Dickey v. Greene

603 F. Supp. 102, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 905, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,079
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. North Carolina
DecidedDecember 19, 1984
Docket82-26-CIV-4
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 603 F. Supp. 102 (Dickey v. Greene) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dickey v. Greene, 603 F. Supp. 102, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 905, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,079 (E.D.N.C. 1984).

Opinion

ORDER

DUPREE, District Judge.

Complaining of sexual harassment by her supervisor, plaintiff Delia R. Dickey brought the present action on March 12, 1982 alleging defendants, all officials of the Region P Human Development Agency, Inc., had engaged in unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The case is now before the court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion will be granted as to defendants Alice Faye Baker and Eulus G. King but denied as to defendant Willie Greene.

Plaintiff began working at Region P Human Development Agency, Inc. in September, 1975 under the immediate supervision of defendant Willie Greene, the executive director of the agency. Approximately three weeks after she began work, plaintiff alleges that Greene began making “lustful and obscene gestures” toward her. Plaintiff resisted his overtures, but she contends that he continued to harass her and eventually asked her to accompany him to a hotel. Although plaintiff refused to acknowledge Greene’s advances and requested that he leave her alone, she claims that Greene continued to sexually harass her until September of 1976 when he terminated her employment, explaining that there was not enough work to support her position. Plaintiff asserts that Greene’s reasons for dismissing her were fabricated, since he later hired another person to do the same work.

Plaintiff filed a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on October 18, 1976 alleging that she had been wrongfully discharged for refusing to succumb to Greene’s sexual advances. It is unclear what, if anything, occurred at the agency level between 1976 and 1981. In any event, plaintiff submitted a second charge of discrimination on August 8,1981, a copy of which is attached to this order, and apparently received a right-to-sue letter sometime thereafter. 1 She then filed the *104 present action on March 12, 1982 against Greene, Alice Faye Baker and Eulus G. King. At the time of suit, Baker was Chairman of the Head Start Policy Council and King was Chairman of the Board of Region P Human Development Agency, Inc. All defendants were sued in their individual and representative capacities.

Defendants answered plaintiffs complaint by generally denying all of her allegations and moving to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants contended that plaintiff had only identified Region P Human Development Agency, Inc., in the charge of discrimination and had not listed any of their names as respondents. By failing to do so, defendants argued, plaintiff had not satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for bringing suit under Title VII.

The case was initially referred to a magistrate who granted defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir.1967). 2 Plaintiff did not object to the magistrate’s memorandum and recommendation and the court adopted it as its order on July 28, 1982 thereby dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII suit against the three defendants. 3

On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, plaintiff argued for the first time that since she referred to defendant Greene in the narrative portion of the charge form, her suit, at least as far as Greene was concerned, should have been allowed to proceed. This court’s order dismissing the case was initially affirmed by a panel of judges over a vigorous dissent by Judge Murnaghan. Dickey v. Greene, 710 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1983) . Plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing en banc and the case was heard a second time by the full Court of Appeals. Dickey v. Greene, 729 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1984) . Writing for a five-four majority, Chief Judge Winter concluded that the case was not properly before the Fourth Circuit since it appeared that a copy of the charge of discrimination had never been made a part of the record and therefore had not been considered by this court or the magistrate. Accordingly, the case was remanded for supplementation of the record and reconsideration.

As Chief Judge Winter surmised, plaintiff's charge of discrimination was never submitted for inclusion in the record and was not considered by this court or the magistrate. Plaintiff’s complaint generally alleged that the jurisdictional prerequisites for a suit under Title VII had been satisfied. Defendants answered by moving to dismiss the case because

[t]he only respondent named in plaintiff’s formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC is “Region P. Human Development Agency, Inc.” Therefore, plaintiff has failed to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites to filing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. [§] 2000e-2(a)(1) as against any defendant other than the corporate entity known as Region P. Human Development Agency, Inc. (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ motions to dismiss and the magistrate apparently, and understandably, concluded from the above-quoted passage that the only name appearing anywhere on the face of the charge of discrimination was that of “Region P. Human Development Agency, *105 Inc.” Relying upon the clear factual and legal precedent of Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, supra, the magistrate dismissed plaintiffs Title VII claim and the court adopted this portion of the magistrate’s memorandum and recommendation for the same reason.

Neither plaintiff nor defendants brought to the court’s attention the fact that Greene’s name appeared elsewhere on the charge of discrimination and made no effort to make the form a part of the record. Thus, the form was not in the record simply because there had been nothing to alert the court that it was needed for a full adjudication of the case.

Following the case’s remand by the Fourth Circuit the court by order filed June 19, 1984 directed plaintiff to submit a copy of the charge of discrimination and allowed both parties the opportunity to make whatever additional submissions and arguments they deemed necessary. Plaintiff responded by providing the court with a copy of the charge. The court will consider defendants’ motions to dismiss as renewed but they will be treated as motions for summary judgment since matters outside the pleadings have been submitted. See Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.Civ.P.

The names of defendants Baker and King do not appear anywhere on plaintiff’s charge of discrimination. In Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service,

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Bluebook (online)
603 F. Supp. 102, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 905, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21123, 36 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 35,079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dickey-v-greene-nced-1984.