Dickson v. Lewis & Graham

2 Del. 289
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedJuly 5, 1837
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Del. 289 (Dickson v. Lewis & Graham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dickson v. Lewis & Graham, 2 Del. 289 (Del. Ct. App. 1837).

Opinion

The Court

said that applications of this kind were directed to the equitable consideration of the court, and governed by a legal discretion, in order to effect the ends of justice. The defendant has by his affidavit laid a ground upon which the courts usually grant a continuance. Yet as the plaintiff, by his counter affidavit, suggests that injustice may be done by the continuance, and proposes a mode by which the defendant may now have the benefit of what he expects to prove by his absent witness, it is but reasonable that the defendant should be required to disclose the facts.

Lewis then, on his oath, stated that he expected to prove by McDowell, that he set up public notice of dissolution of the partnership of Lewis & Graham in March, 1835, which being admitted, the motion for continuance was refused.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Del. 289, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickson-v-lewis-graham-delsuperct-1837.