Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Co., Ltd. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.
This text of 323 So. 2d 482 (Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Co., Ltd. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
DIBERT, BANCROFT & ROSS COMPANY, LTD.
v.
WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE COMPANY.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Pittman & Matheny, Iddo Pittman, Jr., Hammond, for plaintiff-appellee.
Nicaud, Justrabo & Rousset, Rene R. Nicaud, Hugh H. Brister, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Before SAMUEL, GULOTTA and BEER, JJ.
*483 BEER, Judge.
Appellant, Westinghouse Air Brake Company (hereafter, Westinghouse), was the manufacturer of a very large "off highway" vehicle to be used for heavy load carrying. In conjunction with this endeavor Appellee, Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Company, Ltd. (hereafter, Dibert), contracted with Westinghouse to provide certain metal castings which were to conform to a pattern provided by Westinghouse. A total of four such castings were actually produced by Dibert and shipped to Westinghouse. Upon receipt of the first two castings in March of 1972 Westinghouse discovered certain defects in same and called Dibert's attention thereto by correspondence. Notwithstanding this, payment in full for the first two castings was sent by Westinghouse to Dibert in April 1972apparently as the result of a mistake in internal office procedure.
At about the same time, Dibert shipped the third and fourth castings which were received and used by Westinghouse but not paid for by them.
Substantial exchange of correspondence took place between the parties subsequent to the abovedescribed events all centering around the contention by Westinghouse that they should not be obliged to pay for castings number 3 and 4 because of the defective condition of castings number 1 and 2.
However, litigation did not commence until Dibert instituted suit on September 6, 1973 seeking payment for castings number 3 and 4.
On October 19, 1973 Westinghouse answered the suit and reconvened on a basis, which, in our view, clearly sounds in redhibition. Various additional pleadings were filed including an answer to the reconventional demand and thereafter the matter was tried on December 3, 1974.
In the course of that trial counsel for Dibert sought to except to the redhibitory claim filed by plaintiff in reconvention, Westinghouse. In open court he stated: "Now, Your Honor, at this time I would like the court's permission to file an exception for [sic] prescription for any rehabilitory [sic] claim .." In response the court stated: "It will be necessary for you to file an exception of prescription..." Counsel replied: "I will go ahead and file one, if the Court permits." The court responded: "So ordered."
No written exception of prescription was ever filed in the trial court. However, on December 4, 1974 the court handed down a written judgment on the exception stating: "It is ordered that the exception of prescription herein, be and the same is hereby overruled."
On the same day the court rendered judgment, with written reasons, in favor of Dibert and against Westinghouse in the sum of $3,432.15 and, further, dismissed the reconventional demand of Westinghouse.
LSA-C.C.P. Article 852 provides that pleadings, including exceptions, "shall be in writing." No where in this record is there a written exception of prescription except that which was filed by plaintiff-appellee in this court on June 25, 1975.
Under the somewhat unusual circumstances existent herein, we deem it necessary to look further into the matter of the exception of prescription as we have concluded that appellant's reconventional demand sounds in redhibition but might have merit if it is properly before, us.
Although LSA-C.C.P. Article 961 provides that motions may be made orally during trial, no such provision exists with respect to exceptions. Thus, we conclude that an exception, in order to be properly before the court, must be in writing. Even though Dibert's counsel obtained an oral order permitting him to file the exception of prescription, the exception itself was never filed in writing in the trial court.
*484 Accordingly, the judgment overruling that exception handed down by the district court on December 4, 1973 was a nullity, without force or effect and the fact that Dibert did not answer the appeal with respect thereto is of no consequence.
Under these circumstances it is in order that we consider the exception of prescription filed by Dibert in this court on June 25, 1975 for LSA-C.C.P. Article 2163[1] provides that prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal in this manner. Accordingly, we give consideration to the exception of prescription filed by Dibert to the reconventional demand of Westinghouse and conclude that it has merit and should be maintained. The reconventional demand, even if meritorious, sounds in redhibition and must be dismissed since actions so sounding prescribe one year from discovery. Furthermore, the claim in redhibition is not saved from prescriptive disability by having been pled defensively in response to Dibert's main demand for payment for castings 3 and 4. There was no redhibitory vice attributable to those castingsthe proven defects were in castings 1 and 2. Thus, the ability to urge redhibition as a defense, even though the action is otherwise barred by prescription, is not applicable to this situation.[2] For these reasons, it is not necessary for us to consider the redhibitory claim of Westinghouse on its merits. We turn, then, to the sole remaining issue which is the correctness of the trial court's judgment on the main demand.
There is no serious contention that castings 3 and 4 should not be paid for, having been manufactured by Dibert, shipped by them to Westinghouse and subsequently incorporated into the vehicle manufactured by Westinghouse. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is essentially correct in making an award on the main demand although same should have been in the amount of $3,517.15 plus $85.00. The trial court was incorrect in subtracting the $85.00 cost of crating the Westinghouse patterns. This amount should have been added to the judgment to cover the cost of crating the patterns owned by Westinghouse and presently in the possession of Dibert, disposition of which will be covered in the judgment of this court. However, Dibert did not answer the appeal and thus we are procedurally powerless to remedy this small error.
Accordingly, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the exception of prescription filed in this court by Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Company, Ltd. to the reconventional demand of Westinghouse Air Brake Company be and the same is hereby maintained; and the reconventional demand is dismissed;
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans dated. December 4, 1974 overruling the exception of prescription be and the same is hereby recalled, nullified and set aside;
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans dated December 4, 1974 in favor of the plaintiff, Dibert, Bancroft & Ross Company, Ltd. and against the defendant, Westinghouse Air Brake Company, in the full sum of $3,432.15, together with legal interest *485 thereon from date of judicial demand, until paid, and for all costs of these proceedings, be and the same is hereby affirmed; and
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