Dillon v. Jimoh

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 23, 2020
Docket4:17-cv-03109
StatusUnknown

This text of Dillon v. Jimoh (Dillon v. Jimoh) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dillon v. Jimoh, (S.D. Tex. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION KYLE MATTHEW DILLON, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-17-3109 § ISIAKA JIMOH, § § Defendant. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, filed this section 1983 lawsuit seeking monetary damages against defendant prison officer Isiaka Jimoh for use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.1 Defendant Jimoh filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 61), to which plaintiff filed a response (Docket Entry No. 62). Having considered the motion and exhibits, the response, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment and DISMISSES this lawsuit for the reasons shown below. Background and Claims Plaintiff claims that, on July 27, 2017, defendant Jimoh used excessive force against him at the Ferguson Unit in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. According to 1Plaintiff filed several informal “declarations” throughout this lawsuit, presenting various allegations or arguments regarding his claims. These additional pleadings can be construed as supplemental complaints, for which plaintiff did not request or obtain leave to file. The pleadings (Docket Entries No. 9, 10, 11, and 28) are ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD as improper and unauthorized supplemental complaints. plaintiff, Jimoh assaulted him with a rolling security shield and his feet without provocation or cause when plaintiff posed no threat to him. (Docket Entry No. 1, p. 4.) In his response to Jimoh’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiff alleges that he saw

Jimoh walking down the run with a rolling security shield and tried to stop him by sticking his arm and hand out from under his cell door. Jimoh did not stop, so plaintiff grabbed on to the rolling shield and prevented it from moving. He states that Jimoh walked around the shield and kicked and stomped on plaintiff’s hand. Plaintiff continued to hold on to the

shield until another, unidentified officer yanked the shield away, cutting plaintiff’s hand in the process. Plaintiff seeks monetary, nominal, and punitive damages against Jimoh for unnecessary and excessive use of force, and asks that criminal charges be brought against him. Defendant Jimoh argues that plaintiff’s actions constituted an assault and security threat

and that his use of force in light of plaintiff’s actions was objectively reasonable. Summary Judgment Standards Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(c). The appropriate inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986).

2 The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). In sustaining this burden, the movant must identify those portions

of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The moving party, however, “need not negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,

1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant’s burden is only to point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996). In response, the nonmovant may not rely upon mere allegations contained in the pleadings and must set forth and support by probative summary judgment evidence specific

facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Once the moving party makes a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must look beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record to show there is a genuine issue for trial. Stults, 76 F.3d at 655. Neither “conclusory allegations” nor “unsubstantiated assertions” will satisfy the

nonmovant’s burden. Id. Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine 3 issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322–23.

Analysis Eleventh Amendment Immunity Plaintiff sues defendant Jimoh in his individual and official capacity for monetary damages. To the extent he seeks compensatory damages against Jimoh in his official

capacity as an employee or officer of TDCJ, his claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars recovery of money damages from TDCJ officers in their official capacity under section 1983). Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages against defendant Jimoh in his official

capacity are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff’s Response Negates His Claim Plaintiff seeks Eighth Amendment damages against defendant Jimoh for causing the laceration to his hand. His own summary judgment response, however, negates this claim. In his response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff proffers the following version

of the incident under penalty of perjury: The incident happened while I was taking extraordinary measures trying to get the officers to give me some cold water which policy requires staff pass “as needed.” I had already been ignored by these officers numerous times as they passed my cell and the SSI had been ordered not to give me any water so as officer Jimoh came walking down the run towards my cell from the back of the 4 run I placed my arm out the bottom of the door attempting to wave the officer down. He had the rolling shield with him and did not stop but hit my arm with it and tried to keep going. I closed my hand on the side of the shield farthest from the officer. His response was to start kicking and stomping on my hand after he walked around the shield to where my hand was. The other officer grabbed the shield and started jerking it violently until he ripped my palm open. Both officers then went down stairs leaving me in my cell bleeding and did not report the incident. (Docket Entry No. 62, p. 2, emphasis added.) Thus, according to his summary judgment response, plaintiff stuck his hand and arm out the bottom of his cell door to get Jimoh’s attention. Jimoh did not stop, but instead hit plaintiff’s arm with the rolling shield and tried to continue on.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Little v. Liquid Air Corp.
37 F.3d 1069 (Fifth Circuit, 1994)
Ikerd v. Blair
101 F.3d 430 (Fifth Circuit, 1996)
Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.
136 F.3d 455 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
Provident Life & Accident Insurance v. Goel
274 F.3d 984 (Fifth Circuit, 2001)
Oliver v. Scott
276 F.3d 736 (Fifth Circuit, 2002)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Michael Williams v. Valenti
432 F. App'x 298 (Fifth Circuit, 2011)
Roger Poole v. City of Shreveport
691 F.3d 624 (Fifth Circuit, 2012)
Michael Bourne v. Michael Gunnels
921 F.3d 484 (Fifth Circuit, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Dillon v. Jimoh, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dillon-v-jimoh-txsd-2020.