Diaz v. Valente

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 9, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-00003
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOSE ALEJANDRO DIAZ, Case No. 25-cv-00003-PCP

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION, 9 v. DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 10 VALENTE, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 6 Defendants. 11

12 13 Jose Diaz, an inmate at the Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, California, filed a pro se 14 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding events that occurred while he was held at 15 Monterey County Jail. For the reasons stated below, Mr. Diaz’s complaint is dismissed with leave 16 to amend. Mr. Diaz’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 17 I. Background 18 On January 1, 2019, Mr. Diaz was incarcerated in Monterey County Jail. On that date, Mr. 19 Diaz had just had a hip replacement surgery, was disabled, wore a brightly colored vest which 20 identified him as a disabled prisoner, and used a walker. See Compl. at 4.1 21 On January 1, 2019, Mr. Diaz was waiting in the foyer of his dormitory when he “observed 22 a ‘raid of officers’ enter[] the foyer with ‘armor [and] pepperspray guns.’” Defendant Valente, an 23 officer at the Monterey County Jail, was among these officers. Defendant Valente “pulled [Mr. 24 Diaz’s] walker from [him] and tossed it down the foyer.” Defendant Valente then grabbed Mr. 25 Diaz to “picsit” him. Defendant Valente used force to place Mr. Diaz on the floor and then placed 26 both of his knees on Mr. Diaz’s waist. See id. at 6; cf. id. at 8 (claiming defendant Valente placed 27 1 his knees on Mr. Diaz’s back). Mr. Diaz alleges that defendant Valente’s actions caused injuries. 2 See id. at 15. 3 Public records show that Mr. Diaz left the custody of the Monterey County Jail no later 4 than January 24, 2020. See California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Inmate 5 Locator, https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/ (results for “Jose Diaz,” showing he entered CDCR 6 custody on January 24, 2020) (last visited Aug. 28, 2025).2 The instant action was filed on or after 7 November 27, 2024. See Compl. at 3 (signing the complaint on that date); see also Houston v. 8 Lack , 487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988) (announcing the prison mailbox rule). 9 II. Legal Standard 10 Federal courts must screen any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental 11 entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must 12 identify cognizable claims and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 13 upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant immune from such 14 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. 15 Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 16 III. Analysis 17 Mr. Diaz’s claims are untimely and unexhausted. The Court gives Mr. Diaz leave to amend 18 so that he may explain why the exhaustion and time bars should not apply. 19 A. Untimeliness 20 Mr. Diaz wishes to sue defendant Valente for a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 21 United States Constitution, a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 22 negligence under California law. California negligence claims have a two-year statute of 23 limitations. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1. Section 1983 “borrows” the forum state’s statute of 24 limitations for personal injury actions, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278–80 (1985), so the 25 statute of limitations for Mr. Diaz’s Eighth Amendment claims also is two years. The Ninth 26 2 The report from CDCR’s Inmate Locator is a public record, and a proper subject for judicial 27 notice. See United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2016) (taking judicial notice of 1 Circuit has applied a three-year statute of limitations to ADA claims. See Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 2 F.3d 767, 768 (9th Cir. 2015). Where the plaintiff is incarcerated, California tolls the statute of 3 limitations for an additional two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Mr. Diaz thus had 4 four years to bring his Eighth Amendment and state-law negligence claims, and five years to bring 5 his ADA claim. 6 The statute of limitations began to run on January 1, 2019. “[T]he touchstone for 7 determining the commencement of the limitations period is notice: ‘a cause of action generally 8 accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his 9 action.’” Stanley v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations 10 omitted). Here, Mr. Diaz repeatedly states that his injury occurred on January 1, 2019. See Compl. 11 at 6–8, 15. The complaint reveals that Mr. Diaz knew of the injury when it occurred: He sought 12 legal advice from a law firm regarding that injury and received a response from that law firm on 13 February 12, 2019. See id. at 13–14; see also id. at 15 (stating that he “notified the attorneys” of 14 his potential claim). The statute of limitations for all of Mr. Diaz’s claims thus began to run on 15 January 1, 2019. The statute of limitations for his state negligence and federal constitutional 16 claims expired on January 1, 2023, and the statute of limitations for his ADA claim expired on 17 January 1, 2024. The instant action was filed on or after November 27, 2024. See Compl. at 3; see 18 also Houston, 487 U.S. at 270–71. This is well after all applicable statutes of limitations had 19 expired. Mr. Diaz’s claims based on the events of January 1, 2019 thus are time-barred. 20 Mr. Diaz does not explain why his claims should not be dismissed as time-barred, though 21 he appears aware of other procedural bars. See generally Compl.; see also infra (evaluating Mr. 22 Diaz’s argument for why the exhaustion requirement should be excused). The Ninth Circuit has 23 identified the limited circumstances in which a court may excuse a plaintiff’s failure to comply 24 with the statute of limitations.

25 [T]here are two doctrines which may apply to extend the limitations 26 period or preclude a defendant from asserting the defense—equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. … “Equitable tolling” focuses on 27 “whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: If a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can 1 gather what information he needs.” ... Equitable estoppel, on the other 2 hand, focuses primarily on actions taken by the defendant to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit, sometimes referred to as “fraudulent 3 concealment.” …. 4 Lukovsky v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations 5 omitted). It appears that neither doctrine applies to the facts pleaded here. As explained above, Mr. 6 Diaz knew of his injury at the time it occurred, as evidenced by his reaching out to an attorney 7 regarding that injury. Although it seems unlikely that equitable tolling could apply here, if Mr. 8 Diaz chooses to amend, he may attempt to circumvent the time bar by explaining why his delay in 9 filing suit was excusable. 10 Equitable estoppel also seems inapplicable: Mr. Diaz has not identified any way in which 11 defendant Valente prevented or delayed the filing of the instant lawsuit. Public records show that 12 Mr. Diaz left the custody of the Monterey County Jail no later than January 24, 2020. See CDCR 13 Inmate Locator, https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/ (results for “Jose Diaz”) (last visited Aug. 28, 14 2025). This fact shows that Mr. Diaz had nearly three years between the date he left the jail where 15 defendant Valente worked and the date the first statute of limitations expired. This, in turn, 16 suggests Mr. Diaz had three years in which he could have filed a timely claim without interference 17 or retaliation from defendant Valente. If Mr. Diaz chooses to amend, he may attempt to 18 circumvent the time bar by explaining how defendant Valente could have prevented or delayed the 19 filing of this lawsuit during the three years Mr. Diaz was not housed at Monterey County Jail. 20 B. Lack of Exhaustion 21 Mr. Diaz admits on the face of his complaint that he failed to exhaust his claims. See 22 Compl. at 4. He argues that this failure should be excused because he was afraid of retaliation. See 23 id. at 4, 8; see also id. at 16 (stating “I was in fear of my life, that’s why I’m asking” for the 24 exhaustion requirement to be excused). 25 As noted above, Mr. Diaz was outside the custody of Monterey County Jail for nearly three 26 years before any statute of limitations expired. He therefore had ample time in which he could 27 have attempted to his exhaust his claims without fear of retaliation; defendant Valente could not 1 worked. If he chooses to amend, Mr. Diaz must explain why he feared retaliation from defendant 2 Valente during the three years he was not housed in Monterey County Jail. 3 IV. Conclusion 4 1. The Complaint does not state any cognizable claim. The Complaint is therefore 5 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If he truthfully can provide facts to show the 6 exhaustion and time bars should be excused, Mr. Diaz may amend his Complaint. 7 2. The AMENDED COMPLAINT shall be filed within thirty-five days from the date 8 this order is filed. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in 9 this order (25-cv-00003-PCP) and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. In the 10 amended complaint, Mr. Diaz must allege facts that demonstrate he is entitled to relief on every 11 claim against every defendant. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 12 London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[A] plaintiff waives all causes 13 of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint.”); 14 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (where an amended complaint did not 15 name all the defendants to an action, they were no longer defendants). 16 3. It is Mr. Diaz’s responsibility to prosecute this case. He must keep the Court 17 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of 18 Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 19 do so will result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 20 Civil Procedure 41(b). 21 4. Mr. Diaz is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 22 case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case. 23 5. Mr. Diaz’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. See Dkt. No. 6. 24 The initial partial filing fee is $35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring a court to assess an 25 initial filing fee of 20 percent of a prisoner’s average monthly deposits or monthly balance, 26 whichever is greater). A copy of this order and the attached instructions will be sent to Mr. Diaz 27 via U.S. mail, and to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the ] CAND _Finance@cand.uscourts.gov. 2 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: September 9, 2025 Ay ber~ 6 P. Casey Pitt 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 1] a 12

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 INSTRUCTIONS FOR PAYMENT OF PRISONER’S FILING FEE 4 The prisoner shown as the plaintiff or petitioner on the attached order has filed a 5 civil action in forma pauperis in this court and owes to the court a filing fee. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the fee is to be paid as follows: 6

7 The initial partial filing fee listed on the attached order should be deducted by the prison trust account office from the prisoner’s trust account and forwarded to the clerk of 8 the court as the first installment payment on the filing fee. This amount is twenty percent 9 of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint/petition or (b) the average 10 monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint/petition. 11

12 Thereafter, on a monthly basis, 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account should be deducted and forwarded to the court each 13 time the amount in the account exceeds ten dollars ($10.00). The prison trust account 14 office should continue to do this until the filing fee has been paid in full.

15 If the prisoner does not have sufficient funds in his/her account to pay the initial partial filing fee, the prison trust account office should forward the available funds, and 16 carry the balance forward each month until the amount is fully paid. If the prisoner has 17 filed more than one complaint, (s)he is required to pay a filing fee for each case. The trust account office should make the monthly calculations and payments for each case in which 18 it receives an order granting in forma pauperis and these instructions. 19 The prisoner’s name and case number must be noted on each remittance. The initial 20 partial filing fee is due within thirty days of the date of the attached order. Checks should be made payable to Clerk, U.S. District Court and sent to Prisoner Accounts Receivable, 21 U.S. District Court, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36060, San Francisco, CA 94102. 22 cc: Plaintiff/Petitioner 23 Court’s Finance Office United States District Judge 24

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