Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc.

893 F. Supp. 358, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10970, 1995 WL 455559
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJuly 28, 1995
DocketCiv. 92-4717 (JEI)
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 893 F. Supp. 358 (Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10970, 1995 WL 455559 (D.N.J. 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

IRENAS, District Judge:

From May of 1981 to October of 1990 the plaintiff, Jerry Diaz, worked as a maintenance mechanic in New Jersey for Johnson Matthey, Inc. (“JMI”), a corporation which, inter alia, refines, recovers, and markets platinum. Defendant, Johnson Matthey, PLC (“JM PLC”), is JMI’s parent corporation. Plaintiff developed the platinum allergy from on-the-job exposure to platinum salts, and he seeks damages for ongoing lung problems. Diaz claims that employees of both JMI and JM PLC advised him that the effects of the platinum salt allergy were temporary and that he would have no further health problems related to the allergy when he stopped working for JMI and was no longer exposed to platinum salts.

On November 18,1994, the Court rendered its decision on defendants’ summary judgment motion. Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 1155 (D.N.J.1994). In that opinion, Jerry and Cathy Diaz’s claims against JMI were dismissed. The conspiracy claim against Johnson Matthey, PLC was also dismissed, but the fraud and negligence claims survived summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, JM PLC challenged the adequacy and admissibility of the proposed testimony of plaintiffs expert, Dr. Donald Auerbach. Because the Court recognized that plaintiff needed expert testimony to maintain his claims for fraud and negligence, the Court granted defendant’s application for a Fed.R.Evid. 104(a) hearing to decide whether plaintiffs expert testimony would be admissible.

At a Daubert 1 hearing spanning two and one-half days, plaintiff relied solely on the testimony of Dr. Auerbach, while JM PLC presented Mr. Philip Jones, Dr. Paul Epstein, and Dr. Robert Perm. In addition, the defendant submitted the depositions of Dr. John Brodsky and Dr. Alexander Higgins, and the plaintiff offered medical reports of Drs. Leonard Berkowitz and Eric Finkenstadt. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were allowed time to review the hearing transcripts, draft briefs and present oral argument.

The Court finds that plaintiffs expert is unqualified and that his testimony is unreliable, and, accordingly, the motion to strike Dr. Auerbach as a witness is granted. Without Dr. Auerbach’s testimony, the plaintiff has no expert testimony on the issue of whether Diaz’s exposure to platinum salts caused his chronic, post-employment asthma. Thus, Diaz cannot prove causation, and summary judgment in favor of JM PLC must be granted.

I. THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF THE WORKER’S COMPENSATION DECISION

Before we present our findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Daubert hearing, we address plaintiffs argument that because the worker’s compensation court found that Jerry Diaz’s respiratory injury was caused by his employment at JMI and is permanent, JM PLC is collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues. The doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) may be invoked when

(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in a prior proceeding ... (2) the issue was actually litigated in the *362 prior proceeding ... (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits ... (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment ... and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding.

Matter of Estate of Dawson, 136 N.J. 1, 20, 641 A.2d 1026 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).

The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that collateral estoppel would not apply here because worker’s compensation and liability for negligence are “mutually exclusive remedies”:

the former affords what is essentially social insurance in the common and individual interest, irrespective of fault, [and] agreed exclusive relief for the consequences of an industrial accident arising out of and in the course of employment; the latter is the common-law mode of redressing personal injuries attributable to fault not within the Compensation Act.

Imre v. Riegel Paper Corp., 24 N.J. 438, 450, 132 A.2d 505 (1957). In other words, the identity of subject matter necessary to invoke collateral estoppel is lacking. Id. Nor does the worker’s compensation court, with its emphasis on a speedy and efficient resolution, offer the type of forum in which to resolve Daubert issues.

More significantly, the defendant in the earlier worker’s compensation proceeding was JMI, not its parent, JM PLC, the remaining defendant in this case. Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. To bring this action outside the worker’s compensation bar, plaintiff had to convince the Court that JM PLC and JMI were independent entities, see Diaz, 869 F.Supp. at 1163-64. Plaintiff cannot now argue the reverse and attempt to show the identity of JM PLC’s and JMI’s interests to invoke collateral estoppel. Cf. Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir.) (“[Judicial estoppel----preclude^] a party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S.Ct. 495, 102 L.Ed.2d 532 (1988).

II. DAUBERT HEARING: FINDINGS OF FACT

General

1. The refining of platinum creates chloroplatinate salts. Chloroplatinate salt is an allergic sensitizer. There is no dispute that a worker who becomes sensitized may suffer asthmatic symptoms while the exposure to these salts continues.

2. Jerry Diaz has asthma, a condition marked by shortness of breath and wheezing. Dr. Auerbach agrees with the statistic that about 15,000,000 Americans have asthma. Testimony was inconclusive as to what percentage of this total is represented by occupational asthma. One text estimates that in the United States, 2% of all asthmas are of occupational origin, 2 while Dr. Perm said some studies show that up to 20% of adult asthma is occupational.

3. Diaz was employed at JMI from May, 1981, through October, 1990. Diaz was exposed to chloroplatinate salts as a maintenance mechanic at JMI, but he has had no further exposure to this irritant since terminating his employment at JMI. While employed at JMI, Diaz became sensitized to chloroplatinate salts and suffered from asthmatic symptoms.

4. Diaz worked for Bethlehem Steel Corporation from 1977 to 1978 and for C.E. Glass Company from 1978-1981. From 1990 to the present he has worked for Allied Signal. Diaz was required to wear a mask and respirator while working at Bethlehem Steel and C.E. Glass, and there is some indication in the record that this may also be true at Allied Signal. This requirement would suggest at least the possibility of airborne irritants in all three workplaces.

Dr. Donald Auerbach

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
893 F. Supp. 358, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10970, 1995 WL 455559, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diaz-v-johnson-matthey-inc-njd-1995.