Dickenson Co. Medical Centerv Barbara Rose
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Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
DICKENSON COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER AND FIRE & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 0731-00-3 PER CURIAM AUGUST 1, 2000 BARBARA G. ROSE
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Robert M. McAdam; Jones & Glenn, P.L.C., on brief), for appellants.
(Paul L. Phipps; Lee & Phipps, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Dickenson County Medical Center and its insurer
(hereinafter referred to as "employer") contend that the
Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in finding that Barbara
G. Rose proved that (1) her current psychiatric condition is, in
part, causally related to her May 3, 1998 compensable injury by
accident, and (2) she was totally disabled from work due to her
psychiatric condition. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs
of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. See
Rule 5A:27.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. I.
"General principles of workman's compensation law provide
that '[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground of
change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such
change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence.'" Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459,
464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572
(1986)). "[I]t is fundamental that a finding of fact made by the
Commission is conclusive and binding upon this court on review. A
question raised by conflicting medical opinion is a question of
fact." Commonwealth v. Powell, 2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d
532, 533 (1986). "Questions raised by conflicting medical
opinions must be decided by the commission." Penley v. Island
Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1989).
In granting Rose's application alleging a
change-in-condition, the commission found as follows:
We . . . note that, after Dr. [Patricia] Vanover offered her opinion on the issue of disability, neither party thereafter approached Dr. [Russell D.] McKnight or Dr. [Ashvin A.] Patel for a clarification of their respective opinions on the issue of causation. Dr. McKnight found that [Rose's] psychiatric condition was causally related to the work injury and Dr. Patel had previously found that the industrial accident at least aggravated or exacerbated the pre-existing depressive disorder.
- 2 - Given the record before us, we find a sufficient foundation for the opinions rendered by Dr. McKnight and Dr. Patel. We find that the greater weight of the evidence establishes that [Rose's] current psychiatric condition is, in part, causally related to the work injury and likewise any disability flowing therefrom.
The commission's findings are supported by credible
evidence, including the opinions and medical records of Drs.
McKnight and Patel. In its role as fact finder, the commission
was entitled to accept the opinions of Drs. McKnight and Patel
and to reject any contrary medical evidence. In addition, based
upon the opinions and medical records of Drs. McKnight and
Patel, the commission, as fact finder, could reasonably infer
that Rose's current psychiatric condition is, at least in part,
causally related to her compensable injury by accident. See
Papco Oil Co. v. Farr, 26 Va. App. 66, 75, 492 S.E.2d 858, 862
(1997) (holding that "a condition which has two causes, one
related to a work injury, and one not, is compensable and the
treatment of that condition will be the responsibility of the
employer").
II.
On review, before the commission, employer did not argue
that Rose failed to prove that she was entitled to temporary
total disability benefits as a result of her psychiatric
condition. The sole issue raised by employer in its written
statement submitted on review was whether Rose had proven a
- 3 - causal connection between her psychiatric condition and her
compensable injury by accident. Accordingly, we will not
address this issue on appeal. See Green v. Warwick Plumbing &
Heating Corp., 5 Va. App. 409, 413, 364 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1988); Rule
5A:18.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
- 4 -
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