IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LAWRENCE B. DICKENS, § § No. 221, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 79800001DI (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §
Submitted: December 5, 2024 Decided: February 17, 2025
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to
affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Lawrence Dickens, appeals the Superior Court’s denial
of his motions for postconviction relief and correction of illegal sentence. The State
of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Dickens’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We
agree and affirm.
(2) In 1980, a Superior Court jury convicted Dickens of first-degree murder
for the shooting of Myrtis Handy, attempted first-degree murder for the shooting of
Elmira Handy, first-degree assault for the shooting of a bystander, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (PDWDCF). Following a
penalty hearing mandated by Delaware’s death penalty statute, 11 Del. C. § 4209
(“Section 4209”), at which the State conceded that there was no statutory
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the
Superior Court sentenced Dickens to life imprisonment without the possibility of
probation or parole for first-degree murder. Following a presentence investigation,
the Superior Court sentenced Dickens to life imprisonment for attempted first-degree
murder and to fifteen years of incarceration for first-degree assault.1 We affirmed
Dickens’ convictions and sentence on appeal.2
(3) Between 1989 and 2002, Dickens filed three unsuccessful motions for
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.3 On September 5,
2023, Dickens filed a fourth motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he could
overcome the Rule 61’s procedural bar against repetitive motions4 because there was
legislation pending before the General Assembly that would repeal Section 4209.
1 At the time, Dickens’ convictions for first-degree assault and PDWDCF merged for sentencing purposes. See Hunter v. State, 420 A.2d 119 (Del. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 991 (1981). 2 Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 1981). 3 State v. Dickens, 602 A.2d 95 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (denying Dickens’ first motion for postconviction relief), aff’d, 1990 WL 43318 (Del. Mar. 22, 1990); State v. Dickens, 1994 WL 145988 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 1994), aff’d, 1994 WL 466126 (Del. Aug. 25, 1994); Dickens v. State, 2003 WL 1922507 (Del. Apr. 21, 2003) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Dickens’ third motion for postconviction relief). 4 See Del. Super. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) (providing that a second or subsequent motion for postconviction relief must be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial and pleads with particularity new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent or that a new rule of constitutional law is retroactively applicable and renders his conviction invalid). 2 The motion was referred to a Superior Court commissioner. On December 21, 2023,
Dickens filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence, arguing that his life
sentence for attempted first-degree murder is illegal because it was imposed under
Section 4209. This motion was referred to the same Superior Court commissioner.
(4) On January 11, 2024, the Superior Court commissioner issued a report
recommending that the Superior Court deny both of Dickens’ motions.5 In so doing,
the commissioner noted that the pending legislation did not seek to repeal Section
4209 in its entirety but sought to eliminate the death penalty as a possible sentence
for a first-degree murder conviction.6 Because Dickens had not been sentenced to
death, the commissioner found (correctly) that the pending legislation, if signed into
law, would have no effect on Dickens’ sentence and did not create a new
constitutional rule that was retroactively applicable to Dickens’ case. The
commissioner therefore recommended that Dickens’ motion for postconviction
relief be summarily dismissed. The commissioner also recommended that Dickens’
motion for correction of illegal sentence be denied because Dickens’ life sentence
for first-degree murder was not only legal, but mandatory.7 On May 2, 2024, the
Superior Court adopted the commissioner’s report and recommendation and denied
5 State v. Dickens, 2024 WL 165991 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2024) (“Dickens IV”). 6 Id. at *1-2. 7 Id. at *2. 3 Dickens’ motions for postconviction relief and correction of sentence. This appeal
followed.
(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.8 We also review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for
correction of illegal sentence for abuse of discretion.9 A sentence is illegal if it
exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with
respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory,
omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is
a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.10
(6) Dickens’ arguments on appeal may be fairly summarized as follows: (i)
the grand jury’s indictment violated his right to due process because it failed to put
him on notice that he was being charged with capital murder; (ii) he could not be
indicted for capital murder because the indictment failed to identify an aggravating
factor justifying the imposition of the death penalty under Section 4209; and (iii) his
life sentence for attempted first-degree murder is illegal. Dickens has waived those
arguments that he made below but failed to raise in his opening brief.11
8 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 9 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 10 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 11 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 4 (7) On appeal, Dickens does not attempt to overcome Rule 61’s procedural
bar prohibiting repetitive motions for postconviction relief. In any event, there is no
merit to Dickens’ claim that the grand jury’s indictment was constitutionally
deficient. An indictment performs two essential functions: to put the accused on
notice of what he is called upon to defend, and to effectively preclude a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.12 “These purposes are fulfilled if the indictment,
as required by [Superior Court Criminal] Rule 7(c), contains a plain statement of the
elements or essential facts of the crime.”13 Here, the indictment—which, in relevant
part, charged Dickens with “intentionally caus[ing] the death of Myrtis Handy by
shooting her with a .38 caliber pistol”14—did so.15
(8) Although Dickens is correct that the Superior Court incorrectly
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LAWRENCE B. DICKENS, § § No. 221, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 79800001DI (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §
Submitted: December 5, 2024 Decided: February 17, 2025
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to
affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Lawrence Dickens, appeals the Superior Court’s denial
of his motions for postconviction relief and correction of illegal sentence. The State
of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is
manifest on the face of Dickens’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We
agree and affirm.
(2) In 1980, a Superior Court jury convicted Dickens of first-degree murder
for the shooting of Myrtis Handy, attempted first-degree murder for the shooting of
Elmira Handy, first-degree assault for the shooting of a bystander, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony (PDWDCF). Following a
penalty hearing mandated by Delaware’s death penalty statute, 11 Del. C. § 4209
(“Section 4209”), at which the State conceded that there was no statutory
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the
Superior Court sentenced Dickens to life imprisonment without the possibility of
probation or parole for first-degree murder. Following a presentence investigation,
the Superior Court sentenced Dickens to life imprisonment for attempted first-degree
murder and to fifteen years of incarceration for first-degree assault.1 We affirmed
Dickens’ convictions and sentence on appeal.2
(3) Between 1989 and 2002, Dickens filed three unsuccessful motions for
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.3 On September 5,
2023, Dickens filed a fourth motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he could
overcome the Rule 61’s procedural bar against repetitive motions4 because there was
legislation pending before the General Assembly that would repeal Section 4209.
1 At the time, Dickens’ convictions for first-degree assault and PDWDCF merged for sentencing purposes. See Hunter v. State, 420 A.2d 119 (Del. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 991 (1981). 2 Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 1981). 3 State v. Dickens, 602 A.2d 95 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989) (denying Dickens’ first motion for postconviction relief), aff’d, 1990 WL 43318 (Del. Mar. 22, 1990); State v. Dickens, 1994 WL 145988 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 1994), aff’d, 1994 WL 466126 (Del. Aug. 25, 1994); Dickens v. State, 2003 WL 1922507 (Del. Apr. 21, 2003) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Dickens’ third motion for postconviction relief). 4 See Del. Super. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) (providing that a second or subsequent motion for postconviction relief must be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial and pleads with particularity new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent or that a new rule of constitutional law is retroactively applicable and renders his conviction invalid). 2 The motion was referred to a Superior Court commissioner. On December 21, 2023,
Dickens filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence, arguing that his life
sentence for attempted first-degree murder is illegal because it was imposed under
Section 4209. This motion was referred to the same Superior Court commissioner.
(4) On January 11, 2024, the Superior Court commissioner issued a report
recommending that the Superior Court deny both of Dickens’ motions.5 In so doing,
the commissioner noted that the pending legislation did not seek to repeal Section
4209 in its entirety but sought to eliminate the death penalty as a possible sentence
for a first-degree murder conviction.6 Because Dickens had not been sentenced to
death, the commissioner found (correctly) that the pending legislation, if signed into
law, would have no effect on Dickens’ sentence and did not create a new
constitutional rule that was retroactively applicable to Dickens’ case. The
commissioner therefore recommended that Dickens’ motion for postconviction
relief be summarily dismissed. The commissioner also recommended that Dickens’
motion for correction of illegal sentence be denied because Dickens’ life sentence
for first-degree murder was not only legal, but mandatory.7 On May 2, 2024, the
Superior Court adopted the commissioner’s report and recommendation and denied
5 State v. Dickens, 2024 WL 165991 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2024) (“Dickens IV”). 6 Id. at *1-2. 7 Id. at *2. 3 Dickens’ motions for postconviction relief and correction of sentence. This appeal
followed.
(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.8 We also review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for
correction of illegal sentence for abuse of discretion.9 A sentence is illegal if it
exceeds statutory limits, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, is ambiguous with
respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory,
omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is
a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.10
(6) Dickens’ arguments on appeal may be fairly summarized as follows: (i)
the grand jury’s indictment violated his right to due process because it failed to put
him on notice that he was being charged with capital murder; (ii) he could not be
indicted for capital murder because the indictment failed to identify an aggravating
factor justifying the imposition of the death penalty under Section 4209; and (iii) his
life sentence for attempted first-degree murder is illegal. Dickens has waived those
arguments that he made below but failed to raise in his opening brief.11
8 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 9 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 10 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 11 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 4 (7) On appeal, Dickens does not attempt to overcome Rule 61’s procedural
bar prohibiting repetitive motions for postconviction relief. In any event, there is no
merit to Dickens’ claim that the grand jury’s indictment was constitutionally
deficient. An indictment performs two essential functions: to put the accused on
notice of what he is called upon to defend, and to effectively preclude a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.12 “These purposes are fulfilled if the indictment,
as required by [Superior Court Criminal] Rule 7(c), contains a plain statement of the
elements or essential facts of the crime.”13 Here, the indictment—which, in relevant
part, charged Dickens with “intentionally caus[ing] the death of Myrtis Handy by
shooting her with a .38 caliber pistol”14—did so.15
(8) Although Dickens is correct that the Superior Court incorrectly
interpreted his motion for correction of illegal sentence to be challenging the legality
of his life sentence for first-degree murder, we nevertheless affirm the court’s denial
of Dickens’ motion for correction of illegal sentence on the independent and
alternative basis that his life sentence for attempted first-degree murder is likewise
not only legal, but mandatory.16 That is, in 1979—when Dickens engaged in the
12 Malloy v. State, 462 A.2d 1088, 1092 (Del. 1983). 13 Id. 14 State’s Mot. to Affirm, Ex. A, DI 1. 15 State’s Mot. to Affirm, Ex. A, DI 1. 16 See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that this Court may affirm a trial court’s judgment based on a different rationale than that relied upon by the trial court). 5 conduct that led to his attempted first-degree murder conviction—the Superior Court
was required to sentence Dickens to life imprisonment for that offense under 11 Del.
C. § 4205.17
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice
17 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(1) (1979) (fixing the term of imprisonment for a class A felony conviction at life imprisonment, “provided, however, that in the case of an attempt to commit any class A felony, the court shall impose a term of imprisonment and may impose life imprisonment, but may impose less than life imprisonment, except for conviction of an attempt to commit first-degree murder, in which event the court shall impose life imprisonment”). 6