1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ) DIANE JEAN ROJAS, ) Case No. CV 19-06951-JEM 12 ) Plaintiff, ) 13 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER v. ) AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE 14 ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ANDREW M. SAUL, ) 15 Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 On August 9, 2019, Diane Jean Rojas (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) filed a complaint seeking 20 review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying 21 Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental 22 Security Income benefits. (Dkt. 1.) The Commissioner filed an Answer on November 25, 2019. 23 (Dkt. 14.) On January 21, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (“JS”). (Dkt. 16.) The 24 matter is now ready for decision. 25 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed before this 26 Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record (“AR”), 27 the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed and this case 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a 53 year-old female who applied for Social Security Disability Insurance 3 benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits on March 4, 2016, alleging disability 4 beginning August 18, 2015. (AR 23.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in 5 substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2015, the alleged onset date. (AR 26.) 6 Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on May 19, 2016, and on reconsideration on June 7 21, 2016. (AR 23.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing on July 5, 2016. (AR 23.) On 8 July 23, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) MaryAnn Lunderman held a video hearing 9 from Albuquerque, New Mexico. (AR 23.) Plaintiff appeared and testified in Los Angeles, 10 California, and was represented by counsel. (AR 23.) Vocational expert (“VE”) Patricia B. 11 Ayerza, who is a Master’s degree level vocational rehabilitation counselor, also appeared and 12 testified at the hearing. (AR 23.) 13 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 23, 2018. (AR 23-36.) The Appeals 14 Council denied review on July 5, 2019. (AR 1-4.) DISPUTED ISSUES 15 16 As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises only the following disputed issue as 17 ground for reversal and remand: 18 1. Whether the ALJ properly considered the examining physician’s opinion. STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 20 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether 21 the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Smolen v. 22 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 , 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 23 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ’s disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and 24 based on the proper legal standards). 25 Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but less than a 26 preponderance.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. 27 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 28 1 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 2 401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as 4 supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Where 5 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be 6 upheld. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 7 “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 8 simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 9 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 10 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION 11 12 The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial 13 gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 14 can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 15 less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has 16 established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 17 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 18 The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial 19 gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the claimant is engaging 20 in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 21 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 22 combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not 23 significantly limit the claimant’s ability to work. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Third, the ALJ must 24 determine whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. 25 Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impairment 26 meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen, 27 482 U.S. at 141. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents the 28 claimant from doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1 2001). Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 2 residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can 3 still do despite [his or her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant 4 evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all of the 5 claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 6 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ) DIANE JEAN ROJAS, ) Case No. CV 19-06951-JEM 12 ) Plaintiff, ) 13 ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER v. ) AFFIRMING DECISION OF THE 14 ) COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ANDREW M. SAUL, ) 15 Commissioner of Social Security, ) ) 16 Defendant. ) ) 17 18 PROCEEDINGS 19 On August 9, 2019, Diane Jean Rojas (“Plaintiff” or “Claimant”) filed a complaint seeking 20 review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying 21 Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental 22 Security Income benefits. (Dkt. 1.) The Commissioner filed an Answer on November 25, 2019. 23 (Dkt. 14.) On January 21, 2020, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (“JS”). (Dkt. 16.) The 24 matter is now ready for decision. 25 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed before this 26 Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record (“AR”), 27 the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed and this case 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a 53 year-old female who applied for Social Security Disability Insurance 3 benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits on March 4, 2016, alleging disability 4 beginning August 18, 2015. (AR 23.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in 5 substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2015, the alleged onset date. (AR 26.) 6 Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially on May 19, 2016, and on reconsideration on June 7 21, 2016. (AR 23.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing on July 5, 2016. (AR 23.) On 8 July 23, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) MaryAnn Lunderman held a video hearing 9 from Albuquerque, New Mexico. (AR 23.) Plaintiff appeared and testified in Los Angeles, 10 California, and was represented by counsel. (AR 23.) Vocational expert (“VE”) Patricia B. 11 Ayerza, who is a Master’s degree level vocational rehabilitation counselor, also appeared and 12 testified at the hearing. (AR 23.) 13 The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 23, 2018. (AR 23-36.) The Appeals 14 Council denied review on July 5, 2019. (AR 1-4.) DISPUTED ISSUES 15 16 As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises only the following disputed issue as 17 ground for reversal and remand: 18 1. Whether the ALJ properly considered the examining physician’s opinion. STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 20 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether 21 the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. Smolen v. 22 Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 , 1279 (9th Cir. 1996); see also DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 846 23 (9th Cir. 1991) (ALJ’s disability determination must be supported by substantial evidence and 24 based on the proper legal standards). 25 Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla,’ but less than a 26 preponderance.” Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. 27 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 28 1 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 2 401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as 4 supporting evidence. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). Where 5 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be 6 upheld. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). 7 “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 8 simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882 9 (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 10 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). THE SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION 11 12 The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial 13 gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which 14 can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 15 less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has 16 established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 17 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 18 The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial 19 gainful activity. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). If the claimant is engaging 20 in substantial gainful activity, disability benefits will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 21 140 (1987). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or 22 combination of impairments. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. An impairment is not severe if it does not 23 significantly limit the claimant’s ability to work. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290. Third, the ALJ must 24 determine whether the impairment is listed, or equivalent to an impairment listed, in 20 C.F.R. 25 Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appendix I of the regulations. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. If the impairment 26 meets or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is presumptively disabled. Bowen, 27 482 U.S. at 141. Fourth, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment prevents the 28 claimant from doing past relevant work. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1 2001). Before making the step four determination, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 2 residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is “the most [one] can 3 still do despite [his or her] limitations” and represents an assessment “based on all the relevant 4 evidence.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The RFC must consider all of the 5 claimant’s impairments, including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 6 416.945(a)(2); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p. 7 If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past relevant work, 8 the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the impairment prevents the 9 claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 10 869 (9th Cir. 2000). The claimant bears the burden of proving steps one through four, 11 consistent with the general rule that at all times the burden is on the claimant to establish his or 12 her entitlement to benefits. Parra, 481 F.3d at 746. Once this prima facie case is established 13 by the claimant, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant may perform 14 other gainful activity. Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). To support 15 a finding that a claimant is not disabled at step five, the Commissioner must provide evidence 16 demonstrating that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the 17 claimant can do, given his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 18 § 416.912(g). If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is disabled and 19 entitled to benefits. Id. THE ALJ DECISION 20 21 In this case, the ALJ determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff has 22 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2015, the alleged onset date. (AR 23 26.) 24 At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable 25 severe impairments: degenerative disc disease; sprains and strains; and arthritis. (AR 26-29.) 26 At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 27 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 28 impairments. (AR 29.) 1 The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work as defined in 20 2 CFR §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c) with the following limitations: 3 Specifically, climbing of ramps and stairs must be limited to frequently, while 4 climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds must be further limited to occasionally. 5 Stooping (bending at the waist), kneeling, crouching (bending at the knees), and 6 crawling must be limited to frequently. With the bilateral upper extremities all over 7 head reaching or lifting above the shoulder must be limited to occasionally. 8 Within the assigned workplace, there must be less than occasional (seldom to 9 rare) exposure to extreme cold and heat, vibrations, and hazards, such as 10 machinery and heights. 11 (AR 29-34.) In determining the above RFC, the ALJ made a determination that Plaintiff’s 12 subjective symptom allegations were “not entirely consistent” with the medical evidence and 13 other evidence of record. (AR 30.) Plaintiff does not challenge this finding. 14 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform her past relevant work as a 15 massage therapist. (AR 34.) The ALJ also made an alternative finding at step five of the 16 sequential evaluation that, considering Claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 17 there are light jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant can 18 perform, including the jobs of cashier II, mailroom sorter, and self-service door attendant. (AR 19 34-35.) 20 Consequently, the ALJ found that Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the 21 Social Security Act. (AR 35-36.) DISCUSSION 22 I. THE ALJ’S RFC IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 23 24 The ALJ decision must be affirmed. Plaintiff’s sole contention is that the ALJ 25 erroneously rejected the opinion of consulting orthopedist Dr. Mark Wellisch. The Court 26 disagrees. The ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Wellisch for specific, legitimate reasons 27 supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence. 28 1 A. Relevant Federal Law 2 The ALJ’s RFC is not a medical determination but an administrative finding or legal 3 decision reserved to the Commissioner based on consideration of all the relevant evidence, 4 including medical evidence, lay witnesses, and subjective symptoms. See SSR 96-5p; 20 5 C.F.R. § 1527(e). In determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence 6 in the record, including medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including 7 pain reasonably attributable to the medical condition. Robbins, 446 F.3d at 883. 8 In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among the 9 opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) 10 those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who 11 neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, physicians). See 20 12 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). In 13 general, an ALJ must accord special weight to a treating physician’s opinion because a treating 14 physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 15 as an individual.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). If 16 a treating source’s opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments 17 is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is 18 not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record, the ALJ must give it 19 “controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). 20 Where a treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be 21 rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. However, if the 22 treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, such as an examining physician, 23 the ALJ may reject the treating physician’s opinion by providing specific, legitimate reasons, 24 supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; see also Orn, 495 25 F.3d at 632; Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Where a treating 26 physician's opinion is contradicted by an examining professional’s opinion, the Commissioner 27 may resolve the conflict by relying on the examining physician’s opinion if the examining 28 physician’s opinion is supported by different, independent clinical findings. See Andrews v. 1 Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. Similarly, to reject an 2 uncontradicted opinion of an examining physician, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing 3 reasons. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). If an examining physician’s 4 opinion is contradicted by another physician’s opinion, an ALJ must provide specific and 5 legitimate reasons to reject it. Id. However, “[t]he opinion of a non-examining physician cannot 6 by itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 7 examining physician or a treating physician”; such an opinion may serve as substantial 8 evidence only when it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in the 9 record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 10 B. Analysis 11 Plaintiff was a massage therapist and home health aide who injured her neck and lower 12 back in a motor vehicle accident on August 18, 2015, the alleged onset date. (AR 26, 30, 31, 13 34.) She alleges disability due to back pain, neck pain, sciatic nerve, right hip pain, and foot 14 pain. (AR 30.) She alleges daily pain in her neck, fingers, back, and shoulders. (AR 30.) She 15 also alleges headaches and the mental impairments of affective and anxiety disorders. (AR 16 26.) 17 The ALJ did find that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease; 18 sprains and strains; and arthritis. (AR 26.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s impairments of 19 headaches, anemia, heart disorder, obesity and mental impairments are not severe. 20 Notwithstanding the above impairments, severe and nonsevere, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff with 21 a RFC for a reduced range of medium work. (AR 29.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff 22 was not disabled from the alleged onset date of August 18, 2015, through the date of decision 23 on August 23, 2018. (AR 35, 36.) 24 On April 25, 2016, Plaintiff underwent an orthopedic consulting examination with 25 Dr. Mark Wellisch following a motor vehicle accident in which she injured her neck or lower 26 back. (AR 31, 473-478.) She complained of pain in her lower back that radiated down her right 27 leg, pain in the right hand, and her feet hurt. (AR 31.) Dr. Wellisch noted that Plaintiff made 1 antalgic gait or ataxia. (AR 31, 473, 474.) She had tenderness and reduced range of motion in 2 the spine but negative straight leg testing. (AR 31.) Her hips, knees, wrists, hands, and feet 3 were normal. (AR 31.) She had normal strength in her upper and lower extremities and normal 4 sensation. (AR 31.) Dr. Wellisch diagnosed multilevel cervical disc degeneration with probable 5 nerve entrapment, single level lumbar disc degeneration without spinal stenosis or nerve root 6 entrapment, bilateral adhesive capsulitis of the shoulders, degenerative arthritis of the right 7 metacarpal joint, and mild osteoarthritis of the left knee. (AR 31.) Dr. Wellisch opined that 8 Plaintiff was limited to lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10 pounds frequently, 9 can sit, stand, and walk six hours in an eight hour day, does not need a cane to ambulate, and 10 has mild hand and finger impairments. (AR 33, 478.) 11 The ALJ gave Dr. Wellisch’s opinion “some weight,” but rejected his restrictions that 12 exceed than the RFC assessed by State agency reviewing physicians of less than a full range 13 of medium work with postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations. (AR 33.) The ALJ 14 gave several reasons for his assessment. First, the ALJ found that the above RFC was more 15 consistent with the longitudinal objective medical evidence than Dr. Wallisch’s RFC. (AR 33.) 16 An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion that does not have supportive evidence, is 17 contradicted by other assessments, is unsupported by the record as a whole, and is 18 unsupported by or inconsistent with his or her treatment notes. Batson v. Comm’r, 359 F.3d 19 1190, 1195, and n.3 (9th Cir. 2004); Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. (ALJ need not accept a 20 medical opinion that is inadequately supported by clinical findings). Examinations before and 21 after Dr. Wellisch’s report showed that she had reduced range of motion in her neck but normal 22 motor strength, normal sensation, and negative straight leg raising. (AR 31, 410-411, 423, 23 426-427, 429-430, 432-433, 446-447, 489, 560.) In August 2016, an X-ray of Plaintiff’s right 24 knee was unremarkable. (AR 32.) In January 2017, Plaintiff had a normal physical 25 examination except for a facial laceration. (AR 32.) She also had a normal neurological 26 examination other than tenderness. (AR 32.) Dr. Wellisch did not address the objective 27 medical evidence of record discussed above, some of which post-dated his opinion. Plaintiff 1 does not address the extensive longitudinal medical evidence inconsistent with Dr. Wellisch’s 2 opinion cited by the ALJ. 3 Second, the ALJ gave “great weight” to the opinions of State agency reviewing 4 physicians that Plaintiff could perform less than the full range of medium work with postural, 5 manipulative, and environmental limitations. (AR 33, 121, 136, 151, 165.) The contradictory 6 opinions of other physicians provide specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting a physician’s 7 opinion. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). As previously noted, the 8 opinion of a non-examining physician may serve as substantial evidence when it is consistent 9 with and supported by other independent evidence in the record as is the case here. Lester, 81 10 F.3d at 830-31; Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. 11 Third, the ALJ found inconsistencies between Dr. Wellisch’s opinion and his 12 examinations, as explained by State reviewing physician Dr. R. Weeks. (AR 33.) These 13 include vague allegations, lack of effort, and exaggeration of symptoms. (AR 31, 33, 133.) 14 Dr. Weeks also noted that Dr. Wellisch’s adhesive capsulitis diagnosis for Plaintiff’s shoulders 15 was inconsistent with the normal and painless range of motion in the upper extremities 16 reflected in the medical evidence of record. (AR 133.) He further noted that Dr. Wellisch’s 17 diagnosis of degenerative arthritis of the right metacarpal joint was unsupported by and 18 inconsistent with his entirely normal examination of Plaintiff’s wrists and hands. (AR 133.) 19 Dr. Wellisch’s nerve root impairment was inconsistent with his findings of no loss of sensation 20 or strength in the upper extremities. (AR 133.) Dr. Weeks noted Dr. Wellisch failed to explain 21 “0 degrees” cervical spine flexion and “0 pounds” right grip strength. (AR 133.) 22 Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence regarding Dr. Wellisch’s 23 opinion, but it is the ALJ’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence and 24 ambiguities in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Where the ALJ’s interpretation of the 25 record is reasonable, as it is here, it should not be second-guessed. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 26 F.3d at 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954 (“Where the evidence is susceptible 27 to more than rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.”). 1 The ALJ rejected Dr. Wellisch’s opinions to the extent inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 2 assessed RFC for specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s 3 RFC is supported by substantial evidence. 4 * * * 5 The ALJ’s nondisability determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of 6 legal error. 7 ORDER 8 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the 9 Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice. 10 11 DATED: April 24, 2020 /s/ John E. McDermott JOHN E. MCDERMOTT 12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27