Diggs v. Brown Paper Mill Co.

125 So. 632, 12 La. App. 244, 1929 La. App. LEXIS 804
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 31, 1929
DocketNo. 3692
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 125 So. 632 (Diggs v. Brown Paper Mill Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diggs v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 125 So. 632, 12 La. App. 244, 1929 La. App. LEXIS 804 (La. Ct. App. 1929).

Opinion

REYNOLDS, J.

Plaintiff sued defendant, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, for $18 a week, for 400 weeks, beginning July 29, 1924, with legal interest on each installment from its maturity, less 123 payments of $18 each, received by him between July 29, 1924, and November 20, 1926, with legal interest on each payment from the time it was made, as compensation for alleged permanent total disability to do work of a reasonable character said to have resulted from an accidental fall by him from a ladder to a concrete floor in the course of his employment by defendant on July 22, 1924, which broke and mangled his left foot and ankle and injured his left hip and his back.

Defendant admitted the employment and accident but denied that plaintiff was injured to the, extent alleged or that he was permanently or totally disabled and denied that he was incapacitated to do work of a reasonable character, and alleged that only his foot was injured and that all the compensation he was entitled to therefor was $18 a week for 125 weeks and that it had paid him such compensation for 123 weeks and had tendered him $36 as the compensation for the two other weeks and he had refused to accept it.

On these issues the case was tried and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff against defendant for $18 per week during the period of total disability from July 29, 1924, to November 26, 1926, and in the further sum of $16.38 per week, being 40 per cent of the weekly wages of plaintiff, on the basis of permanent partial disability, for the period beginning November 26, 1926, and continuing for the additional period of 178 weeks thereafter, with interest at the legal rate on the weekly installments, beginning November 27, 1926, and on weekly installments thereafter from the respective dates the same became due theretofore and will become due hereafter, until paid; subject to credits of $18 per week paid by defendant for a period of 125 weeks, beginning July 29, 1924.

From this judgment defendant appealed. Plaintiff did not appeal nor did he answer defendant’s appeal.

OPINION

The cause of action arose while Act No. 43 of 1922 was in force, and defendant earnestly contends that plaintiff was entitled, at most, to 60 per cent of wages during 125 weeks, as for the loss of a foot (section 8, subsection 1, clause (d)), and cites many cases in support of its contention, which, -however, are inapplicable except on that theory.

Plaintiff contended that his hip and back also were injured and that in consequence [246]*246he was permanently totally disabled to do work of a reasonable character. The lower court awarded him compensation on the basis of temporary total disability from the time of the accident to November 26, 1926, and on the basis of permanent partial disability from the latter date; and the questions for our determination are, were plaintiff’s hip and back also injured in the accident? And was he at the time of the trial permanently partially disabled in consequence to do work of a reasonable character?

Plaintiff frankly admits, in his testimony, that, while he was undergoing treatment for the injury to his foot, he did not complain of an injury to his hip or back; and defendant insists that this proves that neither his back nor hip was injured.

Defendant’s contention is entitled to and has received proper consideration; but we think plaintiff explains this silence, and we think that in the light of it there was nothing inconsistent between the existence of the injury to the hip and back and his failure to complain of it.

He testified:

“Q. At that time you didn’t claim that you sustained any injury other than the loss of the foot, did you: — or the injury to the foot?

“A. I' didn’t know it at the time. I thought the suffering was caused from the foot. * * *

“Q. In your statement to Messrs. Holland & Cousins, you didn’t say anything about any other injuries, other than the loss of the foot?

“A. No, sir; I was suffering pains in my foot all the time, and didn’t know I was hurt anywhere else.

“Q. That was in January, 1927, I believe? After that, you went to see Messrs. Moss & Siess, in Lake Charles?

“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. You employed them to represent you, didn’t you?

“A. Yes, sir; I talked to them about taking the case.

“Q. You didn’t say anything to them about receiving any injury other than the injury to the foot?

“A. I told them I was suffering pain. I thought the pains I was suffering was from the foot. I didn’t know.

“Q. You didn’t know then that you sustained any other injuries other than the injury to the foot?

“A. No, sir.

“Q. And when they told you that you had been paid in full the amount due you for the loss of the foot, why you got some other lawyers to represent you — didn’t you?

“A. Well, I didn’t like the way they talked. I didn’t know whether they represented the insurance company or not, and I got some other lawyers. Got Mr. Stevenson to get Mr. Stubbs.”

In the light of the testimony of the physicians that plaintiff’s back was injured, this explanation of plaintiff’s failure to complain of that injury seems to us perfectly reasonable.

Plaintiff’s testimony about suffering pain from his back is corroborated by that of Dr. Isidore Cohn, who said:

“Q. Now, when you had him to go through what is known in military parlance or language as the setting up exercises, he experienced considerable pain, did he not?

“A. He experienced considerable pain.

“Q. In his back?

“A. In his back; the lower part of his back. * * *

“Q. Now, doctor, the fact that he has suffered pain in his back, and still suffers pain in his back, suggests, of course, that that is due to some cause, does it not?

“A. If it can be proved or disproved that he has or has not pain.

“Q. Well, you had no reason to think that he was not sincere in his statement?

“A. No, sir; I would go so far as to tell you that I wrote in a letter. Shall I quote from my letter?

“A. Yes.

[247]*247“A. I say: T do not think you are dealing with a case of compensation:itis.’ More than that: I stated in that same letter, that the removal of the hone of the foot, this chief weight bearing bone, results in a disturbance in weight hearing, that is, from that side, and, that being the case, of course you can expect a great many pains to come from it. Any one who has ever had a flat foot knows how much pain an individual can have, and I might say that I speak with a great deal of feeling (exhibiting foot). I wear a built up shoe, because I have pains in the calves of my legs when I don’t.”

Dr. Henry Dasput testified:

“Q. In your examination of the patient, he was perfectly frank with you, as to his symptoms of pain?

“A. Yes; and he stated this: that when he walked, his pain was induced, and that rest relieved the back discomfort. * * *

“Q. You have no reason to doubt that the plaintiff was suffering and is suffering with pains in his back on the left side, and in his left hip?

‘‘A. No reason whatever. * * *

“Q.

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130 So. 657 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1930)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
125 So. 632, 12 La. App. 244, 1929 La. App. LEXIS 804, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diggs-v-brown-paper-mill-co-lactapp-1929.