Dill v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev.

545 So. 2d 994, 1989 La. LEXIS 1460, 1989 WL 66371
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 19, 1989
Docket88-C-0850
StatusPublished
Cited by59 cases

This text of 545 So. 2d 994 (Dill v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dill v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 545 So. 2d 994, 1989 La. LEXIS 1460, 1989 WL 66371 (La. 1989).

Opinion

545 So.2d 994 (1989)

David DILL and Anna Dill
v.
STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

No. 88-C-0850.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 19, 1989.

*995 Norman L. Sisson, Sharon F. Lyles, William J. Doran, Jr., Frank J. Gremillion, Baton Rouge, for applicant.

Robert Chaisson, Destrehan, for respondent.

LEMMON, Justice.

The principal issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) was the sole party at fault in the two-car collision on a state highway.

The mid-day collision occurred in 1985 in a curve of La. Highway 48 (River Road) in St. Charles Parish known as Brown's Curve. Rain had been falling, and the asphalt pavement was wet.

Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. David Dill, were traveling east on the highway with Mr. Dill driving, and Warren Savoie was traveling west. As Savoie was negotiating the curve, he lost control of his car, crossed the center line, and collided head-on with the Dill vehicle.

The Dills compromised their claim with Savoie and filed this action against DOTD, alleging that DOTD was solely at fault in causing the accident. DOTD denied any liability, but alternatively alleged in its answer that Savoie was at least concurrently at fault and that the Dills' recovery should be reduced proportionately to the amount of fault attributable to Savoie.

After a trial on the merits, the district court rendered judgment in favor of the Dills and against DOTD for the full amount of the Dills' damages. The judge found that Dill was driving in his own lane at an appropriate speed and was suddenly faced with another motorist in his lane, without any reasonable opportunity to take evasive action. The judge further found that Savoie was driving at about the posted advisory safe speed for the curve (thirty miles per hour) and that the curvature of the road caused his car to go into the opposite lane. The judge concluded that the defective condition of the highway resulting from DOTD's failure to properly maintain the road was the sole causative fault in the accident.

The court of appeal affirmed in a divided decision. 522 So.2d 1288. The intermediate court reasoned that DOTD was at fault because the roadway was substandard in curvature and superelevation (banking), and was "worn, pot marked and cracked", especially in Savoie's lane. The court noted the history of a large number of accidents in the curve, the numerous complaints to DOTD by parish officials, and the recommendations of DOTD's traffic operations engineer for realignment of the curve because the posted warnings failed to adequately alert drivers to expect fully the significantly dangerous condition of the curve. The court held that the expert testimony, which explained that sliding could occur in the curve at the posted speed limit because of the substandard roadway conditions combined with the surface wetness, supported a finding of Savoie's lack of causative fault. We granted DOTD's application for certiorari. 532 So.2d 753.

DOTD contends that this court's decision in Meyers v. Department of Transportation and Development, 493 So.2d 1170 (La. 1986), requires reversal of the lower courts. This court held in Meyers that DOTD's failure to bring an existing highway up to the standards adopted after construction of the highway was not in itself grounds for imposition for liability on DOTD.[1] The *996 Meyers decision, however, is not controlling here. Meyers does not stand for the proposition advanced by DOTD that it can escape liability simply by showing that a highway met the existing standards when it was built. The present case turns on the determination of the question whether the condition of the highway constituted an unreasonable risk of injury which caused the accident. Design standards both at the time of original construction and at the time of the accident may be relevant factors for consideration in deciding this issue, but are not determinative of the issue.

The posted speed limit along the River Road in the general area was thirty-five miles per hour. A westbound motorist (such as Savoie) approaching the curve was warned by a yellow sign with a black arrow indicating a curve to the right. Attacted to the curve sign was a smaller advisory sign indicating that the safe speed for the curve was thirty miles per hour. There were also six chevron signs warning motorists of the approaching curve and flashing yellow lights warning motorists of a danger ahead.

The evidence also established that there had been seventy-two accidents in the curve in the six and one-half years prior to the accident, including fourteen in 1983 and twenty-three in 1984 (the latter an average of almost two per month). There were also records of numerous complaints from citizens of the community about the dangerousness of the curve and numerous requests from the parish governing authority that DOTD take immediate steps to make the highway safer at that point.

Savoie testified that he traveled the curve approximately two times per week and was aware of some of the dangers. He stated that he was attentive to the road ahead, saw the flashing lights, slowed as he approached the curve, and applied his brakes lightly as he entered the curve. When the car began to slide on the wet pavement, he let up on the brakes and attempted to regain control, but slammed the brakes when he saw the Dill car upon him. He further asserted that there were numerous potholes in his lane in the curve.

Plaintiffs presented an expert in traffic engineering and accident reconstruction who opined that the dangerous condition of the highway was the cause of the accident. He asserted that the highway was too narrow (a ten-foot lane width rather than the twelve-foot width currently required by modern standards); that the degree of the curvature was too severe (almost thirteen degrees, as compared to the recommended maximum curvature of four to six degrees); that there was virtually no shoulder on the highway; that the superelevation measurements of the curve varied, indicating the sloping was not uniform and that the coefficient of friction and critical speed determination were thereby affected; and that the pavement in the curve contained shallow potholes and cracked and worn surfacing, particularly in the right wheel path of the westbound lane.

On cross-examination the expert defined safe curve speed as the speed at which most drivers could negotiate the curve without problems under most conditions.[2]*997 Critical curve speed was defined as the speed at which a vehicle will begin to slide on the pavement under the worst conditions. The expert calculated the critical speed of Brown's Curve at forty-one miles per hour, assuming a uniform surface. He admitted that the facts of the case may indicate driver error on Savoie's part.

The district engineer for DOTD testified that there was a history of problems with driver expectation in the curve despite the seemingly adequate warning signs. More than three years before this accident, the engineer recommended realignment of the curve as the long-term solution and installation of chevron signs and flashing beacons as an interim measure.

DOTD also presented an expert in highway safety and accident reconstruction. He calculated that the coefficient of friction was sufficient to hold a car on the road in the curve at thirty miles per hour with virtually no banking.

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Bluebook (online)
545 So. 2d 994, 1989 La. LEXIS 1460, 1989 WL 66371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dill-v-state-dept-of-transp-dev-la-1989.