Dickey v. Department of Revenue

4 Or. Tax 595
CourtOregon Tax Court
DecidedDecember 22, 1971
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 4 Or. Tax 595 (Dickey v. Department of Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dickey v. Department of Revenue, 4 Or. Tax 595 (Or. Super. Ct. 1971).

Opinion

Carlisle B. Roberts, Judge.

Cases 562 and 595 were consolidated for trial. Each involved the value of a service station site located on Valley View Road, adjacent to the North Ashland Interchange of federal highway 1-5, Jackson County, Oregon, the legal description being recorded as Account No. 381E32-500, Code 5-8, consisting of approximately seven-tenths acres of land. Case No. 562 requires the determination of the true cash value of the subject property as of January 1, 1969, and is on appeal to this court pursuant to ORS 306.545 (the Department of Revenue having failed to act upon plaintiff’s petition for hearing for more than 12 months and the petition therefore being deemed denied) ; case No. 595 requires the determination of true cash value of the subject property as of January 1, 1970, and is an appeal from the Department of Rev *596 enue’s Order No. VL 71-262, dated March. 30, 1971, sustaining the order of the Jackson County Board of Equalization. In both years the true cash value is on the roll at $34,250. The plaintiff contends that the value in both years should be $21,000. In both cases we are dealing with a site value, the value of land only, located in a rural area on a county road immediately adjacent to an interstate freeway, the subject property being leased by the owner to a major oil company for a period of 20 years plus two options for an additional five years each.

Encyclopedia of Real Estate Appraising 849, ch 40, “Gasoline Service Station Appraisal,” (Friedman, ed, Rev Ed 1970), emphasizes at 850:

“* * * Service station property has special features of location that are suited to service station use to a greater degree than property adjacent to it, across the street, or in close proximity. * * *”

See also special articles on factors and trends in appraising service stations found in 4 Assessors J 65-74 (No. 2, July 1969); 5 Assessors J 47-59 (No. 3, October 1970); XXIV The Appraisal J 393-398 (No. 3, July 1956); XXXVI The Appraisal J 559-567 (No. 4, October 1968); and XXXIX The Appraisal J 82-93 (No. 1, January 1971).

The court did not find the testimony of either plaintiff or defendant sufficient to support their respective views. The sole witness for the defendant was an appraiser of several years’ experience in the office of the assessor. He had prepared an appraisal report (Defendant’s Exhibit A) which contained a quantity of pertinent, useful information — and a number of puzzles. In his testimony he gave lip service, at least, to the view that “site” of a service station is *597 vital, not the number of square feet it contains. As stated in Encyclopedia of Real Estate Appraising, supra, at 858:

“Land for a service station is bought as a ‘site.’ Assuming that the plot is ‘large enough to do the job’, the typical buyer will think not in terms of front foot price or square foot price, but in terms of ‘site cost.’ The market for service station sites does not pay much attention to unit values. In comparing properties in service station evaluation, the appraiser tends, therefore, to balance site against site, rather than unit value against unit value, for this is what actually happens in the market place.”

The witness testified that he used the income approach to value but in Ms report he lists nine alleged “comparable” sites for which he noted the square feet of area developed by the lessee oil company and the square feet of undeveloped area, then set a value of $1.45 per square foot for the developed property and ten cents per square foot for the undeveloped property —and all Ms assessed valuations for the comparable properties are based upon this method. The appraisal cards reflect this method. It was developed at trial that the first information he obtained on the minimum lease payments for subject property was volunteered by the plaintiff at the Department of Revenue’s hearing on March 30, 1971, and the information on which he bases his income approach apparently has all been obtained since that time. While stating that the income approach is the best one in the circumstances, he has shown the values attained thereby as “indicated values” only, adhering to the value based upon square feet for use in the actual assessment roll (with no indication in testimony or by exhibit as to what he bases the value of $1.45 per square foot). As to the subject property, he obtained a $34,250 value on the square- *598 foot basis and a value of $36,000 on the income approach, but settled for the $34,250 originally assessed. He admitted the square-foot rates are misleading in this type of appraisal.

Of course, since the parties are seeking to value land only, the cost approach is not applicable. The sales data approach was not available, since only one sale of a service station site (comparable No. 5) could be found. The defendant’s “comparables,” quite properly, were leases by landowners of a “site,” taken out of larger land holdings because of strategic location. As the plaintiff testified, the landowners do not wish to sell, desiring to preserve their estates. This leaves only the income approach available (which the defendant’s witness claimed he followed but, as has been said, it was utilized by him only as an “indication of value,” superimposed on his original appraisal report based on data from an unknown benchmark). For the purpose of income, he sought information as to the leases entered into between the landowner and the oil company. He was able to obtain the amount of minimum rental payments per month and ascertained whether the lessor or lessee paid the taxes on the bare land, but did not obtain any information as to gallonage sold per month, the amount of additional payments over the minimum received by the landowners, or provisions in the leases for “cost of living” adjustments. Using the minimum rental per year, he obtained the value of the property by using a capitalization rate of seven, eight or nine percent and, where taxes were paid by the lessee, adding two and one-half percent to account therefor. It was not made clear as to the situations under which seven, eight or nine percent was determined as the proper rate, but he testified that an eight percent rate was acceptable in the community. *599 The witness’ own records indicated that three percent for taxation would be more readily justified than 2.5 percent, and the plaintiff testified that, in his own ease, the taxes represented at least 25 percent of the minimum income.

Upon being queried as to the difference in the assessed valuation and that found by the income method, the witness’ explanation was unsatisfactory. It reads as follows:

“A * * ® Adding these two figures together, we get a figure of $34,247, rounded to $34,250.
“Q That is $1,750 less than what the 10.5 capitalization rate shows. Is that correct?
“A The difference between $36,000 and $34,250 —yes, sir, $1,750.
“Q Well, how come there was even less value than what the capitalization rate showed?

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