Dillon v. Dillon

222 A.D.2d 645, 636 N.Y.S.2d 103, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13873

This text of 222 A.D.2d 645 (Dillon v. Dillon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dillon v. Dillon, 222 A.D.2d 645, 636 N.Y.S.2d 103, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13873 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant husband appeals from stated portions of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Eerier, J.), dated June 10, 1993, which, inter alia, (a) directed that "all financial issues are deemed resolved in accordance with [the] plaintiff’s claims unless [the] defendant pay[s] any amounts outstanding on that portion of the order of this Court dated June 4, 1992 (Leis, J.), which directed [the] defendant to pay interim accountant’s fees in the sum of $1750”, and (b) referred the branch of the defendant’s cross motion which was to compel the plaintiff to contribute to the upkeep of certain marital real property to the trial court for determination.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs and disbursements.

Under the circumstances of this case, the provision of the order providing for sanctions if the defendant failed to comply with a prior court order did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see, CPLR 3126; Hubbard v Hubbard, 113 Misc 2d 763; see also, Serdaroglu v Serdaroglu, 209 AD2d 606; Arnoff v Lorio, 208 AD2d 581; Kivo v Kivo, 193 AD2d 585; Adinolfi v Adinolfi, 168 AD2d 401).

In light of the parties’ conflicting allegations relating to their respective financial conditions, it was also an appropriate exercise of discretion to refer all of the financial issues related to the carrying costs associated with certain marital real property to the trial court since a speedy trial will provide the best remedy (see, Greenfield v Greenfield, 173 AD2d 592, 593; Coons v Coons, 161 AD2d 924; Carbone v Carbone, 119 AD2d 619, 620).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Balletta, J. P., O’Brien, Santucci and Florio, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Carbone v. Carbone
119 A.D.2d 619 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1986)
Coons v. Coons
161 A.D.2d 924 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)
Adinolfi v. Adinolfi
168 A.D.2d 401 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)
Greenfield v. Greenfield
173 A.D.2d 592 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1991)
Kivo v. Kivo
193 A.D.2d 585 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1993)
Arnoff v. Lorio
208 A.D.2d 581 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
Serdaroglu v. Serdaroglu
209 A.D.2d 606 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1994)
Hubbard v. Hubbard
113 Misc. 2d 763 (New York Supreme Court, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
222 A.D.2d 645, 636 N.Y.S.2d 103, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dillon-v-dillon-nyappdiv-1995.