Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedFebruary 6, 2025
Docket22-1669V
StatusUnpublished

This text of Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Diaz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2025).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 22-1669V

ANGELINA DIAZ, Chief Special Master Corcoran

Petitioner, Filed: December 13, 2024 v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Catherine Wallace Costigan, Mctlaw, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Meghan Murphy, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES1

On November 10, 2022, Angelina Diaz filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that she suffered Guillain Barré syndrome (“GBS”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered to her on January 9, 2020.3 See Petition. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit (“SPU”) of the Office of Special

1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action taken in this case, it must be made

publicly accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2018).

3 Petitioner also received a tetanus, diphtheria, and acellular pertussis vaccine on January 9, 2020. Exhibit

1, ECF No. 5-2 (vaccine record). However, Respondent’s concession and my entitlement ruling was based upon Petitioner’s Table claim of GBS following receipt of the flu vaccine. ECF Nos. 23-24; see 42 C.F.R. § 100.3(a)(XIV)(D) & (c)(15) (2017). Masters. After Respondent conceded entitlement, the parties were unable to resolve damages on their own,4 so I ordered briefing on the matter.

For the reasons set forth below, I find that Petitioner is entitled to an award of damages in the amount $170,000.00 for pain and suffering. (The parties have agreed Petitioner is also entitled to $4,243.51 for past unreimbursed expenses, and $22,636.42 for past lost wages).

I. Legal Standard

Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). Additionally, a petitioner may recover “actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of judgment award such expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which petitioner seeks compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such injury, and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). The petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18, 1996).

There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for emotional distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a mathematical formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL 300594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and suffering is inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when determining an award for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3) duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe 34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and

4 Approximately six months after she was determined to be entitled to compensation, Petitioner informed

me that the parties had reached an impasse in their damages discussions and requested that I set a briefing schedule. Status Report, filed Feb. 20, 2024, ECF No. 33.

2 suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages in this case.”). And, of course, I may rely on my own experience (along with my predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims. Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress contemplated the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims).

Although pain and suffering in the past was often determined based on a continuum, as Respondent argues, that practice was cast into doubt by the Court several years ago. Graves v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579 (Fed. Cl. 2013). The Graves court maintained that to do so resulted in “the forcing of all suffering awards into a global comparative scale in which the individual petitioner’s suffering is compared to the most extreme cases and reduced accordingly.” Id. at 590. Instead, Graves assessed pain and suffering by looking to the record evidence, prior pain and suffering awards within the Vaccine Program, and a survey of similar injury claims outside of the Vaccine Program. Id. at 595. Under this alternative approach, the statutory cap merely cuts off higher pain and suffering awards – it does not shrink the magnitude of all possible awards as falling within a spectrum that ends at the cap. Although Graves is not controlling of the outcome in this case, it provides reasoned guidance in calculating pain and suffering awards.

II. Prior SPU Compensation of GBS Pain and Suffering5

A. Data Regarding Compensation in SPU Flu/ GBS Cases

Flu/GBS cases have an extensive history of informal resolution within the SPU. As of July 1, 2024, 842 SPU GBS cases have resolved since the inception of SPU ten years before. Compensation has been awarded in the vast majority of cases (801), with the remaining 41 cases dismissed.

The data for all categories of damages decisions described above reflect the expected differences in outcome, summarized as follows:

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