Dill v. Hamilton

291 N.W. 62, 137 Neb. 723, 129 A.L.R. 743, 1940 Neb. LEXIS 52
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 22, 1940
DocketNo. 30577
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 291 N.W. 62 (Dill v. Hamilton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dill v. Hamilton, 291 N.W. 62, 137 Neb. 723, 129 A.L.R. 743, 1940 Neb. LEXIS 52 (Neb. 1940).

Opinions

Rose, J.

Under the declaratory judgment act, plaintiffs, alleging they are officers or members and communicants of the Spiritualist Church, applied to the district court for Fillmore county for a judgment declaring their right to worship God according to their religious beliefs, tenets of faith, ceremonies and rituals, including spiritualistic seances, and also declaring the law to be such as to prevent defendants, who are prosecuting, executive and judicial officers, from interfering with the religious freedom and the devotional exercises of plaintiffs.

The petition contains allegations disclosing incorporation of the Spiritualist Church, its membership, tenets of religious faith, ceremonies and rituals, interference therewith by defendants and threats of future prosecutions for violations of the statute forbidding public exhibitions of religious seances for gain.

Defendants assailed the petition by demurrer which was sustained, by the district court and the proceeding dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed.

. The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the petition to state a justiciable case for a declaratory judgment. The determination of the issue thus raised depends on the power conferred upon the courts by the declaratory-judgment act, on the meaning and validity of the act to prohibit all public exhibitions of psychical forces or seances conducted by a spiritualistic medium for gain, and on the allegations of the petition. Declaratory judgments are authorized by the following provisions of statute:

[725]*725“The supreme court and courts of general chancery and common-law jurisdiction shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.” Laws 1929, ch. 75, sec. 1; Comp. St. 1929, sec. 20-21,140.
“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” Laws 1929, ch. 75, sec. 2; Comp. St. 1929, sec. 20-21,141.

“The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Laws 1929, ch. 75, sec. 6; Comp. St. 1929, sec. 20-21,145.

The statute under which the present controversy arose provides:

“Any person or persons who shall hereafter take part in, practice, assist, or become a subject in giving a public, open exhibition or seance or show of hypnotism, mesmerism, animal magnetism or so-called psychical forces for gain shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” Laws 1911, ch. 182, sec. 1; Comp. St. 1929, sec. 28-1111.

Violations of the act subjects the violators upon conviction to fine or imprisonment or both. Plaintiffs allege and contend that they are threatened by defendants with prosecutions for conducting spiritualistic seances as religious exercises authorized by their established mode of worship, [726]*726that defendants construe the act to authorize such prosecutions, and that so construed it is unconstitutional. The petition alleges further than John Wilbert Dill, one of the plaintiffs, is an ordained spiritualistic medium and minister of the Gospel; that he was formerly prosecuted, convicted and fined for alleged violation of the penal statute quoted and paid the fine to avoid imprisonment. Other members of the church are also plaintiffs herein, but no attempt is now made to substitute this proceeding fqr a new trial in the criminal prosecution or for an appeal or for another action. The former prosecution of Dill is not material to the proceeding at bar except perhaps to indicate a controversy and the necessity for a declaratory judgment. The relief grantable in a proceeding for a declaratory judgement extends by the very terms of the legislative act to the construction or validity of a' statute, where there is a justiciable, determinable controversy between the parties in respect to “rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” Plaintiffs, seeking a declaratory judgment, are not required in advance to violate a penal statute as a condition of having it construed or its validity determined. “Declaratory judgment proceedings,” says a text, “have frequently been employed to determine questions as to the construction or validity of statutes.” 16 Am. Jur. 296, sec. 24. Another writer on the same subject, citing cases, says:

“The danger of a criminal penalty attached by law to the performance of an act affords those affected the necessary legal interest in a judgment raising the issue of validity, immunity, or status.” Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 47.

The supreme court of Nebraska by unanimous opinion adopted the following views expressed by the supreme court of Kansas:

“It is hardly conceivable that any fundamental principle of our government, beyond legislative control, prevents two disputants, each of whom sincerely believes in the rightfulness of his own claim, but each of whom wishes to abide by the law whatever it may be determined to be, from obtain[727]*727ing an adjudication of their controversy in the courts without one or the other first doing something that is illegal (in the case of the present defendant criminal) if he is mistaken in his view of the law.” Lynn v. Kearney County, 121 Neb. 122, 236 N. W. 192; State v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82.

Jurisdiction of a court to render a declaratory judgment is not, therefore, lacking merely because the construction or validity of a penal statute is necessary to a decision. In view of the conclusions of law reached in connection with the facts stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer, the petition is not demurrable. The ruling below to the contrary is erroneous.

Does the act prohibiting “all public exhibitions of hypnotism, mesmerism, animal magnetism, or so-called psychical forces, for gain,” deprive plaintiffs of religious rights guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions? The language quoted is from the title of the act and is not legislation but indicates the subject of legislation. Alleged illegal interference with religious seances conducted by a spiritualistic medium is the subject of controversy. The prohibitions of the act itself are in this form:

“Any person or persons who shall hereafter take part in, practice, assist, or become a subject in giving a public, open exhibition or seance or show of hypnotism, mesmerism, animal magnetism or so-called psychical forces for gain shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” Laws 1911, ch. 182, sec. 1.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
291 N.W. 62, 137 Neb. 723, 129 A.L.R. 743, 1940 Neb. LEXIS 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dill-v-hamilton-neb-1940.