Diana Harris v. Experian Information Solutions Incorporated

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04761
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Diana Harris, No. CV-25-04761-PHX-SHD

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Experian Information Solutions Incorporated, 13 Defendant. 14

15 At issue is Defendant Experian Information Solutions Incorporated’s (“Experian”) 16 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (Doc. 15), and Experian’s Motion to Stay 17 Discovery, (Doc. 22). For the following reasons, Experian’s Motion for Judgment on the 18 Pleadings will be granted, and the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot. 19 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 On January 1, 2022, Plaintiff Diana Harris purchased an exercise bike from Target’s 21 website for $529.29, using her Discover credit card. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 59.) In February 22 2022, Harris paid off the full balance of her Discover account (the “Account”), including 23 the amount paid for the exercise bike. (Id. at ¶¶ 45–46.) In March 2022, Harris contacted 24 Target to initiate a return of the bike. (Id. at ¶ 47.) In early April, Target informed Harris 25 that it could schedule UPS to retrieve the item. (Id. at ¶¶ 49–50.) UPS picked the bike up 26 from Harris’s residence on April 5, 2022, and delivered it to a Target facility in Indiana on 27 April 8, 2022. (Id. at ¶¶ 51–52.) 28 By June 2022, Harris had not received a refund for the exercise bike. (Id. at ¶ 54.) 1 Harris contacted Discover, explaining that she had not received a credit for the returned 2 bike and enclosed proof of the UPS pickup and delivery to Target. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–57.) On 3 September 1, 2022, Discover issued Harris a credit for the bike. (Id. at ¶ 58.) However, in 4 October 2022, Harris learned that Discover had reversed the credit and recharged the 5 $529.29 to her Account after an “additional review” in which Discover determined the 6 charge was valid. (Id. at ¶¶ 59–60.) Harris alleges that Discover reversed the credit 7 because Target told Discover that the bike was never returned. (Id. at ¶ 61.) 8 Between October 2022 and February 2023, Harris engaged in numerous 9 communications with Target, which maintained that the bike had not been returned. (Id. 10 at ¶¶ 62–63.) In January 2023, Target advised Harris that it would resolve the matter 11 directly with Discover, and Harris relayed this information to Discover. (Id. at ¶¶ 64–66.) 12 On February 16, 2023, Target sent Harris an email “approving” a refund of $539.17 plus 13 tax, to be credited to her original form of payment. (Id. at ¶¶ 68–70.) Harris, however, 14 never received a credit to her Account. (Id. at ¶ 71.) Instead, she received a Target gift 15 card. (Id.) 16 Harris did not pay the balance on her Account, so on February 28, 2023, Discover 17 suspended both the Account and Harris’s second Discover account, citing “the continued 18 delinquency.” (See id. at ¶¶ 77–78.) Two months later, on April 28, 2023, Discover closed 19 both accounts. (Id. at ¶ 80.) 20 Harris alleges that beginning in June 2023, Discover reported to Experian, a Credit 21 Reporting Agency (“CRA”), that the Account had been charged off with a balance of $811, 22 and that Experian thereafter included that information in Harris’s credit file and consumer 23 reports. (Id. at ¶¶ 15–16, 82–84.) Harris disputed the charged-off status and the $811 24 balance with Experian twice—first in the summer of 2024 and again on September 22, 25 2025—each time describing the Target and Discover controversy in detail and attaching 26 supporting documentation. (Id. at ¶¶ 85–88, 110–14.) In response to each dispute, 27 Experian sent an Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV”) to Discover; 28 Discover verified the reported information as accurate; Experian communicated that result 1 to Harris; and Experian did not correct or delete the reporting. (Id. at ¶¶ 89–90, 106, 115– 2 16.) 3 Harris alleges that Experian’s reporting of the charged-off status and $811 balance 4 caused her to suffer a number of adverse credit actions between March 2025 and September 5 2025, including the suspension of her Home Equity Line of Credit with PNC Bank, an 6 increase in her Annual Percentage Rate by American Express, closure of an account by 7 BMO Bank, N.A., denial of a credit application by CitiBank, denial of an insurance 8 application by Allstate, and denial of an account application by Skyla Credit Union. (Id. 9 at ¶¶ 133–57.) Harris further alleges that she has expended significant time and effort 10 disputing the reporting and has suffered emotional distress, including stress, anxiety, 11 embarrassment, and sleeplessness. (Id. at ¶¶ 160–64.) 12 Harris filed her Complaint on December 17, 2025, alleging that Experian violated 13 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by failing to follow 14 reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of Harris’s credit information 15 as required by § 1681e(b) and by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of her 16 disputes as required by § 1681i. (See generally id.) Harris brings this action individually 17 and asserts two counts. Count I alleges that Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by 18 failing to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the 19 preparation of Harris’s consumer reports. (Id. at ¶¶ 165–72.) Count II alleges that 20 Experian violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681i by failing to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of 21 Harris’s disputes regarding the charged-off status and balance reported on her Discover 22 account. (Id. at ¶¶ 173–81.) Harris seeks actual, statutory, and punitive damages, together 23 with attorneys’ fees and costs, alleging that Experian’s conduct was willful or, in the 24 alternative, negligent. (Id. at ¶¶ 171–72, 180–81.) 25 On February 4, 2026, Experian answered the Complaint. (Doc. 13.) On February 26 26, 2026, Experian filed the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (Doc. 15.) Harris responded, (Doc. 18), and 28 1 Experian replied, (Doc. 19).1 2 On March 25, 2026, Experian filed a Motion to Stay Discovery pending resolution 3 of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. 22.) Harris responded, (Doc. 24), and 4 Experian replied, (Doc. 25). 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD 6 “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may 7 move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is 8 appropriate when, taking all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “the moving 9 party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 10 (9th Cir. 2009). A court’s analysis “under Rule 12(c) is substantially identical to analysis 11 under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, a court must determine whether the facts 12 alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.” Chavez v. 13 United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). 14 Accordingly, to survive a Rule 12(c) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient 15 factual matter, accepted as true” and construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, “to 16 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 17 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff pleads “factual 18 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 19 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In making this determination, courts do not accept legal 20 conclusions as true, nor do they consider “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 21 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a 22 complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” 23 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)). For the purposes of ruling on a Rule 24 12(c) motion, courts must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe 25 the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul 26 Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 27

28 1 The parties did not request oral argument, and it is not necessary, so this motion is decided without holding a hearing. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Experian moves for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Harris has failed 3 to plausibly allege an inaccuracy in her consumer report, as required to state a claim under 4 both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i of the FCRA. (See Doc. 15 at 4.) 5 A. Inaccuracy Under Ninth Circuit Law 6 The FCRA requires CRAs to “follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum 7 possible accuracy” of consumer reports, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and to “conduct a 8 reasonable reinvestigation” upon receiving notice of a consumer dispute, id. 9 § 1681i(a)(1)(A). To state a claim under either provision, a plaintiff must first make “a 10 prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting by the CRA.” Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., 11 Inc., 891 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Information on a 12 consumer report is “inaccurate” if it is “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way 13 and to such an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Id. 14 (citation omitted). Without a cognizable inaccuracy, courts “need not consider whether 15 [the CRA] had reasonable procedures or conducted reasonable reinvestigations.” Id. at 16 759. 17 Harris’s own allegations establish that Experian did not engage in inaccurate 18 reporting. Harris used her Discover credit card to purchase an exercise bike for $529.29. 19 (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43, 59.) Discover initially credited her Account for the charge but later 20 reversed that credit after concluding that the charge was valid. (Id. at ¶¶ 58–60.) Target 21 ultimately refunded Harris by issuing her a Target gift card rather than a credit to her 22 Account. (Id. at ¶¶ 70–71.) Harris did not pay the resulting balance on her Discover card, 23 and Discover suspended and closed the Account for “continued delinquency.” (See id. at 24 ¶¶ 77–81.) On these facts, Experian’s reporting that the Account was charged off with an 25 outstanding balance is neither “patently incorrect” nor materially misleading. See Shaw, 26 891 F.3d at 756. The Complaint’s allegations confirm that the charge was placed on the 27 Account, that the balance went unpaid, and that Discover closed the Account as a result. 28 Harris’s grievance is properly directed at Target and Discover, not Experian. At 1 bottom, Harris believes she should not be required to pay the $811 balance because she 2 returned the exercise bike and Target “approved” a refund to her Discover card. (Doc. 1 3 at ¶¶ 51–53, 70; Doc. 18 at 7–8.) But it is not Experian’s responsibility to resolve a dispute 4 between Harris, Target, and Discover over who is ultimately responsible for the $811 5 balance under the applicable credit and purchase agreements. The Ninth Circuit has 6 squarely held that such disputes are not cognizable against a CRA under the FCRA. In 7 Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, the Ninth Circuit explained that “credit reporting 8 agencies are not tribunals. They simply collect and report information furnished by others. 9 Because CRAs are ill equipped to adjudicate contract disputes, courts have been loath to 10 allow consumers to mount collateral attacks on the legal validity of their debts in the guise 11 of FCRA reinvestigation claims.” 629 F.3d 876, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). “A CRA is not 12 required as part of its reinvestigation duties to provide a legal opinion” on the validity of a 13 consumer’s debt; rather, “determining whether the consumer has a valid defense is a 14 question for a court to resolve in a suit against the creditor, not a job imposed upon 15 consumer reporting agencies by the FCRA.” Id. at 892 (cleaned up). 16 The facts here are materially indistinguishable from those in Carvalho. There, the 17 plaintiff received medical treatment, her insurer declined to pay, and the resulting debt was 18 reported on her credit file. Id. at 881–82. The plaintiff disputed the debt, and did not pay 19 it, on the ground that her insurer had wrongfully refused to pay. Id. at 882. The Ninth 20 Circuit affirmed dismissal of her FCRA claims because “a consumer who avails herself of 21 a good or service but defaults on payment would be considered less creditworthy than one 22 who does not, regardless of how legally sound her reasons for default are.” Id. at 891. The 23 same is true here. Harris availed herself of the exercise bike through a purchase financed 24 by her Discover card, Discover treated the charge as valid, and Harris did not pay the 25 resulting balance. Whether Target’s issuance of a gift card satisfied any obligation owed 26 to Harris, and whether that excuses her obligation to pay Discover, are questions governed 27 by her agreements with Target and/or Discover. They are not questions Experian is 28 required or equipped to resolve. See id. at 892. 1 Nor does the documentation Harris allegedly provided Experian alter that 2 conclusion. Whatever supporting documentation Harris submitted establishes, at most, a 3 potential defense to the debt—a matter to be pressed against Discover or Target, neither of 4 whom is named as a defendant here. See id. Harris’s reliance on Chaitoff v. Experian 5 Information Solutions, Inc., 79 F.4th 800 (9th Cir. 2023), does not change that conclusion. 6 Harris cites Chaitoff for the proposition that “a CRA might be liable if it ignores or 7 overlooks documents of unquestioned authenticity, even if they relate to a legal dispute.” 8 Id. at 815; (Doc. 18 at 7). But even assuming Harris submitted documents of “unquestioned 9 authenticity”—proof of shipment and Target’s refund “approval”—those documents do 10 not themselves resolve the inaccuracy she alleges. They establish, at most, that Harris 11 returned the bike and that Target purported to approve a refund; they do not establish that 12 Target’s issuance of a gift card failed to satisfy its refund obligation, or that any such failure 13 relieved Harris of her obligation to pay Discover. Resolving those questions still requires 14 the kind of contractual interpretation that Carvalho places beyond a CRA’s reinvestigation 15 duties. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 891–92. Chaitoff does not stand for the broader 16 proposition that a CRA must credit a consumer’s documents whenever they bear on a legal 17 dispute. Where, as here, the documents do not resolve the underlying dispute, Chaitoff 18 affords Harris no relief. A consumer’s argument that a CRA is ignoring a “documented 19 discrepancy does not change the fact that [she] has failed to plead sufficient facts that there 20 is an inaccuracy in the [CRA’s] reporting to begin with.” Silva v. Santander Consumer 21 USA Inc., 2025 WL 3215772, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (cleaned up). Harris has therefore 22 failed to plausibly allege a cognizable inaccuracy under binding Ninth Circuit law. 23 B. The Alternative “Objectively and Readily Verifiable” Standard 24 Harris urges me to apply a different standard, adopted by several other circuits, that 25 an inaccuracy is actionable under the FCRA if it is “objectively and readily verifiable.” 26 (Doc. 18 at 5–6.) The Ninth Circuit has not adopted the “objectively and readily verifiable” 27 standard. See Silva, 2025 WL 3215772, at *3 (noting “there is no definitive Ninth Circuit 28 1 case law adopting the ‘objectively and readily verifiable test’ for § 1681e(b) claims”).2 2 Carvalho and Shaw therefore remain binding. But even if I were to apply the standard 3 Harris urges, her claims would still fail. 4 The “objectively and readily verifiable” standard is not satisfied when resolving the 5 alleged inaccuracy requires “bespoke attention and legal reasoning.” Mader v. Experian 6 Info. Sols., Inc., 56 F.4th 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2023). “[I]naccuracies that turn on legal 7 disputes are not cognizable under the FCRA.” Id. Instead, “if a legal question is 8 sufficiently settled so that the import on a particular debt is readily and objectively 9 verifiable, the FCRA sometimes requires that the implications of that decision be reflected 10 in credit reports.” Id. at 271. Other circuits applying this framework have reached the 11 same conclusion in the context of contractual disputes. See Holden v. Holiday Inn Club 12 Vacations Inc., 98 F.4th 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2024) (“The problem for [plaintiffs] is that 13 the alleged inaccurate information is not objectively and readily verifiable because it stems 14 from a contractual dispute without a straightforward answer.”); Roberts v. Carter-Young, 15 Inc., 131 F.4th 241, 251 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[A] dispute that involves complex fact-gathering 16 and in-depth legal analysis of the sort that courts would typically perform is not objectively 17 and readily verifiable.”). 18 The same reasoning applies here. To determine whether the $811 balance was 19 accurately reported, Experian would have to obtain and interpret at least two separate 20 agreements: Target’s purchase and return policies, to assess whether Harris was entitled to 21 a cash refund rather than a gift card; and Harris’s credit agreement with Discover, to assess

22 2 None of the remaining cases Harris cites changes the analysis. Harris’s reliance on Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246 (9th Cir. 2022), for the proposition that the 23 Ninth Circuit has called the “legal vs. factual” framework into question is misplaced. (See Doc. 18 at 6.) Gross addresses the investigative obligations of furnishers like Discover 24 under § 1681s-2(b), not the obligations of CRAs like Experian under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i. See id. at 1253. Indeed, Gross expressly distinguishes the two, citing Carvalho and 25 explaining that because CRAs “lack any direct relationship with the consumer . . . they must rely on the representations of the furnishers who usually own the debt,” whereas 26 furnishers “stand in a far better position to make a thorough investigation of a disputed debt.” Id. (cleaned up). Harris also cites Hebrank v. Early Warning Services, LLC, 2025 27 WL 1148801 (D. Ariz. 2025), which applied the “objectively and readily verifiable” standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See id. at * 4. Hebrank is not binding, and the 28 question whether that standard displaces Carvalho and Shaw was not squarely presented there. In any event, Harris’s claims fail under either standard. 1 whether Target’s alleged failure to provide a cash refund relieves Harris of her obligation 2 to pay the charge. Those are not inquiries that can be resolved by a “straightforward 3 answer,” Holden, 98 F.4th at 1368, and they plainly involve the kind of “in-depth legal 4 analysis” that courts—not CRAs—are equipped to perform, Roberts, 131 F.4th at 251. See 5 also Mader, 56 F.4th at 271 (FCRA does not require CRAs to “resolve unsettled legal 6 questions”). 7 The out-of-circuit district court decisions Harris cites do not compel a different 8 result. Harris relies on Kanani v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2024 WL 3729484 9 (M.D. Fla. 2024), and Brutus v. Yes Companies Fred, LLC, 754 F. Supp. 3d 1161 (N.D. 10 Fla. 2024), for the proposition that whether a debt is owed is “objectively and readily 11 verifiable.” (Doc. 18 at 9–10.) Both cases are distinguishable. The Kanani plaintiffs 12 alleged that an oral “walkaway agreement” with their landlord extinguished their debt 13 entirely, and the court held that whether such an agreement existed was a “straightforward 14 application of law to facts.” 2024 WL 3729484, at *3. The Brutus plaintiff alleged his 15 landlord had duplicated charges in a manner apparent on the face of a single document. 16 754 F. Supp. 3d at 1164–65. Harris alleges neither. She does not contend that the charge 17 never occurred, that the balance was misstated, or that the debt was wiped out by 18 agreement. Although Harris frames her dispute as a purely factual one—“did Plaintiff 19 return the bike?”, (Doc. 18 at 9)—resolving whether the $811 balance is accurate requires 20 more than verifying the return. As discussed above, it requires determining whether 21 Target’s gift card satisfied any refund obligation owed to Harris and whether any 22 deficiency relieves Harris of her obligation to pay Discover under the cardholder 23 agreement. Those questions require interpreting written agreements, and Kanani itself 24 acknowledged that such inquiries fall outside the “objectively and readily verifiable” 25 category. See 2024 WL 3729484, at *3 (contrasting the plaintiffs’ allegations with cases 26 requiring interpretation of written agreements about which courts had reached “conflicting 27 conclusions” (quotation marks omitted)). 28 Harris’s claims thus fail under either standard. Accordingly, because Harris has not 1 || made the prima facie showing of inaccuracy required under either § 1681le(b) or § 16811, 2|| both counts fail as a matter of law. Experian’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, || (Doc. 15), will therefore be granted. 4 C. Leave to Amend 5 Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted without leave to 6 || amend, as any amendment would be futile. Harris contends that she could plead additional || facts regarding her return of the bike, Target’s approval of a refund, and Experian’s failure g || to consider that evidence. (Doc. 18 at 10.) But I assumed the truth of those allegations 9 || throughout this Order, and they do not cure the legal deficiency in Harris’s claims, which || turns on the nature of the underlying dispute rather than the strength of the evidence 11 || supporting her position. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 893 (“Because we hold that Carvalho || cannot make a prima facie case of inaccurate reporting, we conclude that amendment to 13 || include other claims requiring inaccuracy would be futile.”). 14 D. Motion to Stay Discovery 15 Experian’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc. 22), seeks a stay of discovery pending tesolution of the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Because I granted the Motion for 17|| Judgment on the Pleadings, the Motion to Stay Discovery will be denied as moot. 18 IT IS ORDERED that Experian’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 15) □□ is GRANTED. 0 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery, (Doc. || 22),1s DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 3 accordingly and close this case. 4 Dated this lst day of May, 2026. / 25 / 26 yf / 27 H le Sharad H. Desai 28 United States District Judge

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