Dickman v. Union Railway Co.
This text of 133 Misc. 710 (Dickman v. Union Railway Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The moving papers claimed no irregularity in the proceedings on which the default judgment was based. Section 129 of the Municipal Court Code would, therefore, appear to preclude the opening of the default after a year had elapsed. (Stoneware Elec. Stove Works v. Barrett, 117 Misc. 699; Scott v. Hemmer, 131 id. 474; affd., 223 App. Div. 872.)
Respondent attempts to excuse its laches by proof of the fact that it had no notice of the default or judgment. While section 108 of the Civil Practice Act provides that such applications are to be made within one year after notice of the judgment, section 129 of the Municipal Court Code contains no reference to notice. It limits the time to one year after the entry of the judgment.
Order reversed, with ten dollar scosts, and judgment below reinstated.
All concur; present, Lydon, Callahan and Peters, JJ.
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133 Misc. 710, 233 N.Y.S. 331, 1929 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 696, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickman-v-union-railway-co-nyappterm-1929.