Diaz Campos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 14, 2025
• Docket: 23-3677
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE DIAZ CAMPOS, No. 23-3677 Agency No. Petitioner, A077-974-251 v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 11, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, IKUTA, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Jose Diaz Campos (“Diaz Campos”), a native and citizen of Mexico,

petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

denying his motion for reconsideration of a previous BIA decision affirming,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). without opinion, an immigration judge (“IJ”) order denying his motion to reopen

removal proceedings sua sponte. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion

and “reverse only if the Board acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law.”

Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). We

deny the petition.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz Campos’s motion for

reconsideration. The BIA correctly determined that Diaz Campos failed to identify

any legal or factual error in the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen sua

sponte, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Diaz Campos argues that his

purported eligibility for separate immigration relief – cancellation of removal –

constitutes an exceptional situation for which the IJ should have exercised its

discretionary authority to reopen proceedings. However, even assuming that he

has established an exceptional situation, he presents no authority demonstrating

that granting such relief was required. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 585

(9th Cir. 2016) (noting that while sua sponte action may be appropriate, “the Board

is not required – by regulation or its own decisions – to reopen proceedings sua

sponte in exceptional situations”).

Diaz Campos’s argument that his motion to reopen is akin to seeking

rescission of a prior removal order is unavailing. A motion to rescind an in

2 23-3677 absentia removal order on due process grounds has no bearing on Diaz Campos’s

motion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at issue here. See Morales-

Izquierdo v. Gonzalez, 486 F.3d 484, 496 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Because Diaz Campos failed to establish a legal or constitutional error in the

BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s order denying his motion to reopen sua sponte, the

BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration. See

Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2020).

PETITION DENIED.

3 23-3677