Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 4, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D24-1588 Lower Tribunal No. 24-8338-FC-04
Diana De Los Angeles Salazar, Appellant,
vs.
Andre Ramon Blanco, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marcia Del Rey, Judge.
Law Office of Vanessa D. Torres, P.A., and Vanessa D. Torres, for appellant.
No appearance, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY and MILLER, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J. Respondent Diana De Los Angeles Salazar (“the Mother”) appeals the
trial court’s Final Judgment of Paternity, Timesharing/Parenting Plan. We
reverse because the trial court failed to comply with the statutory
requirements set out in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2024).
The Mother and petitioner Andre Ramon Blanco (“the Father”) are not
married to each other. They have one son together, D.X.B., the minor child,
who was three years old at the time of the filing of the Initial Brief.
Both the Mother and Father are pro se litigants. In early May 2024, the
Father filed a petition to determine paternity, parental responsibility,
parenting plan, time sharing schedule, and child support. The Father
requested equal timesharing. The Mother filed an answer denying the
Father’s request for shared parental responsibility, timesharing, and other
financial allegations. The Mother asserted she maintained health insurance
for the child, provides for all his needs, and pays for all his expenses.
On May 31, 2024, the Mother filed a Motion to Family Court Services
requesting supervised visitation, temporary and retroactive child support,
and temporary sole parental responsibility. The Mother contended that the
Father was absent from the child’s life during the child’s first three years and
that the child did not know him. She requested therapy and supervised
visitation so the child could become acquainted with the Father. The Mother
2 further claimed the Father had never paid child support. The record on
appeal does not indicate whether the trial court ruled on this motion.
After no agreement was reached at mediation, the trial court set the
case for non-jury trial on September 3, 2024. There is no transcript of the
hearing that took place on September 3.
On September 4, 2024, the trial court entered a Final Judgment of
Paternity, Time Sharing/Paternity Plan. The court awarded the parties
shared parental responsibility. The trial court made only one finding, stating:
“The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor child that the parties
have shared parental responsibility.”
The trial court further ordered a 50-50 timesharing schedule with
alternating weeks on Sunday and an alternating holiday schedule without
indicating which parent would have even/odd years. The trial court did not
define holidays. The trial court ordered that the minor child would spend the
Mother’s birthday with the Mother and the Father’s birthday with the Father
but did not specify anything regarding the child’s birthday. The Final
Judgment does not address which parent will be responsible for health care
and school-related matters, as well as the address to be used for school-
boundary determination and registration, and other activities. The Final
Judgment also omits how the parties would be financially responsible for
3 extracurricular activities, summer camp, tutoring, and before/after school
care and omits travel provisions.
Regarding child support, the trial court ordered the Mother to pay the
Father $156.49/month based on the child support guidelines. In addition, the
court ordered that the total retroactive child support owed to the Father by
the Mother as of September 3, 2024 was $3,755.76. This included a period
during which the Mother was the child’s primary custodian.
Both parties submitted parenting plans, neither of which the trial court
adopted. In addition, the trial court did not create its own parenting plan, as
required by section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statute (2024), and attach it to or
incorporate it into the Final Judgment. The Mother now appeals.
This court applies a de novo standard of review where the trial court
errs in the application of the law. Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932
(Fla. 2005). Whether a court’s timesharing and parenting plan determination
is supported by competent substantial evidence is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. Wade v. Wade, 159 So. 3d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015). In addition, the appellate court looks to see if there is competent
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings concerning the
statutory factors listed in section 61.13. Ford v. Ford, 700 So. 2d 191, 195-
4 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Adair v. Adair, 720 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998).
The Mother contends that although there was no court reporter present
at the hearing, and thus there is no transcript, reversal is warranted because
the error committed by the trial court is apparent on the face of the judgment,
as the trial court did not consider the factors required by section 61.13,
Florida Statute (2024).1 The Mother is correct that because there is no
transcript provided to this Court, this Court’s review is limited to errors of law
apparent on the face of the judgment. Silverman v. Silverman, 940 So. 2d
615, 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Section 61.13 requires that the trial court decide all matters relating to
parenting plans and time-sharing of each minor child according to the “best
interests of the child.” § 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Fla. Stat. (2024); A.L.G. v. J.F.D., 85
So. 3d 527, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Determining the child’s best interests
is to be made by evaluating all the factors affecting the welfare and interests
of the child and the family’s circumstances, including the twenty factors set
1 The Father did not file an Answer Brief after being directed by this Court to do so; thus, the Court precluded him from filing an Answer Brief and from presenting an oral argument to this Court.
5 forth in the statute. See Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA
2009); Velasquez v. Millan, 963 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Although section 61.13(3) does not require written findings justifying a
custody award, the record must at a minimum demonstrate that section
61.13 factors were considered in making the award. See Cobo, 13 So. 3d at
501; Velasquez, 963 So. 2d at 854; Peacock v. Peacock, 973 So. 2d 501,
502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Decker v. Lyle, 848 So. 2d 501, 502-03 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2003) (reversing and remanding where neither the transcript of the trial
court’s oral pronouncement of its ruling nor the temporary custody order
addressed the best interests of the child).
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 4, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D24-1588 Lower Tribunal No. 24-8338-FC-04
Diana De Los Angeles Salazar, Appellant,
vs.
Andre Ramon Blanco, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marcia Del Rey, Judge.
Law Office of Vanessa D. Torres, P.A., and Vanessa D. Torres, for appellant.
No appearance, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, LINDSEY and MILLER, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J. Respondent Diana De Los Angeles Salazar (“the Mother”) appeals the
trial court’s Final Judgment of Paternity, Timesharing/Parenting Plan. We
reverse because the trial court failed to comply with the statutory
requirements set out in section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2024).
The Mother and petitioner Andre Ramon Blanco (“the Father”) are not
married to each other. They have one son together, D.X.B., the minor child,
who was three years old at the time of the filing of the Initial Brief.
Both the Mother and Father are pro se litigants. In early May 2024, the
Father filed a petition to determine paternity, parental responsibility,
parenting plan, time sharing schedule, and child support. The Father
requested equal timesharing. The Mother filed an answer denying the
Father’s request for shared parental responsibility, timesharing, and other
financial allegations. The Mother asserted she maintained health insurance
for the child, provides for all his needs, and pays for all his expenses.
On May 31, 2024, the Mother filed a Motion to Family Court Services
requesting supervised visitation, temporary and retroactive child support,
and temporary sole parental responsibility. The Mother contended that the
Father was absent from the child’s life during the child’s first three years and
that the child did not know him. She requested therapy and supervised
visitation so the child could become acquainted with the Father. The Mother
2 further claimed the Father had never paid child support. The record on
appeal does not indicate whether the trial court ruled on this motion.
After no agreement was reached at mediation, the trial court set the
case for non-jury trial on September 3, 2024. There is no transcript of the
hearing that took place on September 3.
On September 4, 2024, the trial court entered a Final Judgment of
Paternity, Time Sharing/Paternity Plan. The court awarded the parties
shared parental responsibility. The trial court made only one finding, stating:
“The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the minor child that the parties
have shared parental responsibility.”
The trial court further ordered a 50-50 timesharing schedule with
alternating weeks on Sunday and an alternating holiday schedule without
indicating which parent would have even/odd years. The trial court did not
define holidays. The trial court ordered that the minor child would spend the
Mother’s birthday with the Mother and the Father’s birthday with the Father
but did not specify anything regarding the child’s birthday. The Final
Judgment does not address which parent will be responsible for health care
and school-related matters, as well as the address to be used for school-
boundary determination and registration, and other activities. The Final
Judgment also omits how the parties would be financially responsible for
3 extracurricular activities, summer camp, tutoring, and before/after school
care and omits travel provisions.
Regarding child support, the trial court ordered the Mother to pay the
Father $156.49/month based on the child support guidelines. In addition, the
court ordered that the total retroactive child support owed to the Father by
the Mother as of September 3, 2024 was $3,755.76. This included a period
during which the Mother was the child’s primary custodian.
Both parties submitted parenting plans, neither of which the trial court
adopted. In addition, the trial court did not create its own parenting plan, as
required by section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statute (2024), and attach it to or
incorporate it into the Final Judgment. The Mother now appeals.
This court applies a de novo standard of review where the trial court
errs in the application of the law. Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 932
(Fla. 2005). Whether a court’s timesharing and parenting plan determination
is supported by competent substantial evidence is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. Wade v. Wade, 159 So. 3d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015). In addition, the appellate court looks to see if there is competent
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings concerning the
statutory factors listed in section 61.13. Ford v. Ford, 700 So. 2d 191, 195-
4 196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Adair v. Adair, 720 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998).
The Mother contends that although there was no court reporter present
at the hearing, and thus there is no transcript, reversal is warranted because
the error committed by the trial court is apparent on the face of the judgment,
as the trial court did not consider the factors required by section 61.13,
Florida Statute (2024).1 The Mother is correct that because there is no
transcript provided to this Court, this Court’s review is limited to errors of law
apparent on the face of the judgment. Silverman v. Silverman, 940 So. 2d
615, 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Section 61.13 requires that the trial court decide all matters relating to
parenting plans and time-sharing of each minor child according to the “best
interests of the child.” § 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Fla. Stat. (2024); A.L.G. v. J.F.D., 85
So. 3d 527, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Determining the child’s best interests
is to be made by evaluating all the factors affecting the welfare and interests
of the child and the family’s circumstances, including the twenty factors set
1 The Father did not file an Answer Brief after being directed by this Court to do so; thus, the Court precluded him from filing an Answer Brief and from presenting an oral argument to this Court.
5 forth in the statute. See Cobo v. Sierralta, 13 So. 3d 493, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA
2009); Velasquez v. Millan, 963 So. 2d 852, 854 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Although section 61.13(3) does not require written findings justifying a
custody award, the record must at a minimum demonstrate that section
61.13 factors were considered in making the award. See Cobo, 13 So. 3d at
501; Velasquez, 963 So. 2d at 854; Peacock v. Peacock, 973 So. 2d 501,
502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Decker v. Lyle, 848 So. 2d 501, 502-03 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2003) (reversing and remanding where neither the transcript of the trial
court’s oral pronouncement of its ruling nor the temporary custody order
addressed the best interests of the child). The requisite findings must be
either stated on the record or set out in the order/final judgment. Munroe v.
Olibrice, 83 So. 3d 985, 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); see also Williams v.
Williams, 845 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (a decision based on less
than the court’s consideration of all the factors set out in section 61.13 is
insufficient).
In the case before us, neither the Final Judgment nor anything in the
record indicates the factors the trial court considered in this case in
determining the minor child’s best interests. As this Court stated in Cobo:
We cannot discern that any of these factors were considered in this case. And, in light of the fact that [the mother] had no adequate representation to advocate her position, we cannot conclude that the decision on which parent should have primary
6 residential custody of the minor child was made with the full consideration of the statutory factors.
Id. at 501. For these same reasons, the Final Judgment here is legally
insufficient under section 61.13.2
In addition, the trial court erred in ordering the Mother to pay child
support to the Father for any period during which the minor child was in the
mother’s custody. See Velazquez, 963 So. 2d at 855 (“We also reverse that
that [sic] portion of the final judgment which effectively obligates [the mother]
to pay child support to [the father] for any period of time during which the
child is in her custody[.]”).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s Final Judgment and remand
the case to the trial court with instructions for the trial court to address the
statutory factors outlined in section 61.13 and make the required findings, as
well as establish the requisite parenting plan. We also reverse the portion of
2 Furthermore, section 61.13 requires the trial court to create or approve a parenting plan “which establishes how divorced parents will share the responsibilities of childrearing and decision-making with regard to the child and sets forth a time-sharing schedule.” In re Amendments to the Fla. Family Law Rules, 955 So. 2d 445, 445 (Fla. 2008). Here, the court did not create or approve any parenting plan. Thus, it did not satisfy the requirements outlined in section 61.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2024). See Magdziak v. Sullivan, 185 So. 3d 1292, 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
7 the Final Judgment ordering the Mother to pay child support to the Father for
any period during which the minor child was in her custody.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.