of the
offense was harmless in light of the other, unchallenged aggravating
circumstances that the trial court identified. See McDonald v. State, 868 N.E.2d
1111, 1114 (Ind. 2007) (providing that “even if the trial court had erred in
identifying the foregoing factors as aggravators, McDonald would not be
entitled to remand for resentencing […] because McDonald does not challenge
the remaining aggravating factors”).
[25] Lovelace further alleges that the trial court should have found as a mitigating
circumstance that he was eighteen years old at the time of the instant offenses.
In making his claim, Lovelace acknowledges that age is not a statutory
mitigating circumstance but argues that it should have been a “substantial
mitigating circumstance” here. Appellant’s Br. p. 34. “[Y]outh is not
automatically a significant mitigating circumstance. Rather, whether a
defendant’s youth is a significant mitigating factor is within the trial court’s
discretion. Moreover, if the trial court does not find youth to be a mitigator, it
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 13 of 18 is under no obligation to explain its reasoning.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839,
843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quotation and citations omitted), trans. denied.
[26] With respect to Lovelace’s age as a mitigating circumstance, during the
sentencing hearing, the trial court stated, “It’s hard for me to point to age.
We’re not talking about a fight over a ball game.[…] That’s not what we’re
talking about youth. I just can’t, it saddens me, but I just can’t see it.” Tr. Vol.
III p. 57. The trial court did not overlook Lovelace’s age when making its
sentencing decision, but rather specifically declined to find his age to be a
mitigating circumstance. Upon review, we observe, as the trial court did, that
Lovelace had had multiple contacts with the legal system before the instant
offenses and had not been deterred from engaging in criminal behavior.
Lovelace was also not so young as to require the trial court to find his age
significantly mitigating. See, e.g., Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ind.
2001) (finding no error in the trial court’s decision to attach “little weight” to
Monegan’s age, which was “less than forty days from his eighteenth
birthday.”).
[27] Again, we are confident that the trial court would have imposed the same
sentence for each of Lovelace’s convictions and firearm enhancement even if it
had considered his age to be a significant mitigating circumstance. As such, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find
Lovelace’s age to be mitigating.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 14 of 18 IV. Sentencing—Appropriateness [28] Lovelace further contends that his sentence was inappropriate given the nature
of his offenses and his character. The sentencing range for Lovelace’s murder
conviction was forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-
five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). The sentencing range for each of
Lovelace’s Level 5 felonies was one to six years, with the advisory sentence
being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The sentencing range for the
firearm enhancement was five to twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(g).
[29] The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of fifty-six years for Lovelace’s
murder conviction, three years for Count VI, four years for Count IX, and nine
years for the firearm enhancement. Therefore, the trial court imposed the
advisory sentence for Count VI, a sentence only one year above the advisory
sentence for the murder conviction and only one year above the advisory
sentence for Count IX, and well below the maximum for the firearm
enhancement. Furthermore, the trial court suspended one year of the sentence
for Count I and suspended the sentences for Counts VI and IX, resulting in an
aggregate sentence of seventy-two years of incarceration, with eight years
suspended to probation. As a result, Lovelace received a sentence that was well
below the maximum ninety-seven-year sentence.
[30] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 15 of 18 less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or
hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the
offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about
the defendant’s character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of
persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d
174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
[31] The nature of the offense is “found in the details and circumstances of the
commission of the offenses and the defendant’s participation.” Croy v. State,
953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Furthermore, “we focus on the
forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or
concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual
count.” Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quotation
and citation omitted). Here, Lovelace was involved in a string of robberies, the
last of which resulted in the shooting death of the victim. Afterward, Lovelace
rendered no assistance to Holdbrook, and instead, took part in social-media
videos in which he flaunted firearms. Nothing in the details or circumstances of
these offenses, or Lovelace’s participation in them, paints the nature of the
offenses positively.
[32] Lovelace further contends that his character did not warrant the imposition of
his sentence. We note that “[t]he character of the offender is found in what we
learn of the offender’s life and conduct.” Croy, 953 N.E.2d at 664. Initially, we
note that Lovelace began consuming marijuana and alcohol at fourteen years
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 16 of 18 old. “A court may consider evidence that a defendant committed crimes at an
earlier date as support for a finding that the defendant has a history of criminal
activity, even if those acts were not reduced to judgment.” Bailey v. State, 763
N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ind. 2002).
[33] Lovelace contends that his criminal history contains “no evidence of violent
felonies.” Appellant’s Br. p. 37. We nonetheless agree with the State that
Lovelace’s criminal history reflects poorly on his character. See Madden v. State,
162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“A defendant’s criminal history is
one relevant factor in analyzing his or her character”). Lovelace had prior
adjudications for resisting law enforcement, possession of a controlled
substance, and theft. See McCray v. State, 823 N.E.2d 740, 745 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (providing that “acts committed by a juvenile that would constitute a
criminal offense if committed by an adult may be used to support an enhanced
sentence”). Furthermore, prior to the instant offenses, Lovelace had been
arrested for Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony pointing a firearm, and
Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. After he was
released on bond, Lovelace committed the instant offenses and was later
convicted of Level 6 felony pointing a firearm in the prior case.
[34] Lovelace’s record reflects a pattern of criminal activity culminating in the
commission of multiple felonies, including felony murder. Moreover, while
Lovelace was in the Tippecanoe County Jail for the instant offenses, he was
charged with multiple violations. Based on the foregoing, Lovelace has failed
to convince us that his character did not warrant the imposition of his sentence,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 17 of 18 and, therefore, has failed to convince us that his sentence is inappropriate. See
Sanchez, 891 N.E.2d at 176.
[35] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Bruce W. Graham Graham Law Firm P.C. Lafayette, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana George P. Sherman Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1353 | February 27, 2026 Page 18 of 18