Diaz v. Franco

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Diaz v. Franco

258 A.D.2d 449, 683 N.Y.S.2d 267

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 14, 1999

StatusPublished

This text of 258 A.D.2d 449 (Diaz v. Franco) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Diaz v. Franco, 258 A.D.2d 449, 683 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert Lippmann, J.), entered October 6, 1997, which, after a hearing, granted petitioner’s application for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 to the extent of awarding petitioner’s counsel $2,000, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner applied for public housing in 1995. Respondent, however, made no determination as to petitioner’s eligibility for such housing until March 27, 1997, some nine days subsequent to petitioner’s commencement of this proceeding, when it notified petitioner that she was indeed eligible. In light of respondent’s long delay in processing petitioner’s meritori[450]*450ous application and its representations prior to the commencement of this proceeding that no determination upon petitioner’s application would be forthcoming until July 1997, we decline to accept respondents’ contention that the institution of this proceeding was not a catalyst of respondent agency’s belated eligibility determination. Indeed, since the opposite view is the one justified by the record in this matter, the motion court’s award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 was proper (see, Marbley v Bane, 57 F3d 224, 233-235). Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Nardelli, Williams and Rubin, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert Lippmann, J.), entered October 6, 1997, which, after a hearing, granted petitioner’s application for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 to the extent of awarding petitioner’s counsel $2,000, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner applied for public housing in 1995. Respondent, however, made no determination as to petitioner’s eligibility for such housing until March 27, 1997, some nine days subsequent to petitioner’s commencement of this proceeding, when it notified petitioner that she was indeed eligible. In light of respondent’s long delay in processing petitioner’s meritori[450]*450ous application and its representations prior to the commencement of this proceeding that no determination upon petitioner’s application would be forthcoming until July 1997, we decline to accept respondents’ contention that the institution of this proceeding was not a catalyst of respondent agency’s belated eligibility determination. Indeed, since the opposite view is the one justified by the record in this matter, the motion court’s award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 was proper (see, Marbley v Bane, 57 F3d 224, 233-235). Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Nardelli, Williams and Rubin, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

258 A.D.2d 449, 683 N.Y.S.2d 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diaz-v-franco-nyappdiv-1999.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack