Ringo, Chief Justice,
delivered the opinion of thc-Court:
That all of the courls of this State derive the whole of their jurisdiction from the Constitution, and statutes passed in conformity with the provisions thereof, is a proposition which, in our judgment cannot be denied, for they arc all created, or their creation specially provided for by the Constitution; and their respective jurisdiction is, in many respects, expressly defined and limited by the same instrument; yet, in some respects, it is subjected to the control of the Legislature, and may be, fiom time to time, distributed by statute, according to the will of that department, among thé several judicial tribunals, not prohibited by the Constitution from taking cognizance thereof. In regard to matters of contract, the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace, is definitely and definitively prescribed by the Constitution, so far as it depends upon the sum in controversy, and in this respect the power of the Legislature over the subject is confined or restricted: so, likewise it is in regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, except that the latter is not made exclusive, and therefore it is competent for the Legislature to vest in other judicial tribunals, a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Circuit Court, over all matters oí contract of which it has cognizance: although it is not within the power of that department to divest the Circuit Courts of their original jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Constitution in “ matters of contract where the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars,” or in any manner restrict or prohibit their exercise thereof, so far as it depends upon the sum in controversy. On this subject the language of the Constitution is that the Circuit Court shall have “original jurisdiction of all civil cases which shall not be cognizable before the Justices of the Peace, until otherwise directed by the General Assembly: and original jurisdiction in all matters of contract, where the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars,” and that Justices of the Peace, “shall have individually, or two or more of them jointly, exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of contract, except in actions of covenant, when the sum in controversy is of one hundred dollars arid under.” This language comprehends every description of contract, and gives to the Circuit Courts or Justices of the Peace jurisdiction over them, and leaves their respective jurisdiction to be determined solely by the sum- in controversy; and therefore it is that each Circuit Court is alike vested with original jurisdiction in every matter of contract where the sum in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars, and no valid law can be passed by the Legislature prohibiting its exercise; and every Justice of the Peace is in like manner vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in every matter of contract, (except in actions of covenant,) where the sum in controversy does not exceed one hundred dollars. But before such jurisdiction can be exercised, every party to the contract, whose rights in respect thereof, are to be adjudicated, must be legally before the court, or at least be legally notified of the proceeding, and have an opportunity of contesting the demand of his adversary, and vindicating his own right according to law, and therefore, unless the defendant voluntarily enters his appearance to the action, or is found and legally served with such process or notice as is required by law in such case, within the territorial juris» diction of the court or Justice of the Peace, or such other place as the law authorizes such service to be made, the jurisdiction so conferred by the Constitution on the Circuit Court and Justices of the Peace cannot be exercised. But upon such appearance being entered, or such process or notice served on the defendant, the court or Justice of the Peace thereby acquires jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and may lawfully take cognizance of and adjudicate the case, without any regard to the residence of the parties, or either of them; because the jurisdiction of the court, in such cases, depends entirely upon the sum in controversy, and neither does or can be made to depend upon the residence of the parties. And if the right of a party to sue, can be restricted by statute to the county or township where the defendant resides, or where the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found, it must in our opinion, upon the same principle, be also conceded, that the Legislature possesses the power of prohibiting suits from being brought in the Circuit Court of more than one county in the State — a power which, if so exercised, would effectually take from every other Circuit Court the whole of their jurisdiction in civil cases, and vest it in a single court, contrary to the express letter, as well as the obvious design of the Constitution. We are therefore of opinion that so much of the 4th section of the 116th chapter of the Revised Statutes .of this State, as enacts that suits instituted either by summons or capias “shall be brought, when the defendant is a resident of this State, either in the county in which the defendant resides, or in the county in which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found,” so far as it restricts the right to sue upon matters of contract in any of the Circuit Courts of this State, when the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars, is in conflict with, and repugnant to the Constitution of this State and void, and that in suits instituted in said courts on any contract, no averment as to the residence of either party is necessary to give the court jurisdiction of the case, or for any other purpose whatever.
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Ringo, Chief Justice,
delivered the opinion of thc-Court:
That all of the courls of this State derive the whole of their jurisdiction from the Constitution, and statutes passed in conformity with the provisions thereof, is a proposition which, in our judgment cannot be denied, for they arc all created, or their creation specially provided for by the Constitution; and their respective jurisdiction is, in many respects, expressly defined and limited by the same instrument; yet, in some respects, it is subjected to the control of the Legislature, and may be, fiom time to time, distributed by statute, according to the will of that department, among thé several judicial tribunals, not prohibited by the Constitution from taking cognizance thereof. In regard to matters of contract, the jurisdiction of the Justices of the Peace, is definitely and definitively prescribed by the Constitution, so far as it depends upon the sum in controversy, and in this respect the power of the Legislature over the subject is confined or restricted: so, likewise it is in regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, except that the latter is not made exclusive, and therefore it is competent for the Legislature to vest in other judicial tribunals, a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Circuit Court, over all matters oí contract of which it has cognizance: although it is not within the power of that department to divest the Circuit Courts of their original jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Constitution in “ matters of contract where the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars,” or in any manner restrict or prohibit their exercise thereof, so far as it depends upon the sum in controversy. On this subject the language of the Constitution is that the Circuit Court shall have “original jurisdiction of all civil cases which shall not be cognizable before the Justices of the Peace, until otherwise directed by the General Assembly: and original jurisdiction in all matters of contract, where the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars,” and that Justices of the Peace, “shall have individually, or two or more of them jointly, exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of contract, except in actions of covenant, when the sum in controversy is of one hundred dollars arid under.” This language comprehends every description of contract, and gives to the Circuit Courts or Justices of the Peace jurisdiction over them, and leaves their respective jurisdiction to be determined solely by the sum- in controversy; and therefore it is that each Circuit Court is alike vested with original jurisdiction in every matter of contract where the sum in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars, and no valid law can be passed by the Legislature prohibiting its exercise; and every Justice of the Peace is in like manner vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in every matter of contract, (except in actions of covenant,) where the sum in controversy does not exceed one hundred dollars. But before such jurisdiction can be exercised, every party to the contract, whose rights in respect thereof, are to be adjudicated, must be legally before the court, or at least be legally notified of the proceeding, and have an opportunity of contesting the demand of his adversary, and vindicating his own right according to law, and therefore, unless the defendant voluntarily enters his appearance to the action, or is found and legally served with such process or notice as is required by law in such case, within the territorial juris» diction of the court or Justice of the Peace, or such other place as the law authorizes such service to be made, the jurisdiction so conferred by the Constitution on the Circuit Court and Justices of the Peace cannot be exercised. But upon such appearance being entered, or such process or notice served on the defendant, the court or Justice of the Peace thereby acquires jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and may lawfully take cognizance of and adjudicate the case, without any regard to the residence of the parties, or either of them; because the jurisdiction of the court, in such cases, depends entirely upon the sum in controversy, and neither does or can be made to depend upon the residence of the parties. And if the right of a party to sue, can be restricted by statute to the county or township where the defendant resides, or where the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found, it must in our opinion, upon the same principle, be also conceded, that the Legislature possesses the power of prohibiting suits from being brought in the Circuit Court of more than one county in the State — a power which, if so exercised, would effectually take from every other Circuit Court the whole of their jurisdiction in civil cases, and vest it in a single court, contrary to the express letter, as well as the obvious design of the Constitution. We are therefore of opinion that so much of the 4th section of the 116th chapter of the Revised Statutes .of this State, as enacts that suits instituted either by summons or capias “shall be brought, when the defendant is a resident of this State, either in the county in which the defendant resides, or in the county in which the plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found,” so far as it restricts the right to sue upon matters of contract in any of the Circuit Courts of this State, when the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars, is in conflict with, and repugnant to the Constitution of this State and void, and that in suits instituted in said courts on any contract, no averment as to the residence of either party is necessary to give the court jurisdiction of the case, or for any other purpose whatever.
In regard to the other defects or imperfections specially expressed in the demurrer, it is deemed sufficient to remark that each count in the declaration discloses a contract for a sum exceeding one hundred dollars, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the court; and the fact that it appears from the oyer granted that the several obligations upon which the first and third counts are founded, are respectively endorsed with a credit, sufficient to reduce the amount due thereon to a sum less than $100 does not, in our opinion, constitute an objection of which the defendant can avail himself on demurrer to the declaration, because the demurrer expressly admits the jurisdiction of the court, and the declaration in each count thereof, declares in legal form on a good cause of action against the defendant, which is apparently within its jurisdiction; and although-the obligation set out, on oyer thereof being given, enters into and forms a part of the declaration, the credits thereon endorsed do not, because they are no part of the contract upon which the suit is founded, and do not change or quality the legal rights of the parties to it, otherwise than as a payment of so much of the debt, of which the endorsement is but evidence of the same grade as a receipt, which is not otherwise connected with the original contract, but may be explained or controverted by the plaintiff; and therefore the amount of the defendant’s legal liability upon the contract, as set out in the declaration, and shown upon oyer, exclusive of interest^ must, in regard to the question of jurisdiction attempted to be raised upon the demurrer, be considered as the sum in controversy; although it was competent for the defendant, if he thought proper to have done so, to have shown the facts by a special plea in abatement, to the jurisdiction of the court, be/ore he had interposed any defence admitting the jurisdiction thereof, and thereby have raised and presented a distinct issue as to the sum really in controversy, the finding upon which would have determined the question of jurisdiction; and according to the principle established by this court in the case of Heilman vs. Martin, decided at the last term, this is the only means by which the want of jurisdiction can be shown, when the contract, as set out in the declaration, is within the jurisdiction of the court. We are therefore of the opinion that the declaration is sufficient, and that the demurrer thereto was rightly overruled.
The pleas to the jurisdiction of the court were not filed until after the demurrer was disposed of, which is too late, as has been repeatedly held by this court, and for this reason they were properly struck out of the case.
The third error assigned questions the opinion and judgment of the court in refusing to instruct the jury as asked by the defendant, as well as in the instructions given. As a general rule, it is unquestionably true, that the finding of the jury must embrace all the issues joined, and be responsive thereto. But when all of the issues are, as in this case, essentially the same, and such as may be distinctly and fully responded to by a general verdict for either party, we are not aware of any principle of law which requires a separate finding as to each issue, and in such case we have not been able to discover what benefit either party could derive therefrom, and therefore, in our opinion, the court did not err in refusing to give the instruction asked, nor in the instruction given. The judgment is therefore affirmed.