Dillon v. Barnard

7 F. Cas. 714, 1 Holmes 386
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 15, 1874
StatusPublished

This text of 7 F. Cas. 714 (Dillon v. Barnard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dillon v. Barnard, 7 F. Cas. 714, 1 Holmes 386 (circtdma 1874).

Opinion

SHEPLET, Circuit Judge.

This case is-presented on a demurrer to the bill in equity. The material averments of fact which the demurrer admits are as follows: That the Boston, Hartford, and Erie Railroad Company, a corporation duly existing under the-laws of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and New York, was, prior to the first day of March, 1866, authorized to construct, maintain, and operate a railroad in each of said states, and owned the railroad and franchises described in the bill; that, for the purpose of providing for and retiring all the-existing mortgage debt and prior liens upon the line of the railroad of said corporation, and for the purpose of completing and equipping its railroad, then only partly constructed, the corporation, by a mortgage deed or [715]*715indenture in trust, on the nineteenth day of March, 1866, conveyed to Robert H. Berdell and others, trustees, all its property, then owned and after to he acquired, in trust, upon the terms and for the purposes set forth in the mortgage deed, which indenture in trust ’or mortgage was ratified and validated by, the legislation of the several, states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York.

The bill alleges that, among other things, it was provided in the indenture that certain bonds or evidences of debt, to an amount named in said indenture, should be issued, sold, and disposed of, as the means and for the purpose of raising money to complete and equip the road; that such bonds, attested by the trustees, should be secured by said indenture, and become a lien upon the property therein described and conveyed, and also upon all the property afterwards purchased, and on the increase of value in the railroad given to it by the expenditure of the money raised by the sale of the bonds. It is also alleged that it was agreed by said indenture, and was a part of the trusts and terms under which the trustees held and were to hold the trust estate, that the expenditure of all sums of money realized from the sale of the bonds issued under the mortgage should be made with the approval of at least one of the trustees, whose assent in writing should be necessary to all contracts made by the railroad corporation for the purposes aforesaid, before the same should be a charge upon any of the sums received from such sales; and also alleges “that such contracts, to be assented to, should and would be a charge upon such sums so received and realized by or from such sales.” This last averment must be understood as the allegation of what complainant claims to be the legal inference resulting from the terms of the contract, as no such provision is anywhere expressed in terms in the mortgage, which is made part of the bill and the record in the case.

Afterwards, on the 24th ol' October, 186T, the complainant, Dillon, entered into a contract with the corporation, in writing, which was approved and assented to in writing by the trustees, for the construction of a certain portion of said road. . It is alleged to have been the purpose, object, and intention of the corporation, the trustees, and the complainant, that the sums becoming due under the construction contract should be a Charge on the sums to be received from sales of the bonds; that the complainant performed work and expended large sums of money under the contract, relying for his compensation on the sums of money to be derived from sales of bonds, and upon a lien thereon, by virtue of the premises, and that his reliance thereon was well known to the corporation and the trustees; that his work under the contract was performed and accepted, and approved in accordance with the stipulations -in the contract; and that a balance is due to him of $1,030.693.29. with interest. The bill alleges that, instead of devoting the proceeds of the sale of the bonds to the payment of complainant, the corporation and the trustees suffered the money to be expended in acquiring new property to be held under the indenture, and in improving and increasing the value of the property already held under it; and that the value of the new property acquired and the increased value of the old property held under the indenture greatly exceeded the amount due to the complainant. The defendants, Hart, Oliphant, and Clark, became legally the successors of Berdell and others, as trustees under the mortgage, and, before the filing of the bill, entered into possession under the mortgage of all the property covered by it, and commenced proceedings to foreclose the same. The corporation is alleged to be insolvent and without means, except the property covered by the mortgage, and in bankruptcy, and the assignees in bankruptcy are made defendants.

In substance, the claim of the complainant is, that the money received from the sales of the Berdell bonds was to be expended in building and equipping the railroad, which was to be held by the trustees in mortgage as security for the bondholders; that a part of the money due to the complainant for building the railroad, which has passed into the possession of the trustees under the mortgage, has been withheld from him and applied to the purchase of other property, which the contract did not contemplate should be bought and conveyed to the trustees, but which has been conveyed to them; and the complainant seeks to follow this property, upon the ground, as he claims, that the contract between him and the corporation, in connection with the terms and conditions of the mortgage, constituted in equity a charge upon the sums received from the sales of the. bonds. As far as possible, the averments of matters of legal inference and of conclusions of law, and of the construction of documents, have been omitted in the statement of the allegations in the bill of complaint. The demurrer does not admit the truth of such allegations, but only such facts as are well pleaded. 2 Mitf. Eq. Pl. 227: Story, Eq. Pl. § 452; Daniell, Ch. Pl. 560; Commercial Bank of Manchester v. Buckner, 20 How. [61 U. S.] 108; Ford v. Peering, 1 Ves. Jr. 72. So far as the allegations in the bill are concerned which set up what are alleged as understandings between the parties, whether they refer to matters contained in the written agreement or indenture, and may be taken to be aver-ments of conclusions of law from the agreements, or whether they refer to parol agreements incompatible with the written agreements, the questions as to the correctness of the legal conclusions in the one case, or the [716]*716admissibility of tbe parol evidence in the other, are open to the defendants on demurrer. Lea v. Robeson, 12 Gray, 280.

The mortgage in trust, after reciting the authority given to the directors of the company to make a mortgage upon the whole or any portion of the road, and to issue and dispose of their mortgage bonds to the amount of twenty millions of dollars, payable in New York, excepting such portion as the directors should authorize to be payable in London in sterling currency, declares the purpose of the mortgage to be to secure the ■“bonds to be issued, for the purpose of providing for and retiring all the existing mortgage debt and prior liens upon the line of the road of the party of the first part, and fo- the purpose of completing and equipping their road, and of laying down a third rail, so as to form an additional track corresponding with the gauge of the Brie Railway of New York.” The form of the bonds to be secured by the mortgage was recited in the mortgage deed. Each bond to be issued •contained a statement on its face that it was one of a series of twenty thousand bonds issued for the purpose of paying the existing debt of the company, and of completing and equipping their road.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
7 F. Cas. 714, 1 Holmes 386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dillon-v-barnard-circtdma-1874.