Diane Scott v. Erica Stewart

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: December 18, 2024
• Docket: 3D2024-1045
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed December 18, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-1045 Lower Tribunal No. 22-SC-112-M ________________

Diane Scott, Appellant,

vs.

Erica Stewart, Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Monroe County, James W. Morgan, III, Judge.

Diane Scott, in proper person.

No appearance, for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and GORDO, JJ.

GORDO, J. Diane Scott (“Scott”), pro se, appeals a final judgment rendered in

favor of Erica Stewart (“Stewart”).1 We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P.

9.030(b)(1)(A). Because Scott is unable to demonstrate the trial court’s

findings were unsupported, we affirm.

On appeal, Scott challenges the trial court’s entry of final judgment in

favor of Stewart and argues: (1) the trial court erred in finding Stewart proved

her counterclaim for malicious prosecution; (2) the evidence presented

supports a finding that Stewart defamed her; (3) the trial court made an error

regarding the facts; (4) the trial court’s final judgment was “wrong”; (5) the

damages were excessive and unjust; and (6) the trial court was biased

against her.

It is well settled that “[w]ithout a record of the trial proceedings, the

appellate court can not properly resolve the underlying factual issues so as

to conclude that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by the evidence

or by an alternative theory.” Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377

So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla. 1979). “Without knowing the factual context, neither

1 Scott appeals the following orders: the trial court’s order entering final judgment in favor of Stewart; the trial court’s order striking her motion for recusal; the trial court’s order denying her motion for rehearing; and the trial court’s order for hearing in aid of execution.

2 can an appellate court reasonably conclude that the trial judge so

misconceived the law as to require reversal.” Id.

Scott contends the judgment against her must be reversed on several

procedural and evidentiary grounds. Scott, however, has failed to provide

us with a transcript of the bench trial that preceded the final judgment. This

failure precludes meaningful appellate review. See Applegate, 377 So. 2d

at 1152 (“In appellate proceedings the decision of a trial court has the

presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to

demonstrate error.”); Kvinta v. Kvinta, 277 So. 3d 1070, 1075-76 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2019) (“When ‘there is no transcript of the testimony presented to the

trial judge,’ an appellate court should ‘give utmost credence to his fact

findings, and assume there was the best imaginable evidence adduced to

support them.’” (quoting Hudson Pest Control, Inc. v. Westford Asset Mgmt.,

Inc., 622 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993))); Zarate v. Deutsche Bank

Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr., 81 So. 3d 556, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (“Where there is

no record of the testimony of witnesses or of evidentiary rulings, and where

a statement of the record has not been prepared . . . a judgment which is not

fundamentally erroneous on its face must be affirmed.”).

To the extent Scott is attempting to seek review of the trial court’s order

striking her motion for recusal, the motion did not “allege[] facts [that] would

3 create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a

fair and impartial trial.” See Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214,

216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Indeed, the motion did not allege any facts. Scott

merely asserted, in a conclusory fashion, that the trial court’s decision was

“biased.” As such, we find the trial court did not err in finding the motion was

legally insufficient and failed to comply with the rule governing

disqualification of trial judges. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin. 2.330.

Affirmed.