[Cite as Dicken v. Statutory Agent for Allstate Ins. Co., 2013-Ohio-3103.]
COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: ELLEN C. DICKEN : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 12-CA-127 STATUTORY AGENT FOR : ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., ET AL : : OPINION Defendants-Appellees
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2010 CV 01400
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 12, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees
DANIEL FRUTH RICK MARSH CHARLES M. ELSEA Lane, Alton & Horst, LLC 109 N. Broad Street, Suite 200 Two Miranova Place, Suite 500 Box 130 Columbus, OH 43215 Lancaster, OH 43130-0130 [Cite as Dicken v. Statutory Agent for Allstate Ins. Co., 2013-Ohio-3103.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant appeals the August 31, 2011 judgment entry of the Fairfield
County Common Pleas Court denying her motion for summary judgment and the
October 25, 2012 judgment entry finding appellee was not in breach of contract and
finding for appellee on an estoppel claim.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} In May of 2005, appellant Ellen Dicken f.k.a. Hamilton and her husband
Rick, who subsequently passed away in 2008, procured a homeowner’s insurance
policy with appellee Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) through her local agent
Rutter Insurance Company. The policy had an initial period of May 5, 2005 to May 5,
2006. The named insured on the policy was listed as Rick Hamilton and the location of
the property was listed as 8060 State Route 312, Logan, Ohio. AMC Mortgage
Services, Inc. (“AMC Mortgage”) was listed as the mortgagee on the insurance policy.
Appellant testified she paid the insurance on a monthly basis and paid the monthly
premium in person either by cash or check. When she would bring the payment in each
month, an employee at the local agency would write her a handwritten receipt.
Appellant testified she had previously been late on her insurance payments, but always
paid the bill within the grace period when she received the cancellation notice stating it
had to be paid by a certain date.
{¶3} Appellant’s payment for her October 2006 coverage on the homeowner’s
insurance policy was due on September 5, 2006. On September 15, 2006, appellee
issued appellant a Homeowner’s Policy Cancellation Notice. The notice stated, in
pertinent part, “If you want your insurance to continue and do not want it to cancel, Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 3
please make sure we receive the Minimum Amount Due by the end of the day
(midnight) on October 4, 2006 or your policy will cancel at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time on
October 5, 2006.” The minimum amount due was stated at $107.93 and the “pay in full”
amount was $407.13 to pay the full balance due on the May 5, 2006 to May 5, 2007
policy period. Appellant testified she never received the notice of cancellation, though
she had no problems getting her mail and the notice was addressed correctly.
Appellant stated she received all correspondence from appellee except for the
September 15, 2006 notice of cancellation. Kathy Collard (“Collard”), a senior field
support representative for Allstate and an Allstate employee for thirty-five years,
reviewed the records in appellee’s account to determine if the notice of cancellation had
been returned to Allstate. The notice had not been returned to them.
{¶4} On October 12, 2006, appellant’s home and personal belongings were
destroyed in an accidental fire caused by an unattended kerosene heater. Appellant
testified she knew she had made the September 2006 homeowner’s insurance
payment. Appellant stated she called appellee’s claims reporting number the night of
the fire and that she called her local insurance agent, Marla Rutter (“Mrs. Rutter”), the
morning of October 13, 2006. Mrs. Rutter disputes appellant called her the morning of
October 13th and indicates the first she knew of the fire was when appellant showed up
at her office the day after the fire and attempted to make the overdue premium
payment. Mrs. Rutter testified when she attempted to put the payment into the system,
she noticed it was an overdue payment and the policy had canceled. Mrs. Rutter stated
after she attempted to put the payment into the system, appellant informed her about
the fire and asked her for the Allstate claims reporting phone number. Mrs. Rutter told Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 4
appellant she would have to check with the district manager to see if she could accept
the late payment. Appellee told Mrs. Rutter to refuse to accept the late payment. Mrs.
Rutter testified she later mailed the check to appellant after appellant refused to take it
back on October 13th and that she did not give appellant a receipt on October 13th.
Appellant testified Mrs. Rutter accepted the check and gave her a handwritten receipt
for the check. Appellant again attempted to pay the premium on October 26, 2006, but
Mrs. Rutter refused the check.
{¶5} Collard testified it is appellee’s policy to allow a lienholder to protect their
interest in the property by giving them a window of opportunity to pay the premium so
the lienholder’s interest is protected even after the policy is canceled as to the
homeowner. Accordingly, on October 10, 2006, appellee issued a Homeowner’s Policy
Cancellation Notice to the lienholder on appellee’s home, AMC Mortgage. The notice
stated, in pertinent part, “If you want your insurance to continue and do not want it to
cancel, please make sure we receive the Minimum Amount Due by the end of the day
(midnight) on October 29, 2006 or your policy will cancel at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time
on October 30, 2006.” Again the minimum payment was stated at $107.93 and with a
“pay in full” amount of $407.13. AMC Mortgage made a payment to appellee on
October 26, 2006 in the amount of $407.13. Collard testified the mortgage holder has
an interest in the property to the extent of the mortgage only. She further stated that, at
the time of the fire, appellee’s policy was not in effect as to appellant because it had
lapsed on October 5, 2006.
{¶6} Appellee issued a Reinstatement Notice on October 31, 2006 to AMC
Mortgage with a copy to appellant that stated: Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 5
“Your policy was cancelled effective at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time
on October 5, 2006. Your policy was reinstated at 12:01 a.m.
Standard Time on October 30, 2006. A payment was credited to
your policy in the amount of $407.13. If this payment was by
check, draft, or other remittance which is not honored upon
presentation to your financial institution, this notice is void, and your
policy cancelled as of 12:01 a.m. Standard Time on October 5,
2006.”
{¶7} Jimmy Rutter (“Mr. Rutter”), the local insurance agent, testified about the
principle of insurable interest and stated for there to be an insurable interest, a home
has to actually exist. In this case, once the home burned down, there was nothing left
of the structure to insure after October 12, 2006. Mr. Rutter went through all the receipt
books in the office after the fire and determined appellant had not paid the premium due
September 5, 2006.
{¶8} Appellant proffered a claim to appellee and appellee refused the claim.
AMC Mortgage did not make a claim under appellee’s policy. Appellant testified that
after the fire, SafeCo. Insurance Company notified her there was a blanket insurance
policy on the loan that would pay off the property. Appellant learned that AMC
Mortgage took out their own policy on appellant’s property and this policy, held by
SafeCo., paid off appellant’s mortgage of $78,000. In addition, SafeCo. issued
appellant a check for $38,000. On November 15, 2006, appellee refunded to appellant
the amount of $39.00, an amount Collard testified was a lapsed credit which Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 6
represented the portion of the premium when the policy lapsed from October 5, 2006 to
October 30, 2006.
{¶9} Appellant filed a complaint on November 5, 2010 against appellee alleging
breach of contract, declaratory judgment, promissory estoppel, and bad faith. Appellant
alleged appellee insured her losses related to the fire per hazard insurance contract.
Appellee maintained it did not owe coverage to appellant because she did not pay her
premium and her policy was canceled as to her interest at the time of the fire. Both
appellant and appellee filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court denied both
appellant and appellee’s motions for summary judgment. Appellee’s motion to bifurcate
the claims of bad faith and punitive damages was granted by the trial court. A trial to
the court was held on January 24, 2012. On March 31, 2012, the trial court issued a
judgment entry finding in favor of appellee, concluding the insurance policy was not in
effect at the time of the fire and thus appellee was not in breach of contract. After this
court dismissed appellant’s first appeal because the entries at issue were not final
appealable orders, the trial court issued a judgment entry on October 25, 2012,
disposing of all claims and finding that appellee was entitled to judgment in its favor on
the claim of breach of contract, bad faith, the declaratory judgment action, and estoppel.
{¶10} Appellant appeals the August 31, 2011 entry denying her motion for
summary judgment and the October 25, 2012 judgment entry finding appellee was not
in breach of contract and finding for appellee on her estoppel claim. She raises the
following assignments of error on appeal: Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 7
{¶11} “I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, VIA ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY
FILED AUGUST 31, 2011.
{¶12} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO. AND AGAINST
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT, ELLEN C. DICKEN VIA ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY FILED
OCTOBER 25, 2012 ON HER CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
{¶13} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT ELLEN C. DICKEN VIA ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY FILED
OCTOBER 25, 2012 ON HER CLAIM FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL.”
I.
{¶14} Civ.R. 56 states, in pertinent part:
“Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed
in the action, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or
stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary
judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or
stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to
the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 8
party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed mostly
strongly in the party’s favor. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.”
{¶15} A trial court should not enter a summary judgment if it appears a material
fact is genuinely disputed, nor if, construing the allegations most favorably towards the
non-moving party, reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from the
undisputed facts. Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 424 N.E.2d 311
(1981). The court may not resolve any ambiguities in the evidence presented. Inland
Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Inds. of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 474
N.E.2d 271 (1984). A fact is material if it affects the outcome of the case under the
applicable substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301,
733 N.E.2d 1186 (6th Dist. 1999).
{¶16} When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, an
appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court. Smiddy v. The
Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). This means we review
the matter de novo. Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St. 3d 388, 2000-Ohio-186, 738 N.E.2d
1243.
{¶17} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis of the motion and identifying the portions of the
record which demonstrates absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of
the non-moving party’s claim. Drescher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264
(1996). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non- Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 9
moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact
does exist. Id. The non-moving party may not rest upon the allegations and denials in
the pleadings, but instead must submit some evidentiary materials showing a genuine
dispute over material facts. Henkle v. Henkle, 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 600 N.E.2d 791
(12th Dist. 1991).
{¶18} Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary
judgment. We disagree. Appellant contends it was an “undisputed fact” that the policy
was paid in full by appellant and accepted in full by appellee. However, when the trial
court denied the motion for summary judgment, several disputed facts existed
surrounding the payment and potential lapse of the policy. For example, while appellant
testified in her deposition that the policy didn’t lapse, Mrs. Rutter testified in her
deposition the policy did lapse for the period between the cancellation date and the
payment by AMC. In addition, appellant testified in her deposition she did not receive
the cancellation notice and had in fact paid the premium while Mrs. Rutter stated in her
deposition appellant had not paid the premium due September 5th. Accordingly,
genuine issues of material fact were disputed and summary judgment on behalf of
appellant was not warranted pursuant to Civil Rule 56.
{¶19} Further, a majority of the arguments advanced by appellant in support of
her argument that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment
related to the trial testimony of Collard and appellant. However, this testimony was not
Rule 56 evidence before the trial court at the time the trial court ruled on the motions for
summary judgment and thus the trial court did not err in not considering this testimony
at the time it ruled on the motions for summary judgment. Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 10
{¶20} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶21} The trial court conducted a bench trial in this case. As an appellate court,
we are not fact finders; we neither weigh the evidence nor the credibility of witnesses.
Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent, and credible evidence
upon which the fact finder could base his or her judgment. Peterson v. Peterson, 5th
Dist. No. CT2003-0049, 2004-Ohio-4714, citing Cross Truck v. Jeffries, 5th Dist. No.
CA-5758, 1982 WL 2911 (Feb. 10, 1982). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Erie
Ins. Co. v. Paradise, 5th Dist. No. 2008CA00084, 2009-Ohio-4005, ¶ 12.
{¶22} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding appellee did not breach its
insurance contract with appellant. We disagree.
{¶23} Pursuant to the terms of the policy, appellee had a right to cancel the
policy for non-payment by mailing a Notice of Cancellation to appellant at her mailing
address (“Our mailing the notice of cancellation to you will be deemed proof of notice”)
and appellee was required to give appellant ten (10) days notice before canceling the
policy pursuant to the language in the policy stating if cancellation is for “non-payment
of premium, we will give you at least ten (10) days notice.”
{¶24} Despite appellant’s assertion that she never received the notice of
cancellation and made her September 2006 payment, the trial court found appellant did
not make the payment due in September of 2006 and that a notice of cancellation was
sent out by appellee canceling appellant’s policy for non-payment of premium as of
October 5, 2006. Based on appellant’s testimony that she received all correspondence
from appellee except the notice of cancellation, Collard’s testimony that appellee’s Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 11
records did not show any mail returned to them for non-delivery, Collard’s testimony that
appellee’s records did not show a payment for September of 2006, Mrs. Rutter’s
testimony that the September 2006 premium was not paid when appellant came into her
office on October 13, 2006, and Mr. Rutter’s testimony that he went through the receipt
books and could find no record of appellant’s September 2006 payment, we find there is
relevant, competent, and credible evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
appellant did not pay the September 2006 premium and that appellee sent appellant a
notice of cancellation on September 15, 2006.
{¶25} The notice of cancellation clearly states the policy would be canceled at
12:01 a.m. Standard Time on October 5, 2006 if appellee did not receive a minimum
payment of $107.33 by this date. Appellee did not receive the minimum payment by
October 5, 2006. Thus, pursuant to the cancellation provision in the policy, the policy
was canceled on October 5, 2006 and was not in effect as to any interest of appellant
on October 12, 2006, the date of the fire. Further, appellant’s attempts to tender the
minimum payment after the October 12, 2006 date do not provide coverage for the loss
as the policy specifically states in the Conditional Reinstatement portion:
“If we mail a cancellation notice because you did not pay the required
premium when due and you then tender payment by check, draft, or other
remittance which is not honored upon presentation, your policy will
terminate on the date and time shown on the cancellation notice and any
notice we issue which waives the cancellation or reinstates coverage is
void. This means Allstate will not be liable under this policy for claims or
damages after the date and time indicated on the cancellation notice.” Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 12
{¶26} Appellant asserts the October 26, 2006 payment by AMC Mortgage to
appellee of the full policy premium of $407.13 kept the policy in effect on the date of the
fire as to both AMC Mortgage and appellant.
{¶27} “It is well established that to recover under an insurance policy for fire loss
to property, an insured must have an insurable interest in the property at the time of the
loss.” Patteron-Leitch Co. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 366 F.Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Ohio
1973), citing Stauder v. Assoc. Gen. Fire Co., 105 Ohio App. 105, 151 N.E.2d 583 (9th
Dist. 1957). An insurable interest in property arises when a person “would profit by or
gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer some loss or disadvantage
by its destruction.” Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mohammed, 195 Ohio App.3d 224 at ¶
42, 2011-Ohio-4009, 959 N.E.2d 568 (2d Dist. 2011). If one does not have an insurable
interest in the subject matter of the insurance, the policy is void. Phillips v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 60 Ohio St.2d 180, 181, 398 N.E.2d 564.
{¶28} Per appellee’s standard procedure, they issued a notice of cancellation to
AMC Mortgage on October 10, 2006, prior to the fire, stating if they wanted the
insurance to continue, the minimum amount was due by midnight on October 29, 2006,
or the policy would cancel. AMC Mortgage made the payment on October 26 in an
attempt to keep the coverage in effect to protect their interest in the property, i.e. their
mortgage. The reinstatement notice by appellee states the policy was “cancelled
effective at 12:01 a.m. Standard Time on October 5, 2006 and reinstated on October
30, 2006.” The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “when an insurance policy provides
that acceptance of a delinquent payment will reinstate the policy, the acceptance of the
late payment does not revive the original policy. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Ingle, Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 13
180 Ohio App.3d 201 at 207. Thus, the policy was canceled October 5, 2006 and was
not in effect at the time of the fire on October 12, 2006.
{¶29} Further, at the time AMC Mortgage made the payment on October 26,
2006 and the policy was reinstated on October 30, 2006, AMC Mortgage was divested
of any pecuniary interest in the property because the fire destroyed the home on
October 12, 2006. Since the home was destroyed by the fire, AMC Mortgage would
not, on October 26 or October 30, profit or gain some advantage by its continued
existence and would not suffer any loss by the property’s destruction because there was
nothing left of the structure to insure after October 12, 2006. For AMC Mortgage to
have an insurable interest on the date of payment or reinstatement, the home would
have had to physically exist. Accordingly, any insurable interest AMC Mortgage had in
the home was extinguished at the time of the fire and appellant cannot, through their
payment, recover under insurance policy because “if one does not have an insurable
interest in the subject matter of the insurance, the policy is void.” Phillips v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 60 Ohio St.20 180, 181, 398 N.E.2d 564.
{¶30} We find the insurance policy was not in effect as to any interest of
appellant on October 12, 2006. Further AMC Mortgage’s attempt to reinstate the policy
was void because they had no insurable interest at the time they tendered payment.
Accordingly, appellee did not breach its contract and the trial court did not err in
rendering judgment for appellee on appellant’s breach of contract claim. Appellant’s
second assignment of error is overruled. Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 14
III.
{¶31} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding for appellee on appellant’s
claim for promissory estoppel and wavier because appellee induced, accepted, and
credited payment in full on appellant’s policy from AMC Mortgage with knowledge of the
loss. We disagree.
{¶32} Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine for preventing the harm
resulting from reasonable reliance upon false representations. GGJ, Inc. v. Tuscarawas
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 5th Dist. No. 2005AP070047, 2006-Ohio-2527, citing Karnes v.
Doctors Hosp., 51 Ohio St.3d 139, 142, 555 N.E.2d 280 (1990). The party asserting
promissory estoppel bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, all
of the elements of the claim. In re Estate of Popov, 4th Dist. No. 02CA26, 2003-Ohio-
4556. The elements necessary to establish a claim for estoppel are: (1) a promise clear
and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made;
(3) the reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party claiming
estoppel must be injured by the reliance. Schepflin v. Sprint-United Telephone of Ohio,
5th Dist. No. 96-CA-62-2, 1997 WL 1102026 (April 29, 1997), citing Stull v. Combustion
Eng.,Inc., 72 Ohio App.3d 553, 557, 595 N.E.2d 504 (3d Dist. 1991).
{¶33} Acceptance of late premiums by the insurer may constitute waiver.
Starcher v. Reserve Ins. Co., 68 Ohio App.2d 176, 428 N.E.2d 461, citing Ohio Farmers
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 70 Ohio St. 354, 359, 72 N.E. 715 (1904). Waiver is the voluntary
and intentional relinquishment of a known right, claim, or privilege. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. v. Ingle, 68 Ohio App.2d 176 at 179-180. However, “acceptance of a late
payment after loss does not, by itself, result in waiver. Rather, the conduct of the Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 15
insurer must indicate that it intended to waive the lateness of the payment. Such
conduct might include retention of the portion of the premium for the period of time that
the policy had been cancelled.” State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Ingle, 180 Ohio App.3d
201 at 208.
{¶34} Appellant argues appellee induced AMC Mortgage and/or appellant to pay
the balance of the policy premium for their promise to continue coverage with the
notices of cancellation sent to appellant and AMC Mortgage. Both notices of
cancellation were sent prior to the fire of October 12, 2006. Further, appellant did not
attempt to tender payment on either the balance or the minimum payment until after the
policy expired on October 5, 2006. Therefore, appellee did not induce appellant into
paying the balance of the premium and no promise of continued coverage after October
5, 2006 was made to appellant. In fact, appellee refunded to appellant the $39.00
amount of the overdue premium that would have been used to cover the time period
when the policy had been canceled and the balance paid by AMC Mortgage was not
applied retroactively to avoid a gap in coverage.
{¶35} The entity that actually paid the balance of the premium was AMC
Mortgage. AMC Mortgage is not a plaintiff in this case and makes no argument that
appellee is estopped from denying them payment on the policy or that appellee waived
the late payment by accepting their October 26th payment.
{¶36} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting judgment for appellee on
appellant’s claim for promissory estoppel. Appellant’s third assignment of error is
overruled. Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 16
{¶37} Based on the foregoing, Appellants Assignments of Error I, II, and III are
overruled and the judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J., and
Farmer, J., concur;
Hoffman, J., concurs separately
_________________________________ HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
_________________________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
WSG:clw 0613 Fairfield County, Case No. 12-CA-127 17
Hoffman, J., concurring
{¶38} I concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition of Appellant’s first and
third assignments of error.1
{¶39} I further concur in the majority’s disposition of Appellants second
assignment of error. My only disagreement is with the majority’s conclusion AMC
Mortgage did not have an insurable interest in the property on the date of payment.
{¶40} At the time Appellee sent AMC Mortgage the Mortgage Notice of
Cancellation, the fire had not yet occurred. That notice provided coverage would
“continue”, as opposed to being reinstated, if payment was received before October 30,
2006, I find the intervening fire does not operate to divest AMC Mortgage of an
insurable interest because its subsequent payment caused the policy to continue in
effect, rather than lapse and then become reinstated.
{¶41} Nonetheless, I concur in the decision to overrule Appellant’s second
assignment of error because the notice to AMC Mortgage does not inure to the benefit
of Appellant. The fact the insured receive a copy of the notice sent to AMC Mortgage
does not continue his policy covering the property, which the majority finds terminated
on October 5, 2006.
________________________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
1 My only disagreement, with the majority’s discussion of the first assignment of error is its statement the parties disagreement as to whether the policy lapsed is an example of a disputed fact. I find the example represents a dispute of law, not a dispute of fact, and does not prevent summary judgment on that limited basis. [Cite as Dicken v. Statutory Agent for Allstate Ins. Co., 2013-Ohio-3103.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ELLEN C. DICKEN : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : STATUTORY AGENT FOR : ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO., ET AL : : : Defendants-Appellees : CASE NO. 12-CA-127
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to appellant.