Dickson and Johnson v. State

127 S.W.2d 126, 197 Ark. 1161, 1939 Ark. LEXIS 348
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedApril 3, 1939
Docket4110
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 127 S.W.2d 126 (Dickson and Johnson v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dickson and Johnson v. State, 127 S.W.2d 126, 197 Ark. 1161, 1939 Ark. LEXIS 348 (Ark. 1939).

Opinion

Baker, J.

Tire indictment in tins case by the grand jury of Garland county was against Joe Anderson, Lucille Anderson, Alfred (Png) Dickson, and Clarence (Bill) Johnson charging the crime of murder in the first degree. It was charged that the four of them entered into a conspiracy by which they agreed with each other to commit the crime of robbery upon one Eldon Cooley, and that in furtherance of this design and while in pursuance thereof one of the defendants, the particular one being unknown to the grand jury, killed and murdered the said Eldon ‘Cooley by shooting him.

Joe Anderson and Lucille Anderson were tried together and both convicted. Upon an appeal decided January 30, 1939, this court affirmed the conviction of Joe Anderson, but reversed and remanded for a new trial the case as against Lucille Anderson. Anderson v. State, ante p. 600, 124 S. W. 2d 216.

Upon this appeal by Dickson and Johnson the questions are not exactly identical with those in the Anderson Case, supra. It was there urged particularly that the confessions made by Dickson and Johnson were not properly admissible in evidence against Anderson and his wife, Lucille Anderson, but it was held under the facts presented that there was no prejudicial error as to Joe Anderson and his conviction was affirmed. Upon this particular case, upon trial in the circuit court, both of the defendants were found guilty of murder in the first degree and punishment in each case was death.

The appellants have furnished us with an elaborate argument and contention in which they insist a reversal in each of these cases is justified. The attorney general has prepared a much more elaborate abstract of the testimony, and we think that the issues involved upon this appeal have been, by both appellants and appellee, forcefully presented for our consideration. It may be said that there are only two propositions of sufficient importance to justify comment. The first is that the appellants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The second question is somewhat unusual, that is to say, that the appellants contend that even though it may he determined that the evidence was sufficient to show a conspiracy to rob Eldon Cooley, the conspiracy ended and its purposes had been fully consummated prior to the time Cooley was hilled, and that therefore, to justify a conviction of murder in the first degree the burden was upon the state to prove that these appellants participated in the murder. Both of these propositions are questions of fact and may be settled in determining the sufficiency of evidence.

For the reason that most of the facts are stated in the Anderson Case, supra, only such of them will be repeated as may be deemed necessary to state the issues upon the appeal and to preserve the continuity of such facts as must be of controlling effect.

Each of the appellants testified in the circuit court that he had prior to the time of his trial made a voluntary statement which had been offered in evidence without objection. The said statement made by each was offered against the other upon a showing that it had been reduced to writing and read in the presence of both of them and that neither questioned the accuracy of either statement. They only claimed that explanations should be made of certain matters set out in the statements given. It should be said, however, in his testimony appellant Johnson asserted that some of the matters in his signed statement were not true and he said that the reason therefor was the fact that he was so uneducated or illiterate as to be unable to “follow through” when the statement was read to him and the further fact that he was scared or frightened.. Both of these defendants testified in the case and went into minute details in explanation of all matters set forth in their respective statements and the statements given by the other, as well as explanations, corrections or denials of the testimony of other witnesses.

Without resorting to the well known rule that the appellee has the right upon appeal to have the most favorable conclusion of which the evidence may he susceptible to sustain the verdict and judgment of the court, it may be here said that it is without substantial dispute that Joe Anderson, who had never lived in or around Hot Springs, and was unacquainted with local conditions there, reached the home of appellant Johnson, who lived in the country five or six miles from the business district of Hot Spring's, about midnight of Tuesday, September 6, 1938. On Wednesday Johnson and Anderson visited the business district of the city. Johnson was in one of the Steuart stores. ' Anderson, if not in the store, was at or near the front of it some time during the day. On Thursday morning, perhaps around eight or nine o’clock, Anderson and Johnson visited Dickson, who was living with one of his.sisters in Hot Springs. He was found to be at work moving some old lumber, in the yard. When he had finished, the three of them talked a little while before Dickson went into the bath room, into which Dickson was followed by the other two. All three of them testified about what occurred on that visit. Without- giving conclusions as to more material matters resort will be had to evidence of witnesses.

The cases upon appeal were tried immediately following the trial and conviction óf Anderson and his wife, and Anderson was called in this case to testify on behalf of the state. He said at the time he was introduced by Johnson to Dickson, Johnson assured him Dickson was a good man .to do business with. It is argued by appellants.that this remark had reference to the fact that Anderson had offered to furnish money to enable Johnson and Dickson to open a dance hall and beer parlor combined, and that the parties were discussing this matter of business and the remark was applicable to it. Anderson said they were discussing “getting money. ’ ’ When asked to explain what he meant by ‘ ‘ getting money, ’ ’ and if they meant “stick-ups” or robberies, he said that was the idea.

He asked about large chain stores in that community and said that Dickson told him of two chain stores operating in Hot Spiings. One being Jett’s and tlie other Steuart’s. While Dickson does not deny that this conversation took place regarding the large chain stores., he made his explanation upon the trial saying that the information given Anderson was in response to an idle or apparently disinterested question made by Anderson, and without knowing that Anderson was seeking information to perpetrate a robbery.

All of these matters were gone into by testimony by the three parties who knew about it. Explanations were duly given. The arguments presented upon these matters assumes the correctness of appellants’ theory, and, therefore, the insufficiency of proof in that regard. Much other evidence as to surrounding conditions and circumstances was introduced for consideration of the jury. We think the jury may well have reached a decision contrary to the contention appellants make.

Johnson and Anderson both testified that they had served time in the United States prison' together, that there was an understanding, if not agreement, that when Anderson had served his time, Johnson having been released first, Anderson would visit' him, and the visit made was in accordance with that understanding.

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Bluebook (online)
127 S.W.2d 126, 197 Ark. 1161, 1939 Ark. LEXIS 348, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickson-and-johnson-v-state-ark-1939.