Diana Blakeslee v. Quermin Madrigal

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-2301
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed December 3, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-2301 Lower Tribunal No. 15-15812-FC-04 ________________

Diana Blakeslee, Appellant,

vs.

Quermin Madrigal, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Christina Marie DiRaimondo, Judge.

Marro Law, P.A., and Meaghan K. Marro (Plantation), for appellant.

Law Office of Elena Vigil-Farinas, P.A., and Elena Vigil-Farinas (Tavernier), for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Appellant Diana Blakeslee challenges the trial court’s order granting

Appellee Quermin Madrigal’s request to relocate the minor child from

Tavernier, Florida, to Cape Coral, Florida. The trial court found that

relocation was in the best interests of the child. In doing so, it made

numerous findings of fact which tracked the relocation statute, including

credibility findings of the parties. § 61.13001(7)(a)–(k), Fla. Stat. (2024). We

affirm the order in all respects. See Ness v. Martinez, 249 So. 3d 754, 757

(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“An order on a petition for relocation is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion, and the appellate court considers whether competent,

substantial evidence supports the court’s findings under section

61.13001(7), Florida Statutes.”); Greenwood v. Greenwood, No. 3D24-1585,

2025 WL 2656234, at *1 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 17, 2025) (“But the trial court

simply did not abuse its discretion. Instead, it properly exercised that

discretion. Its findings were supported by competent, substantial evidence.

This evidence was ‘reasonable and logical.’ To hold otherwise would require

us to reweigh evidence and substitute our judgment and findings for those of

the trial court. This we cannot do.”) (internal citations omitted).

Affirmed.