IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1190 Filed June 18, 2025
DILLAN ILMBERGER, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
SHIEGHE REINHARDT f/k/a SHIEGHE DONALD, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Wyatt Peterson,
Judge.
A mother appeals a custody decree modification concerning her child
shared with the father. AFFIRMED.
D. Raymond Walton of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson,
P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Chad D. Brakhahn (until withdrawal), Drew A. Powell (until withdrawal),
Ryan C. Shellady (until withdrawal), and Rae M. Kinkead of Simmons Perrine
Moyer Bergman PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Shieghe Reinhardt appeals from a decree modifying custody of a minor
child to place physical care with the father, Dillan Ilmberger. She contests whether
there was a material and substantial change in circumstances and whether Dillan
demonstrated he was a superior caretaker. Both parties request appellate attorney
fees. We affirm the district court’s modification ruling and decline to award attorney
fees.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Shieghe and Dillan were never married but share a child born in 2014. The
original stipulated custody decree established joint legal custody, placed physical
care with Shieghe, and granted Dillan visitation. At the time of the original decree
in 2016, Shieghe and Dillan both lived in Lee County.
Soon after the stipulated decree, Dillan and Shieghe began to disagree
about visitation. Dillan documented issues in a diary spanning from late 2016
through April 2017. Over several years, both parents engaged in
passive-aggressive text conversations and lengthy phone calls regarding the
child’s education, medical care, and visitation.
Visitation scheduling for summer 2021 caused a major argument between
Shieghe and Dillan, spanning multiple weeks. The same summer, while Dillan was
exercising visitation, Shieghe called the police when Dillan did not provide her with
the child’s exact location.
Shieghe often acted in strict adherence to the terms of the custody decree.
She refused to let anyone other than Dillan pick up the child. She refused to let
the child attend her paternal great-grandmother’s funeral when Dillan was sick, 3
denying both Dillan’s parents’ offer to take her and Dillan’s request for Shieghe to
take the child herself. Shieghe seldom allowed Dillan additional visitation time,
even if he requested it months in advance. Shieghe even prevented the child—
who was to be a flower girl—from attending her godfather’s wedding.
Dillan petitioned to modify the original custody decree, asking the district
court to grant him physical care of the child, or joint physical care in the alternative.
The court ruled against the first modification request despite noting “the evidence
presented places a significant part of the blame at [Shieghe]’s feet.” The court also
found Shieghe “appear[ed] to not care as much about Dillan’s relationship with his
child.” From the court’s perspective, the biggest factor in denying modification was
the lack of permanency to the change in circumstances. Although the district court
recognized the long-running visitation issues, most of the disputes were more than
a year in the past. But the district court noted further refusal from Shieghe to honor
Dillan’s visitation “would bolster a future claim that the conditions have become
more or less permanent.”
About two weeks later, Dillan moved for a second modification request after
the district court’s initial denial, identifying new—and worsening—issues with
visitation. Another trial was held in late 2023, centering on Shieghe’s move to a
different town about twenty miles away without informing Dillan. The move
resulted in the child changing school districts, which Shieghe also did not discuss
with Dillan. Shieghe asserted Dylan could “do the legwork” to stay up to date on
the child’s schooling and said she “do[esn’t] like bothering him” about the child’s
medical appointments. The district court found refusing to share this information 4
violated Dillan’s parental rights as joint custodian. See Iowa Code § 598.1(3)
(2023).
Throughout both trials, the district court found Shieghe lacked credibility.
Shieghe accused Dillan of buying marijuana, claimed to already have plans during
the child’s godfather’s wedding, and said Dillan’s family was unfriendly to the child
because she is biracial. In the first trial, the court found Dillan’s explanation for
smelling like marijuana credible and that there was “no reasonable explanation”
for Shieghe denying the child’s attendance at the godfather’s wedding. As for the
biracial issue, the court noted it did not find Shieghe “credible in the slightest.” In
the second trial, Dillan said he “missed once or twice making sure” the child took
her medication but “never tried to miss” it. And the court concluded Shieghe’s
accusation that Dillan withheld medication from the child was unfounded.
In the modification ruling, the district court highlighted Shieghe unilaterally
moving the child and found a permanent change in circumstances not
contemplated at the time of the original order. The court also found communication
between the parents had worsened, such that Shieghe now displayed a “near total
disregard” for Dillan’s custodial rights with “a lack of civility, decency, and extremely
poor communication.” Because of both new and old issues with visitation, the court
found “Shieghe ha[d] not overcome animosity towards Dillan to concentrate on the
best interests of [the child].” The district court found Dillan’s career stability, ability
to help facilitate a relationship between Shieghe and the child, and genuine interest
in the child’s education demonstrated he could provide superior care. The court
found Dillan “puts the child’s best interests above his own” and placed physical
care with him, subject to Shieghe’s visitation. And it noted Dillan was generally 5
more credible than Shieghe through his “demeanor, tone, eye contact, posture,
body language, [and] overall courtroom conduct.” Shieghe appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review custody and care decisions de novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “[W]e examine the entire record and decide
anew the issues properly presented.” In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d
677, 680 (Iowa 2005). While we are not bound by the district court’s fact-findings,
we do give them weight, especially credibility determinations. Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d
at 5.
III. Discussion
Shieghe challenges the modification of physical care, arguing no substantial
change in circumstances occurred and that Dillan did not prove he could provide
superior care. Shieghe and Dillan both request appellate attorney fees.
A. Physical Care
In seeking to disturb the physical-care status quo, Dillan had to prove by a
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 24-1190 Filed June 18, 2025
DILLAN ILMBERGER, Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
SHIEGHE REINHARDT f/k/a SHIEGHE DONALD, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Wyatt Peterson,
Judge.
A mother appeals a custody decree modification concerning her child
shared with the father. AFFIRMED.
D. Raymond Walton of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson,
P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Chad D. Brakhahn (until withdrawal), Drew A. Powell (until withdrawal),
Ryan C. Shellady (until withdrawal), and Rae M. Kinkead of Simmons Perrine
Moyer Bergman PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and
Buller, JJ. 2
BULLER, Judge.
Shieghe Reinhardt appeals from a decree modifying custody of a minor
child to place physical care with the father, Dillan Ilmberger. She contests whether
there was a material and substantial change in circumstances and whether Dillan
demonstrated he was a superior caretaker. Both parties request appellate attorney
fees. We affirm the district court’s modification ruling and decline to award attorney
fees.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Shieghe and Dillan were never married but share a child born in 2014. The
original stipulated custody decree established joint legal custody, placed physical
care with Shieghe, and granted Dillan visitation. At the time of the original decree
in 2016, Shieghe and Dillan both lived in Lee County.
Soon after the stipulated decree, Dillan and Shieghe began to disagree
about visitation. Dillan documented issues in a diary spanning from late 2016
through April 2017. Over several years, both parents engaged in
passive-aggressive text conversations and lengthy phone calls regarding the
child’s education, medical care, and visitation.
Visitation scheduling for summer 2021 caused a major argument between
Shieghe and Dillan, spanning multiple weeks. The same summer, while Dillan was
exercising visitation, Shieghe called the police when Dillan did not provide her with
the child’s exact location.
Shieghe often acted in strict adherence to the terms of the custody decree.
She refused to let anyone other than Dillan pick up the child. She refused to let
the child attend her paternal great-grandmother’s funeral when Dillan was sick, 3
denying both Dillan’s parents’ offer to take her and Dillan’s request for Shieghe to
take the child herself. Shieghe seldom allowed Dillan additional visitation time,
even if he requested it months in advance. Shieghe even prevented the child—
who was to be a flower girl—from attending her godfather’s wedding.
Dillan petitioned to modify the original custody decree, asking the district
court to grant him physical care of the child, or joint physical care in the alternative.
The court ruled against the first modification request despite noting “the evidence
presented places a significant part of the blame at [Shieghe]’s feet.” The court also
found Shieghe “appear[ed] to not care as much about Dillan’s relationship with his
child.” From the court’s perspective, the biggest factor in denying modification was
the lack of permanency to the change in circumstances. Although the district court
recognized the long-running visitation issues, most of the disputes were more than
a year in the past. But the district court noted further refusal from Shieghe to honor
Dillan’s visitation “would bolster a future claim that the conditions have become
more or less permanent.”
About two weeks later, Dillan moved for a second modification request after
the district court’s initial denial, identifying new—and worsening—issues with
visitation. Another trial was held in late 2023, centering on Shieghe’s move to a
different town about twenty miles away without informing Dillan. The move
resulted in the child changing school districts, which Shieghe also did not discuss
with Dillan. Shieghe asserted Dylan could “do the legwork” to stay up to date on
the child’s schooling and said she “do[esn’t] like bothering him” about the child’s
medical appointments. The district court found refusing to share this information 4
violated Dillan’s parental rights as joint custodian. See Iowa Code § 598.1(3)
(2023).
Throughout both trials, the district court found Shieghe lacked credibility.
Shieghe accused Dillan of buying marijuana, claimed to already have plans during
the child’s godfather’s wedding, and said Dillan’s family was unfriendly to the child
because she is biracial. In the first trial, the court found Dillan’s explanation for
smelling like marijuana credible and that there was “no reasonable explanation”
for Shieghe denying the child’s attendance at the godfather’s wedding. As for the
biracial issue, the court noted it did not find Shieghe “credible in the slightest.” In
the second trial, Dillan said he “missed once or twice making sure” the child took
her medication but “never tried to miss” it. And the court concluded Shieghe’s
accusation that Dillan withheld medication from the child was unfounded.
In the modification ruling, the district court highlighted Shieghe unilaterally
moving the child and found a permanent change in circumstances not
contemplated at the time of the original order. The court also found communication
between the parents had worsened, such that Shieghe now displayed a “near total
disregard” for Dillan’s custodial rights with “a lack of civility, decency, and extremely
poor communication.” Because of both new and old issues with visitation, the court
found “Shieghe ha[d] not overcome animosity towards Dillan to concentrate on the
best interests of [the child].” The district court found Dillan’s career stability, ability
to help facilitate a relationship between Shieghe and the child, and genuine interest
in the child’s education demonstrated he could provide superior care. The court
found Dillan “puts the child’s best interests above his own” and placed physical
care with him, subject to Shieghe’s visitation. And it noted Dillan was generally 5
more credible than Shieghe through his “demeanor, tone, eye contact, posture,
body language, [and] overall courtroom conduct.” Shieghe appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review custody and care decisions de novo. Thorpe v. Hostetler, 949
N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020). “[W]e examine the entire record and decide
anew the issues properly presented.” In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d
677, 680 (Iowa 2005). While we are not bound by the district court’s fact-findings,
we do give them weight, especially credibility determinations. Thorpe, 949 N.W.2d
at 5.
III. Discussion
Shieghe challenges the modification of physical care, arguing no substantial
change in circumstances occurred and that Dillan did not prove he could provide
superior care. Shieghe and Dillan both request appellate attorney fees.
A. Physical Care
In seeking to disturb the physical-care status quo, Dillan had to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that conditions related to parenting the child have
materially and substantially changed since the stipulated custody arrangement.
See Iowa Code § 600B.40 (applying marriage-dissolution custody and visitation
provisions to children born outside of marriage); In re Marriage of Frederici, 338
N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). To be material and substantial, changed
circumstances must meet three criteria: (1) the court did not contemplate those
circumstances when entering the decree; (2) the changes are more or less
permanent rather than temporary; and (3) the changed circumstances relate to the
welfare of the child. See Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158. Additionally, to warrant 6
modification, the parent seeking to change custody bears the burden to prove a
superior ability to care for the child. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32
(Iowa 2015). “The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify custody stems
from the principle that once custody of children has been fixed it should be
disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.” Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158.
Shieghe attacks the district court’s reliance on her unilateral move with the
child in making its determination of a permanent, substantial change in
circumstances. In doing so, she conflates the tie-breaker right of having the “final
say concerning where the [child’s] home will be” with a right to relocate the child
without any discussion with the noncustodial parent. See Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d
at 33 (cleaned up). The custodial parent moving with the child is “the kind of
decision the other joint custodian has a right to be consulted about.” Id. at 32
(citation omitted). Shieghe moved without notice to Dillan, which is considered
“adverse to her position,” and the district court correctly considered this conduct
when finding a substantial change in circumstances. See In re Marriage of
Mayfield, 577 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
We have also previously held that withholding important medical information
and making unilateral medical decisions can establish a substantial change in
circumstances. See In re Marriage of Downing, 432 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1988). Shieghe ignored Dillan’s requests for a bare minimum of information
about the child’s doctor appointments. The district court also found Shieghe lacked
a credible explanation for refusing to provide this information. On the other hand,
Dillan showed a willingness to take the child to appointments during his limited 7
visitation time. Shieghe’s continued refusal to share medical information supports
a substantial change in circumstances. See id.
Shieghe contends most cases where this court found a substantial change
in circumstances involved more severe or harmful conduct perpetrated by the
custodial parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d 212, 214–15
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (disapproving of parental alienation). But Shieghe ignores
frequent communications from Dillan regarding the child and makes visitation
difficult for him. See In re Marriage of Grabill, 414 N.W.2d 852, 853 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1987). Although Shieghe’s actions are arguably less drastic than parents in
other cases, “[i]f visitation rights of the noncustodial parent are jeopardized by the
conduct of the custodial parent, such acts could provide an adequate ground for a
change of custody.” In re Marriage of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d 476, 480
(Iowa 1993). Shieghe’s less than credible reasons for continually interfering with
Dillan’s visitation rights support the district court’s finding of a substantial change
in circumstances. See id. And, in any event, custody decisions are necessarily
fact-bound, and Shieghe’s comparison-shopping attempt to show her conduct was
not as bad as others’ does not persuade us. See In re Marriage of Krebsbach, 395
N.W.2d 189, 190 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (“Prior cases have little precedential value;
we must base our decision primarily on the particular circumstances of the parties
in this [child-custody] case.”). Nor are we persuaded that separating the child at
issue from here from Shieghe’s other child overpowers the good and compelling
considerations supporting modification. In re Marriage of Jones, 309 N.W.2d 457,
461 (Iowa 1981) (“The rule [related to separating siblings] is not ironclad, however, 8
and circumstances may arise which demonstrate that separation may better
promote the long-range interests of children.”).
Shieghe also argues many qualities the district court attributed to Dillan
apply equally to her, including her ability to provide medical care, education, and
stability. In physical-care determinations, Iowa Code section 598.41(3)
enumerates factors to consider the custody arrangement in the “best interest of [a]
minor child.” Two relevant factors here include “[w]hether the parents can
communicate with each other regarding the child’s needs” and “[w]hether each
parent can support the other parent’s relationship with the child.” Iowa Code
§ 598.41(3)(c), (e). Shieghe’s actions, including denying Dillan’s visitation and
severely restricting the child’s time with extended family, tend to suggest Dillan can
provide superior care. As does Dillan’s willingness to foster the child’s relationship
with Shieghe and his attempts to resolve their disputes.
Shieghe’s final argument rests on her role as the child’s primary caregiver
for eight years. See In re Marriage of Wilson, 532 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995) (discussing the role of primary caretaker). “While we afford some weight to
the parent who historically acted as the primary caregiver, this factor is not
dispositive.” Eviglo v. Bedia, No. 22-2108, 2023 WL 4530263, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
July 13, 2023). The district court found Dillan’s willingness to accommodate the
child’s best interests—even at the cost of his career and salary—outweighed
Shieghe’s historical role as primary caregiver. We agree.
We recognize both parents have stable home lives and the necessary
resources to provide for the child. But in our de novo review, we largely agree with
the district court’s assessment and discern no basis for reversal. 9
B. Appellate Attorney Fees
Last, both Shieghe and Dillan seek appellate attorney fees to the tune of
$6750 and $12,500 respectively. In a custody modification action, the court may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. Iowa Code § 600B.26.
Shieghe did not prevail, so she cannot be awarded attorney fees. As for Dillan, “In
determining whether to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of
the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the
party making the request was obligated to defend the decision of the trial court on
appeal.” Hensch v. Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). Dillan has
adequate financial resources to pay his attorney fees. Having considered the
relevant factors, we decline to award any appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.