Diego Fernando Echiverri Mancilla v. Director, Texas Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedJune 1, 2026
Docket25-13520
StatusUnpublished

This text of Diego Fernando Echiverri Mancilla v. Director, Texas Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (Diego Fernando Echiverri Mancilla v. Director, Texas Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diego Fernando Echiverri Mancilla v. Director, Texas Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (11th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13520 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13520 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

DIEGO FERNANDO ECHIVERRI MANCILLA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

DIRECTOR, TEXAS SERVICE CENTER, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 6:24-cv-01065-PGB-DCI ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ABUDU and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 25-13520 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2026 Page: 2 of 6

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13520

Diego Fernando Echiverri Mancilla appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his amended complaint challenging the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services’ denial of his Form I- 140 petition for Alien Worker status under the Administrative Pro- cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court correctly dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but because that dismissal should have been without prejudice, we modify and affirm its order of dismissal. I. BACKGROUND In 2024, Echiverri Mancilla, a citizen of Colombia, filed an amended complaint requesting review of the denial of his Form I- 140 petition for Alien Worker status based on the finding that he did not meet the three-part test established in Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I. & N. Dec. 884 (USCIS AAO 2016). He contended that the dis- trict court had jurisdiction to review the denial under the Adminis- trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), because the government did not provide adequate explanation for its denial. The govern- ment moved to dismiss Echiverri Mancilla’s amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It applied Brasil v. Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 28 F.4th 1189 (11th Cir. 2022), and Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024), in concluding that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), barred judicial review of the discretionary decision to deny Echiverri Mancilla’s Form I-140, and it entered an order dismissing the amended complaint with prejudice. USCA11 Case: 25-13520 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2026 Page: 3 of 6

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Bouarfa v. Sec’y, Dept. of Homeland Sec., 75 F.4th 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 2023). III. DISCUSSION Echiverri Mancilla argues that the government did not ade- quately explain why it found he did not meet the second and third parts of the three-part Dhanasar test. He argues that he did not seek review of a discretionary decision and that the district court erro- neously dismissed his amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Administrative Procedure Act allows courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” an agency decision that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Section 1153(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act governs Form I-140 petitions for professions with advanced de- grees or exceptional ability. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A). Section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) carves out an exemption to the job offer and labor certification requirements for certain prospective aliens seeking im- migrant visas via a National Interest Waiver by providing that “the Attorney General may, when the Attorney General deems it to be in the national interest, waive the requirements of subparagraph (A) that an alien’s services in the sciences, arts, professions, or busi- ness be sought by an employer in the United States.” Id. § 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). As established in Matter of Dhanasar, the govern- ment may grant a National Interest Waiver if the petitioner estab- lishes “(1) that the foreign national’s proposed endeavor has both USCA11 Case: 25-13520 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2026 Page: 4 of 6

4 Opinion of the Court 25-13520

substantial merit and national importance; (2) that the foreign na- tional is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor; and (3) that, on balance, it would be beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certifica- tion.” 26 I & N Dec. 884, at 889. We lack jurisdiction to review “any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). In Bouarfa, we explained that there are two types of claims that are not subject to the jurisdic- tional bar in section 1252(a)(2)(B), even when the challenge relates to a discretionary decision: “a claim that the Secretary erred when he made a non-discretionary determination that is a statutory pred- icate to his exercise of discretion,” and “a claim that the Secretary failed to follow the correct procedure in making a discretionary de- cision.” 75 F.4th at 1163. Regarding this second category of claims, we explained that it is not the case “that all assertions of procedural error necessarily subject the Secretary’s actions to judicial review.” Id. And a petitioner may not sidestep the jurisdictional bar of sec- tion 1252(a)(2)(B) by reframing a challenge to the denial of relief as a claim of procedural error. Id. In Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review immigration decisions by the Attor- ney General or Secretary of Homeland Security that are “made dis- cretionary by legislation.” 604 U.S. at 9, 17. USCA11 Case: 25-13520 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2026 Page: 5 of 6

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In Brasil v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y, we affirmed a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) provides that a National Interest Waiver is within the discretion of the Attorney General because the words “may” and “deem” con- note discretion. 28 F.4th at 1193-94. We expressed no opinion about whether section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of deci- sions made under section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) when the issue involves the government’s failure to apply the Dhanasar test for granting Na- tional Interest Waivers or the failure to follow other agency proce- dures. Id. at 1194. Because Brasil argued that the government erred in finding that he did not meet the Dhanasar test, we held that sec- tion 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of that decision. Id.

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Related

DHANASAR
26 I. & N. Dec. 884 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2016)
Bouarfa v. Mayorkas
604 U.S. 6 (Supreme Court, 2024)

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Diego Fernando Echiverri Mancilla v. Director, Texas Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diego-fernando-echiverri-mancilla-v-director-texas-service-center-us-ca11-2026.