Diaz v. Capital One, N.A.

District Court, S.D. California·Decided November 30, 2021·No. 3:21-cv-00526·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 ISMAEL DIAZ, Case No.: 21cv526-DMS-LL

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 14 CAPITAL ONE, N.A.; CAPITAL ONE

FINANCIAL CORPORATION; and 15 [ECF No. 29] CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A., 16 Defendants. 17

18 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of this Court’s 19 Order Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. 20 ECF No. 29 (“Mot.”). Defendants filed a Response in Opposition. ECF No. 31 (“Opp.”). 21 For the below reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 23 “A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery.” Laub 24 v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). Unless otherwise limited by 25 court order, the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is as 26 follows: 27 Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the 28 1 case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the 2 parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and 3 whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in 4 evidence to be discoverable. 5 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The frequency or extent of discovery must be limited if the court 7 determines that: 8 (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 9 obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity 10 to obtain the information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed 11 discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).

12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). “The party who resists discovery has the burden to show 13 discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and 14 supporting its objections.” Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 16 Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Defendant to identify its telephone service 17 provider for the number that was used to call Plaintiff. Mot. at 2. As previously noted, on 18 June 28, 2021, Plaintiff propounded Interrogatory No. 19 asking Capital One to “[l]ist the 19 telephone provider who services the telephone number (800) 435-1415.” Doc. No. 22-3 at 20 12. On August 11, 2021, Capital One objected on the grounds of overbreadth, burden, 21 scope, relevance, proportionality, confidentiality, and the undefined “services” term. ECF 22 No. 22-6 at 10. In his August 25, 2021 meet and confer letter, Plaintiff responded: 23 The phone number in question belongs to Capital One, N.A. and Capital One, N.A. is uniquely positioned to easily state who the telephone service provider 24 is. Capital One goes on to “object” on the basis that the request is not relevant 25 to any claim or defense. Virtually all of Plaintiff’s claims in this case surround unlawful telephone calls. Plaintiff requests the service provider as that entity 26 would be able to produce through a subpoena verifiable phone records highly 27 relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. For example, by subpoena Plaintiff could obtain third-party records verifying the calls made by Capital One, N.A. to Plaintiff 28 1 were more voluminous than the mere 1 page summary of alleged calls to Plaintiff covering the mere time period of February 12, 2021 to April 9, 2021. 2

3 Defendant also objects to the term “services,” although it states no specific explanation for why it objects to that term. The term “services” in this context 4 is not a term of art or a phrase with a specific definition beyond its normal 5 meaning in the vernacular. In said context, the telephone provider who services the telephone number is clearly understood to be either: AT&T, 6 Sprint, Verizon, and/or one of many other “telephone service providers.” 7 8 ECF No. 22-8 at 18. On September 2, 2021, prior to a meet and confer call, Capital One’s 9 counsel stated in a letter: 10 This information [in Interrogatory No. 19] has no bearing on whether [Capital 11 One] violated the TCPA or RFDCPA. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to subpoena phone records to evaluate against [Capital One’s] records, the 12 proper course would be to subpoena Plaintiff’s phone carrier. This is assuming 13 Plaintiff does not have access to his own call record history for the relevant time period. 14

15 ECF No. 22-10 at 5. 16 Capital One previously argued that Interrogatory No. 19 is “beyond the scope of 17 appropriate discovery” because: (1) Plaintiff already has his own phone records, as well as 18 Capital One’s phone records, which show the exact same call information; (2) if Plaintiff 19 wants to “triple check” the accuracy of the records, he can subpoena his own carrier; (3) it 20 would be burdensome and expensive for Capital One’s carrier “to sift through a financial 21 institution’s phone records for calls to a single number,” (4) it would be burdensome on 22 Capital One to redact customer information and risk the public disclosure of information; 23 (5) it would be burdensome on Capital One customers who will have their phone numbers 24 provided to Plaintiff’s counsel; (6) it would establish dangerous precedent where single 25 plaintiffs could obtain thousands of call records for unrelated third parties; and (7) it would 26 negatively impact relations between Capital One and its service provider and put it at a 27 competitive disadvantage in contract negotiations. ECF No. 23 at 7-8. 28 This Court previously denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to compel the 1 disclosure of Capital One’s telephone service provider because, inter alia, “it is not clear 2 why Plaintiff needs the identity of Capital One’s telephone service provider given, as 3 Capital One points out, that he already has access to his own phone records and Capital 4 One’s matching phone records, and given that Plaintiff could presumably subpoena his 5 own phone company if he wanted to verify the records’ accuracy.” ECF No. 25 at 10. 6 Plaintiff now argues that Interrogatory No. 19 is not burdensome or cumulative because 7 “Defendant’s telephone service provider will have records of outbound calls made to 8 Plaintiff, which were either not answered, or rejected by Plaintiff due to the excessive 9 frequency of said harassing calls.” Mot. at 6. Plaintiff states “only Defendant’s [telephone 10 service provider] would likely have records of the many outbound calls that Plaintiff 11 declined to answer.” Id. In response, Capital One argues the request is cumulative and 12 unnecessary because “[t]he call records produced by Plaintiff (screen shots of incoming 13 calls to what is purportedly Plaintiff’s cellular telephone), clearly display the icon for 14 ‘missed call’ and not that of a ‘voicemail.’” Opp. at 3. 15 Here, the records attached to Capital One’s Opposition contradict Plaintiff’s claim 16 that “only” Capital One’s telephone service provider would have records of outbound calls 17 that Plaintiff did not answer. Mot. at 2. The records cited by Capital One show that 18 Plaintiff’s phone keeps a record of calls that were received but not answered.

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Diaz v. Capital One, N.A., (S.D. Cal. 2021).

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