Dickson v. Entergy Arkansas LLC

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS NORTHERN DIVISION RONNIE DICKSON PLAINTIFF

No. 3:21-cv-59-DPM

ENTERGY ARKANSAS, LLC DEFENDANT ORDER 1. The Court dismissed Dickson’s first amended complaint in July 2021 without prejudice and with leave to amend. He has filed a second amended complaint. Entergy moves to dismiss again, arguing that Dickson still hasn’t pleaded his causes of action with enough specificity to state any federal claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts the well-pleaded facts as true. Trone Health Services, Inc. v. Express Scripts Holdings Co., 974 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2020). 2. Dickson again concedes that Entergy isn’t a state actor. Doc. 21 at 10. His constitutional tort claims therefore fail. 3. The allegations in Dickson’s second amended complaint are sufficient to plead race discrimination. Lake v. Yellow Transportation Inc., 596 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2010). Dickson, a white man, says Entergy treated him less favorably than black employees. He says Entergy falsely accused him of using a racial slur on the job and fired him. Dickson alleges that Entergy doesn’t make false accusations about

black employees, plus black employees who routinely broke the rules weren't fired for doing so. Doc. 15 at § 30. Whether Dickson has a solid reverse-discrimination case on disparate treatment is a question for a later day. Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 794 F.3d 899, 905 (8th Cir. 2015). Dickson’s federal and state race discrimination claims go forward because they’re plausible. 4. Dickson’s disability-related claims, however, still lack key ingredients. He hasn’t plausibly alleged that he’s a qualified individual under the ADA, a threshold requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Cook v. George’s, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 939 (8th Cir. 2020). Dickson says that due to a work-related injury to his left arm, he can’t use that arm to drive, can’t lift more than five pounds, and can’t do the essential functions of his job as asenior lineman. Doc. 15 at 42, 48. He does not allege, though, that he could perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation. He pleads only that Entergy didn’t provide or offer any accommodation. Doc. 15 at { 49. Dickson is not a qualified individual unless he could do his job with some adjustment; and the Court can’t reasonably infer that key ingredient. 5. Dickson’s retaliation claims also fall short. The second amended complaint doesn’t plausibly allege that Dickson engaged in statutorily protected conduct and suffered an adverse employment action that was causally linked to the protected conduct. Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 2007). He maintains that he was fired

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in retaliation for requesting medical treatment, for taking medical leave, and for filing an unidentified grievance with his union. None of these activities is protected under Title VII. Hunt v. Nebraska Public Power District, 282 F.3d 1021, 1028 (8th Cir. 2002). Dickson also says he was fired for helping a black employee get more hours and overtime. With additional background facts, this allegation could support a retaliation claim. But Dickson hasn’t pleaded those background facts or otherwise alleged sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference of retaliation. 6. Dickson has pleaded a plausible slander claim. It’s plausible that getting fired for using a racial slur has left a mark on Dickson's reputation. Ellis v. Price, 337 Ark. 542, 549-50, 990 S.W.2d 543 (1999). Motion to dismiss, Doc. 18, partly granted and partly denied. Dickson’s constitutional tort, ADA, and retaliation claims will be dismissed without prejudice. His race discrimination and slander claims remain. So Ordered.

fr. D.P. Marshall Jr. United States District Judge lo Meemker ZO2\