Diaz v. Starbucks Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 3, 2023
• Docket: 4:22-cv-07625
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANDREA DIAZ, et al., Case No. 22-cv-07625-DMR

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER RE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 9 v. AMEND COMPLAINT AND MOTION TO REMAND 10 STARBUCKS CORPORATION, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 29 11 Defendants.

12 Plaintiffs Andrea Diaz and her minor son M.A. move for leave to file an amended 13 complaint adding a new defendant, and to remand this action in the event the court permits filing 14 of the amended complaint. [Docket No. 29-1 at 1-8 (“Mot.”).] Defendant Starbucks Corporation 15 opposes. [Docket No. 35 (“Opp’n”).] This matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing. 16 Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motions are denied. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiffs are citizens of California. They filed this action against Starbucks, Mariko Doe, 19 and Does 1-25 in Alameda County Superior Court on April 29, 2022, alleging one claim for 20 negligence. [Docket No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”), Ex. A (“Compl.”).] Plaintiffs allege that on 21 May 2, 2020, a hot beverage purchased from a Starbucks location in San Leandro spilled on them 22 because the lid was not securely attached to the coffee cup. See generally Compl. Starbucks, 23 which is headquartered in Washington, removed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the 24 basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 25 When Plaintiffs filed the complaint, they believed Mariko Doe – later identified as Mariko 26 Brown – was the supervisor and/or manager of the San Leandro location at the time of the 27 incident. Mot. at 3; Compl. ¶ 4. Through discovery, Plaintiffs’ counsel learned that the shift 1 Aug. 8, 2023) ¶¶ 2, 3).] Hopken is a citizen of California. Shakhbazyan Decl. ¶ 5. 2 Plaintiffs move to join Hopken as a defendant. They have already dismissed Mariko 3 Brown. [Docket No. 33 (8/16/2023 Minute Order).] Plaintiffs argue that Hopken may be joined 4 as a defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) because “a) Plaintiff has a right 5 to relief against her; b) the action against SABRINA HOPKEN arises from the same occurrence as 6 provides the basis of the action against ASHLEY1 and c) there are multiple same questions of law 7 and fact against SABRINA HOPKEN and STARBUCKS.” Mot. at 5. If the court grants leave to 8 amend the complaint to add Hopken, Plaintiffs move to remand this action on the ground that 9 diversity jurisdiction no longer exists. Mot. at 6-7. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the 12 district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or 13 other defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing 14 the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has diversity 15 jurisdiction where the parties are “citizens of different States” and “the matter in controversy 16 exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 17 If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 18 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court has discretion to deny joinder, or permit joinder and 19 remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e); Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 20 691 (9th Cir. 1998). When determining whether to permit joinder under Section 1447(e), courts 21 generally consider six factors: 1) whether the party plaintiff seeks to join is needed for just 22 adjudication and would be subject to joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); 2) 23 whether the statute of limitations would preclude an action against the new defendants in state 24 court if the court denied joinder; 3) whether there has been unexplained delay in seeking joinder; 25 4) whether joinder is sought solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction; 5) whether the claim(s) against 26 the new party appears valid; and 6) whether denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. IBC 27 1 Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 2 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Starbucks argues that the court should deny joinder of Hopken because she is not needed 5 for just adjudication, Plaintiffs’ request to join Hopken is untimely, joinder is sought solely to 6 defeat diversity jurisdiction, there is no valid claim against Hopken, and Plaintiffs would not 7 suffer prejudice if Hopken were not named as a defendant. Opp’n at 5-8. The court considers 8 each factor of the multi-part test applicable under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) in turn. 9 A. Necessary Party 10 Rule 19(a) governs joinder of necessary parties. It requires joinder of persons whose 11 absence would preclude the grant of complete relief, impede their ability to protect their interests, 12 or subject a party to the danger of inconsistent obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). “Although 13 courts consider whether a party would meet [Rule] 19’s standard for a necessary party, 14 amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under [Rule] 19.” IBC, 15 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1011-12. “Courts disallow joinder of non-diverse defendants where those 16 defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete 17 relief.” Id. 18 Here, Plaintiffs claim that Hopken was “a supervisor and/or manager of the premises at the 19 time of Plaintiffs’ incident,” who was responsible for “the maintenance of the store, equipment 20 and merchandise at the time of Plaintiffs incident,” “verify[ing] that there was in place a policy 21 which provided for the maintenance of the maintenance of the store, equipment and merchandise 22 according to industry standards,” “the training and education of the store employees who were 23 tasked with conducting the maintenance . . . of the store, equipment and merchandise,” and 24 “verifying that the maintenance of the store, equipment and merchandise be maintained according 25 to industry standards and sufficient policies and procedures.” Mot. at 3 (citing Compl. ¶ 4). 26 Plaintiffs also generally allege that Defendants maintained the coffee “at a temperature sufficiently 27 hot as to pose a risk of serious injury to persons such as Plaintiffs,” and that while “acting in the 1 ordered into a cup . . . placed a lid . . . over the CUP, and then proceeded to hand the CUP to 2 Plaintiff.” Compl. ¶¶ 9-10. According to Plaintiffs, “prior to handing the CUP containing the 3 dangerous COFFEE to Plaintiff ANDREA DIAZ[,] Defendants’ agent had negligently failed to 4 securely attach the LID to the CUP[.]” Id. ¶ 11. In addition, “Defendant’s agent failed to exercise 5 due care in packaging the CUP . . . but instead handed such CUP to Plaintiff ANDREA DIAZ in a 6 careless and negligent fashion so that the CUP spilled the COFFEE on Plaintiffs [so] as to cause 7 the injuries hereinafter alleged.” Id. ¶ 12. 8 Starbucks argues that Hopken is not a necessary party, asserting that any finding of 9 negligence against Hopken would be assigned to it as the employer. Opp’n at 5. It claims that 10 because an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope 11 of their employment, just adjudication does not require joining Hopken as a party. Id. 12 “Under the California doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for 13 the tortious acts of its employees when they are acting within the scope of their employment.” 14 Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 327 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “An 15 employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment if either one of two conditions is 16 met: (1) the act performed was either required or incident to her duties, or (2) the employee’s 17 misconduct could be reasonably foreseen by the employer.” Id. (citations omitted). 18 On September 15, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation agreeing that Hopken was acting 19 within the scope of her employment with Starbucks in connection with the incident alleged in this 20 case. [Docket No. 38.] In light of the parties’ agreement that Starbucks will be held vicariously 21 liable for any alleged actions by Hopken, joinder of Hopken is not needed for just adjudication. 22 Accordingly, this factor weighs against joinder. See Sharpe v. Fedex Corp., No. C-06-4964 EMC, 23 2007 WL 1888878, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2007) (holding that joinder of additional defendant 24 (driver of FedEx truck) was not needed for just adjudication where FedEx stipulated to vicarious 25 liability if the individual defendant was found liable and effectively waived any defense based on 26 scope of employment); see also Oettinger v. Home Depot, No. C 09-01560 CW, 2009 WL 27 2136764, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (holding that joinder of Home Depot’s assistant 1 an employer liable for injuries caused by employees acting within the scope of their employment 2 is not required to name or join the employees as defendants”); Cha v. Hiossen, Inc., No. 2:23-CV- 3 00691-WLH-PD, 2023 WL 4492420, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2023) (“courts have regularly 4 determined that joinder of non-diverse supervisors is not required in . . . cases where the 5 supervisors only acted within the scope of their employment, because complete relief can be 6 accorded under a respondeat superior theory” (collecting cases)).2 7 B. Statute of Limitations 8 Starbucks argues that the statute of limitations issue is moot because just adjudication does 9 not require joining Hopken as a party. Opp’n at 5. It makes no other argument in this respect. 10 Plaintiffs likewise do not meaningfully address the issue. Accordingly, this factor is neutral. 11 C. Timeliness of Amendment 12 Plaintiffs explain that they only recently learned about Hopken through Defendant’s first 13 set of discovery responses served on June 24, 2023. Mot. at 3, 6; Shakhbazyan Decl. ¶ 3. 14 Confusingly, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint shortly after, on July 5, 2023, incorrectly 15 identifying Mariko Doe as Mariko Brown. [Docket No. 21 (corrected at Docket No. 23).] In any 16 event, Plaintiffs filed the present motion on August 8, 2023, a little over one month after receiving 17 Defendant’s discovery responses. In addition, no significant activity has yet occurred in the case. 18

19 2 Plaintiffs rely on Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) in arguing that “[t]he joinder of a nondiverse party requires remand even if newly joined defendant 20 (sic) is not indispensable.” Mot. at 8. Morris does not stand for that proposition. The Ninth Circuit first analyzed whether the district court properly held that it had removal jurisdiction based 21 on diversity jurisdiction, even though a non-diverse defendant had been joined. Morris explained that “one exception to the requirement of complete diversity is where a non-diverse defendant has 22 been ‘fraudulently joined.’” 236 F.3d at 1067. Because it was “abundantly obvious that [the plaintiff] could not possibly prevail on her [] claim against [the non-diverse defendant],” the Ninth 23 Circuit held that the district court correctly ignored the defendant’s joinder, and removal was proper based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 1068. Next, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether 24 the district court retained jurisdiction over the action after plaintiff amended her complaint to join two additional non-diverse defendants. Id. The district court had permitted joinder of the non- 25 diverse parties but nevertheless retained jurisdiction over the action. The Ninth Circuit explained that “[t]he presence of the [new defendants] in this action destroyed the district court’s diversity 26 jurisdiction, but not its original subject matter jurisdiction [based on the court’s admiralty jurisdiction].” Id. It also noted that the plaintiff had not sought remand based on the joinder of the 27 non-diverse defendants and had therefore waived the issue. Id. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, 1 Under these circumstances, the court finds that there has not been undue delay in moving to join 2 Hopken as a defendant. See Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. CH2M Hill, Inc., No. 19-CV- 3 08295-LHK, 2020 WL 4252677, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2020) (describing relevant factors in 4 assessing timeliness). 5 D. Motive for Joinder 6 Starbucks argues that Plaintiffs have an improper motive for joinder, have been 7 “forthcoming to the Court and counsel about their intent to remand to state court,” and their 8 “shotgun approach in selecting a partner (employee) defendant verifies their intent to disrupt 9 diversity jurisdiction instead of reaching the merits of the case.” Mot. at 6; [see also Docket No. 10 35-1 (Emily Genge Decl., Aug. 18, 2023) ¶ 8 (“During the second case management conference 11 on May 31, 2023, Plaintiffs’ counsel told the Court and me that Plaintiffs intend to rely on the 12 inclusion of Mariko Doe, once properly served, to destroy diversity jurisdiction and request a 13 remand to state court”); but see id. ¶ 13 (On August 3, 2023, “[Plaintiffs’] [c]ounsel . . . explained 14 that Plaintiffs have named Mariko Brown because of her supervisory role at the store and that it 15 was not just because they want to remand the case to state court”).] 16 Plaintiffs contend that they pleaded a claim against Hopken in the original complaint but 17 mistakenly named her as Mariko Brown. Mot. at 6. They argue that they would have substituted 18 Hopken for Brown even if this case were still pending in state court. Id. at 7. Finally, Plaintiffs 19 assert that their motive for seeking to join Hopken is “to permit adjudication of this action in its 20 entirety against all possible culpable parties.” Shakhbazyan Decl. ¶ 4. 21 In light of the parties’ competing narratives on this point, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ 22 motive weighs only slightly against amendment. See Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 2020 WL 23 4252677, at *6 (“Importantly, even when the circumstances suggest that one of the plaintiff’s 24 motives is to defeat jurisdiction, factor four does not necessarily weigh against amendment when it 25 is not readily apparent that it is the sole motivation, particularly when there is a seemingly valid 26 claim against the proposed defendant” (cleaned up)). 27 E. Validity of Claim 1 because Starbucks is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of 2 the employment. Opp’n at 7. The court agrees. 3 On its face, the negligence claim against Hopken appears valid as she was the supervisor 4 and/or manager of the premises where Plaintiffs were allegedly injured. See Sandhu v. Volvo Cars 5 of N. Am., LLC, No. 16-CV-04987-BLF, 2017 WL 403495, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (noting 6 that a court need only determine whether claim asserted against proposed diversity-destroying 7 defendant “seems valid”). However, Plaintiffs have effectively conceded that the claim does not 8 have merit by agreeing that Hopken was acting within the scope of her employment with 9 Starbucks in connection with the incident. See McGrath v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 10 601, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding claims against three individual defendants were “weak” where 11 the operative complaint included no allegations to support a claim against any of them in their 12 individual capacities “separate and apart from their actions in the scope of their employment by 13 Defendant Home Depot USA, Inc.”). Thus, this factor weighs against joinder. 14 F. Prejudice to Plaintiffs 15 Denial of joinder will prejudice Plaintiffs by denying them their choice of forum. 16 However, Plaintiffs may still obtain information and evidence from Hopken as a witness through 17 the discovery process in this action. See Opp’n at 8. 18 Weighing the six factors, the court concludes that joinder of Hopken is not warranted. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Plaintiffs’ motions to amend the complaint and 21 remand this action to Alameda County Superior Court. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: October 3, 2023 25 ______________________________________ Donna M. Ryu 26 Chief Magistrate Judge 27