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4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY DIBBERN, Case No. 1:22-cv-00723-CDB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY v. AND DAMAGES PORTIONS OF TRIAL 14 15 CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al., ( Doc. 71) 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Introduction 20 Plaintiff Jeffrey Dibbern asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against 21 Defendants City of Bakersfield, Anthony Kidwell, Nghia Duong, and Fabian Salazar, based on 22 Defendants’ alleged actions in connection with a law enforcement encounter between Plaintiff and 23 Defendants and others on December 30, 2021, in Bakersfield, as alleged in the operative First 24 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 50). In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) 42 25 U.S.C § 1983 - Violation of the Fourth Amendment - Excessive Force; (2) 42 U.S.C § 1983 - 26 Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment - Denial of Medical Care; (3) 42 U.S.C § 1983 - Conspiracy 27 to Violate Civil Rights; (4) Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; (5) Battery/Assault; (6) 28 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (7) Negligence. 1 Trial of the action is scheduled to commence on September 16, 2024. Pending before the 2 Court is Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate trial into two phases (damages and liability), filed on August 3 13, 2024 (Doc. 71), for which Defendants filed an opposition (Doc. 78). 4 Plaintiff’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial 5 A. Legal Standard 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[f]or convenience, to 7 avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more 8 separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” The determination of 9 whether to bifurcate a trial is a matter within the Court’s discretion. See Hangarter v. Provident Life 10 & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004). “In exercising this discretion, the court 11 should consider ‘potential prejudice to the parties, potential confusion to the jury, and the relative 12 convenience and economy which would result’ from bifurcation.” Stevenson v. Holland, 504 F. 13 Supp.3d 1107, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). 14 “Absent some experience demonstrating the worth of bifurcation, ‘separation of issues for trial is not 15 to be routinely ordered.’” Id. (quoting Hamm v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 16 (E.D. Cal. 1995)) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 42(b) advisory committee notes). “The party who moves to 17 bifurcate a trial has the burden of proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid 18 inconvenience or prejudice to the parties.” A.G.1. v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-cv-1914-JLT-SAB, 19 2023 WL 3752008, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2023) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 20 B. The Parties’ Arguments 21 Plaintiff argues that trying the issues of liability before damages serves “the interest of 22 promoting judicial economy” and avoiding prejudice. (Doc. 71 at 3, 4). Plaintiff argues, “[s]ince the 23 evidence of compensatory and punitive damages usually overlaps substantially, ‘the normal procedure 24 is to try compensatory and punitive damage claims together with appropriate instructions to make 25 clear to the jury the difference in the clear and convincing evidence required for the award of punitive 26 damages.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1021). Plaintiff further argues bifurcation would 27 “allow the jury to focus on the reasonableness of the force used by Defendant officers, rather than 28 determine liability and damages through jumbled testimony from several law enforcement officers 1 offering liability evidence at the same as hearing testimony numerous doctors on complex injuries and 2 various medical procedures.” Id. at 4-5. 3 In opposition, Defendants principally argue that bifurcation is unwarranted given that Plaintiff 4 will be required to introduce damages-related evidence during a liability phase of trial to establish the 5 damages elements of Plaintiff’s claims – in particular, his state law causes of action for negligence and 6 intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 78 at 5-7). Defendants separately argue that 7 Plaintiff fails to carry his burden under Rule 42(a) to establish that bifurcation would promote judicial 8 efficiency. Id. at 7. Finally, while Defendants seemingly acknowledge that proceeding without 9 bifurcating liability and damages will result in some prejudice to Plaintiff (id. at 7), Defendants 10 propose that any possible prejudice can be ameliorated with appropriate jury instructions restricting 11 the jury’s consideration of the evidence for limited purposes. Id. at 9. 12 C. Discussion 13 In Stevenson, a former prisoner brought excessive force and failure to intervene claims against 14 correctional officers he accused of physically abusing him. 504 F. Supp.3d at 113-14. Defendants 15 sought to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of trial to minimize prejudice and avoid the “risk 16 of the jury making its liability determination based on Stevenson’s damages evidence.” 504 F. 17 Supp.3d at 1126. The court noted the likelihood “that separate trials for liability and damages would 18 involve presentation of much of the same evidence.” Id. at 1127. The Court further noted that, given 19 “the liability evidence and damages evidence are entwined, bifurcating trial would raise additional 20 line-drawing questions as to what evidence is relevant and admissible at the separate mini-trials.” Id. 21 In A.G.1 v. City of Fresno, an estate brought excessive force and related state law causes of 22 action against a police officer who shot and killed the decedent during a foot chase. 2021 WL 23 4502949, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2021). Only Plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action survived 24 summary judgment. Id. In advance of trial, Plaintiffs moved to bifurcate the liability and damages 25 phases on the grounds that some issues relevant to damages – “including the decedent’s criminal 26 history” and autopsy results showing methamphetamine and THC in decedent’s system – would be 27 “extremely prejudicial if they are brought out during the liability phase of this action.” 2023 WL 28 3752008, at *6. The Court declined to bifurcate the trial, noting that numerous contested issues were 1 relevant to both liability and damages – for instance, that decedent was under the influence of 2 methamphetamine and on parole at the time of the incident – and that, while some prejudice may 3 result from declining to bifurcate, Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that any prejudice would 4 outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence. Id. at *7. 5 The Court finds this case and the arguments advanced by Plaintiff in support of bifurcation are 6 similar to the same issues addressed by the courts in Stevenson and A.G.1. First, Plaintiff’s argument 7 that “the evidence relevant to the Defendant Officers’ liability is sufficiently separate from the 8 evidence that is relevant to damages” and that “[t]he only witnesses whose testimony would be 9 relevant in both phases is Plaintiff and Defendant” (Doc.
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4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY DIBBERN, Case No. 1:22-cv-00723-CDB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 MOTION TO BIFURCATE LIABILITY v. AND DAMAGES PORTIONS OF TRIAL 14 15 CITY OF BAKERSFIELD, et al., ( Doc. 71) 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 Introduction 20 Plaintiff Jeffrey Dibbern asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against 21 Defendants City of Bakersfield, Anthony Kidwell, Nghia Duong, and Fabian Salazar, based on 22 Defendants’ alleged actions in connection with a law enforcement encounter between Plaintiff and 23 Defendants and others on December 30, 2021, in Bakersfield, as alleged in the operative First 24 Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (Doc. 50). In the FAC, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) 42 25 U.S.C § 1983 - Violation of the Fourth Amendment - Excessive Force; (2) 42 U.S.C § 1983 - 26 Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment - Denial of Medical Care; (3) 42 U.S.C § 1983 - Conspiracy 27 to Violate Civil Rights; (4) Violation of California Civil Code § 52.1; (5) Battery/Assault; (6) 28 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (7) Negligence. 1 Trial of the action is scheduled to commence on September 16, 2024. Pending before the 2 Court is Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate trial into two phases (damages and liability), filed on August 3 13, 2024 (Doc. 71), for which Defendants filed an opposition (Doc. 78). 4 Plaintiff’s Motion to Bifurcate Trial 5 A. Legal Standard 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides, in pertinent part, that “[f]or convenience, to 7 avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more 8 separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” The determination of 9 whether to bifurcate a trial is a matter within the Court’s discretion. See Hangarter v. Provident Life 10 & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004). “In exercising this discretion, the court 11 should consider ‘potential prejudice to the parties, potential confusion to the jury, and the relative 12 convenience and economy which would result’ from bifurcation.” Stevenson v. Holland, 504 F. 13 Supp.3d 1107, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 2005)). 14 “Absent some experience demonstrating the worth of bifurcation, ‘separation of issues for trial is not 15 to be routinely ordered.’” Id. (quoting Hamm v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 16 (E.D. Cal. 1995)) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 42(b) advisory committee notes). “The party who moves to 17 bifurcate a trial has the burden of proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid 18 inconvenience or prejudice to the parties.” A.G.1. v. City of Fresno, No. 1:16-cv-1914-JLT-SAB, 19 2023 WL 3752008, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2023) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 20 B. The Parties’ Arguments 21 Plaintiff argues that trying the issues of liability before damages serves “the interest of 22 promoting judicial economy” and avoiding prejudice. (Doc. 71 at 3, 4). Plaintiff argues, “[s]ince the 23 evidence of compensatory and punitive damages usually overlaps substantially, ‘the normal procedure 24 is to try compensatory and punitive damage claims together with appropriate instructions to make 25 clear to the jury the difference in the clear and convincing evidence required for the award of punitive 26 damages.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Hangarter, 373 F.3d at 1021). Plaintiff further argues bifurcation would 27 “allow the jury to focus on the reasonableness of the force used by Defendant officers, rather than 28 determine liability and damages through jumbled testimony from several law enforcement officers 1 offering liability evidence at the same as hearing testimony numerous doctors on complex injuries and 2 various medical procedures.” Id. at 4-5. 3 In opposition, Defendants principally argue that bifurcation is unwarranted given that Plaintiff 4 will be required to introduce damages-related evidence during a liability phase of trial to establish the 5 damages elements of Plaintiff’s claims – in particular, his state law causes of action for negligence and 6 intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 78 at 5-7). Defendants separately argue that 7 Plaintiff fails to carry his burden under Rule 42(a) to establish that bifurcation would promote judicial 8 efficiency. Id. at 7. Finally, while Defendants seemingly acknowledge that proceeding without 9 bifurcating liability and damages will result in some prejudice to Plaintiff (id. at 7), Defendants 10 propose that any possible prejudice can be ameliorated with appropriate jury instructions restricting 11 the jury’s consideration of the evidence for limited purposes. Id. at 9. 12 C. Discussion 13 In Stevenson, a former prisoner brought excessive force and failure to intervene claims against 14 correctional officers he accused of physically abusing him. 504 F. Supp.3d at 113-14. Defendants 15 sought to bifurcate the liability and damages phases of trial to minimize prejudice and avoid the “risk 16 of the jury making its liability determination based on Stevenson’s damages evidence.” 504 F. 17 Supp.3d at 1126. The court noted the likelihood “that separate trials for liability and damages would 18 involve presentation of much of the same evidence.” Id. at 1127. The Court further noted that, given 19 “the liability evidence and damages evidence are entwined, bifurcating trial would raise additional 20 line-drawing questions as to what evidence is relevant and admissible at the separate mini-trials.” Id. 21 In A.G.1 v. City of Fresno, an estate brought excessive force and related state law causes of 22 action against a police officer who shot and killed the decedent during a foot chase. 2021 WL 23 4502949, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2021). Only Plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action survived 24 summary judgment. Id. In advance of trial, Plaintiffs moved to bifurcate the liability and damages 25 phases on the grounds that some issues relevant to damages – “including the decedent’s criminal 26 history” and autopsy results showing methamphetamine and THC in decedent’s system – would be 27 “extremely prejudicial if they are brought out during the liability phase of this action.” 2023 WL 28 3752008, at *6. The Court declined to bifurcate the trial, noting that numerous contested issues were 1 relevant to both liability and damages – for instance, that decedent was under the influence of 2 methamphetamine and on parole at the time of the incident – and that, while some prejudice may 3 result from declining to bifurcate, Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that any prejudice would 4 outweigh the probative value of the contested evidence. Id. at *7. 5 The Court finds this case and the arguments advanced by Plaintiff in support of bifurcation are 6 similar to the same issues addressed by the courts in Stevenson and A.G.1. First, Plaintiff’s argument 7 that “the evidence relevant to the Defendant Officers’ liability is sufficiently separate from the 8 evidence that is relevant to damages” and that “[t]he only witnesses whose testimony would be 9 relevant in both phases is Plaintiff and Defendant” (Doc. 71 at 4) is incorrect. In order to establish 10 Defendants’ liability on his negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, Plaintiff 11 will be required to introduce evidence of damages during any bifurcated liability phase. This 12 inevitably would require testimony from medical practitioners and Plaintiff’s expert noticed to testify 13 concerning Plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder during both phases of a bifurcated trial. See 14 Stevenson, 504 F. Supp.3d at 1127. Relatedly, in their joint pretrial statement, the parties seemingly 15 agree that evidence of the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries is relevant to Defendants’ liability on Plaintiff’s 16 § 1983 claims. See (Doc. 62 at 14-15) (quoting Ninth Circuit Jury Instruction 9.25, “Excessive 17 Force,” directing the jury to consider “the extent of the plaintiff’s injury”). 18 Second, Plaintiff has noticed more than 200 exhibits consisting of body worn and vehicle dash 19 camera video excerpts which invariably depict evidence relevant to both liability and damages issues. 20 Thus, there inevitably will be an overlap of substantial amounts of evidence that would be introduced 21 during both phases of a bifurcated trial. E.g., Rubalcava v. City of San Jose, No. 20-cv-04191-BLF, 22 2024 WL 2031641, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2024) (declining to bifurcate liability and damages 23 phases where the same witnesses would be required to testify during both phases; “[t]hus, bifurcation 24 would not serve judicial economy, and would needlessly prolong the trial unless the jury were to find 25 Defendants not liable”). 26 Finally, the Court acknowledges Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the prejudice that may result 27 from introduction of certain unfavorable evidence during a liability phase of trial and which Plaintiff 28 seeks to restrict to a separate damages phase. (Doc. 71 at 5-6). However, as the party bearing the 1 || burden “of proving that the bifurcation will promote judicial economy and avoid inconvenience or 2 || prejudice to the parties” (A.G./, 2023 WL 3752008, at *6), Plaintiff has failed to explain why any 3 || potential prejudice could not be addressed through appropriate limiting instruction. See Dunivin, 202 4 || WL 3468785, at *4. 5 || Conclusion and Order 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate (Doc. 71). 7 |IIT IS SO ORDERED. * || Dated: _ August 22, 2024 | □□ D 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28