Dianna Grace Reuter v. Hostelling International USA.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: February 8, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-0652
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-652

DIANNA GRACE REUTER

vs.

HOSTELLING INTERNATIONAL USA.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Dianna Grace Reuter, appeals from an order

denying her motion for reconsideration or to vacate a judgment

dismissing her amended Superior Court complaint against the

defendant, Hostelling International USA. We affirm.

We recite the pertinent facts as alleged in the amended

complaint and accept them as true for purposes of this appeal.

See Curtis v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676

(2011). The plaintiff enrolled as a first-year student at a

Boston law school for the fall 2022 semester. She arrived at

the defendant's Boston hostel on August 15, 2022, intending to

stay until she found a permanent apartment with roommates. The

plaintiff purchased an annual membership from the defendant and

bought, stored, and cooked food in the communal kitchen. Soon after midnight on August 18, the plaintiff exited the

shower near her room and was still wrapped in a towel when a

male hostel employee approached without identifying himself.

The employee commanded her to leave immediately because she had

"slept on the floor." She tried to reach a compromise but was

ejected without even a chance to fully clothe herself or

retrieve her food from the communal kitchen. Worse yet, she was

due at the law school later that day for orientation, where she

arrived unkempt, in shock, and "with her belongings in tow."

The plaintiff fell behind in her studies at law school, which

she attributed to the defendant's conduct.

The plaintiff's amended complaint asserted tort claims

labeled as negligence per se and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. A Superior Court judge granted the

defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiff had

not plausibly pleaded a claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress, that the alleged damages did not meet the

Superior Court's jurisdictional threshold, and that the damages

sought were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The plaintiff

moved for reconsideration, attaching to her motion (1) a

"Sidewalk Plan" to address homelessness and beautify the streets

of Boston and (2) a statement of monetary damages, which listed

$192,127.75 in various categories unrelated to any physical

injury or property damage caused by the defendant, except

2 perhaps twenty-five dollars for food and milk "taken" by the

defendant and an amount "TBD" for counseling. The judge denied

the motion, and this appeal followed.

When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim we

"proceed de novo and consider the same pleadings as the motion

judge," accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing

any reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Baker v.

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 835,

842 (2017). "[W]e look beyond the conclusory allegations in the

complaint and focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly

suggest an entitlement to relief." Curtis, 458 Mass. at 676.

The facts alleged in the amended complaint suggest that one

of the defendant's employees inexplicably ordered the plaintiff

to leave the hostel, resulting in hardship to the plaintiff. On

appeal, however, the plaintiff does not argue that the motion

judge erred in dismissing the claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Instead, the plaintiff asks us to conduct

"review of the amended complaint under the tort of negligence or

negligence per se." Negligence per se is not a recognized cause

of action in Massachusetts. See Juliano v. Simpson, 461 Mass.

527, 532 (2012). We therefore address whether the plaintiff

plausibly alleged a claim of negligence.

"As a general principle of tort law, every actor has a duty

to exercise reasonable care to avoid physical harm to others."

3 Remy v. MacDonald, 440 Mass. 675, 677 (2004). Innkeepers "owe a

duty to take steps to protect their guests against unreasonable

risk of physical harm." Addis v. Steele, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 433,

436 (1995). See Bonafini v. G6 Hospitality Prop., LLC, 101

Mass. App. Ct. 612, 613-614 (2022).

The amended complaint lacked any allegations of physical

harm. "While detailed factual allegations are not necessary, to

be sufficient a complaint must nevertheless provide more than

labels and conclusions" (quotations and citation omitted).

Kelleher v. Lowell Gen. Hosp., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 51 (2020).

Although the complaint alleges seemingly arbitrary misconduct by

an employee of the defendant, it alleges an intentional act.

Intentional conduct cannot also be negligent. See Waters v.

Blackshear, 412 Mass. 589, 590 (1992); Sabatinelli v. Butler,

363 Mass. 565, 567 (1973).

Moreover, the plaintiff failed to allege that the injuries

she suffered "involved physical harm or property damage, and not

solely economic loss." Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. BJ's Wholesale

Club, Inc., 455 Mass. 458, 469 (2009). In a portion of the

amended complaint titled "proximate cause," the plaintiff

discussed being turned out into the street and the attendant

effects on her law school performance; the paragraph labeled

"harm" discussed the defendant's lack of altruism and failure to

address her response to its online survey; and under "remedy,"

4 the plaintiff sought a variety of injunctive relief concerning

the defendant's future conduct. She did not allege injury or

seek damages based on harm to her person or property.

In her motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff attempted

to cure the insufficiency of her complaint by submitting a

statement of monetary damages. The judge correctly disregarded

the statement because, on a motion to dismiss, the judge may not

consider "extraneous materials." Mmoe v. Commonwealth, 393

Mass. 617, 620 (1985). "Pleadings must stand or fall on their

own." Id. Although a motion for reconsideration may be based

on newly discovered evidence or information, see Audubon Hill S.

Condominium Ass'n v. Community Ass'n Underwriters of Am., 82

Mass. App. Ct. 461, 470 (2012), nothing about the statement of

damages suggests that the information in it was discovered after

the amended complaint was dismissed. While "some leniency is

appropriate" for self-represented litigants, the rules of

procedure "bind a pro se litigant as they bind other litigants."

Mmoe, supra.

Because the judge properly dismissed the amended complaint,

5 he did not abuse his discretion by denying the motion for

reconsideration or to vacate the judgment.

Order denying motion to reconsider or vacate the judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Massing & Sacks, JJ.1),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: February 8, 2024.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.