Diamondstar Entertainment Holdings, LLC v. THH LLC

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJuly 15, 2021
Docket8:21-cv-01150
StatusUnknown

This text of Diamondstar Entertainment Holdings, LLC v. THH LLC (Diamondstar Entertainment Holdings, LLC v. THH LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diamondstar Entertainment Holdings, LLC v. THH LLC, (C.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:21-cv-01150 KES Date: July 15, 2021

Title: DIAMONDSTAR ENTM’T HOLDINGS, LLC v. THH LLC and RICK ZIELOMSKI

PRESENT:

THE HONORABLE KAREN E. SCOTT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Jazmin Dorado Not Present Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF: DEFENDANTS: None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): Order to Show Cause Why this Action Should Not Be Remanded

On July 2, 2021, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal from Orange County Superior Court case number 0-2020-01152786-CU-BC-CJC (Dkt. 1 [“Notice”]), together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon Defendants, including the summons and complaint (Dkt. 1-1–1-30). Plaintiff has stipulated to removal of this case to federal court. (Dkt. 1-31.) On removal, Defendants—the parties which invoked the federal court’s removal jurisdiction—have the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.”). Even when both sides stipulate to federal jurisdiction, this Court has an independent obligation to examine whether removal jurisdiction exists before deciding any issue on the merits. Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (The federal district court is “obligated to consider sua sponte whether [it has] subject matter jurisdiction.”). Defendants assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which confers original jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between … citizens of different States.” (Notice at 2.) Diversity must exist both at the time the case was filed in state court and at the time of removal. Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass’n. of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). Defendants assert that Plaintiff Diamondstar is “a CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 8:21-cv-01150 KES Date: July 15, 2021 Page 2

citizen of Nevada.” (Id. at 3.) For diversity purposes, however, corporate entities may have dual citizenship: “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). If Defendants choose to file an amended notice of removal, they should assert not only where Plaintiff is incorporated but also the state where it has its principal place of business. (Cf. Notice at 3 [asserting that Defendant THH “is a California limited liability company with its principal place of business in California”].) Similarly, the Notice asserts that Defendant Rick Zielomski “is an individual with his primary residence in California.” (Notice at 3) (emphasis added). But the diversity statute looks to “citizenship” not “residence.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. To establish “citizenship” for diversity purposes, an individual must be both a citizen of the United States and a domiciliary of one particular state. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). An individual residing in a particular state is not necessarily domiciled there. Instead, a person’s “domicile” is the place he or she resides with the intention to remain or to which he or she intends to return. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). While a mere allegation of “residency” is insufficient to establish citizenship, it may be cured by amendment. 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Finally, the Notice does not adequately demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. “Where the plaintiff originally files in federal court, the amount in controversy is determined from the face of the pleadings.” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “in a case that has been removed from state court to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the proponent of federal jurisdiction—typically the defendant in the substantive dispute—has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.” Id. at 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, Defendants must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff could recover more than $75,000 if successful. The complaint revolves around a single transaction whereby Defendant THH agreed to sell 10,000 packages of disinfectant wipes to Plaintiff, who intended to resell the wipes to its customer Safeguard. (Dkt. 1-3 ¶¶ 7–12.) Plaintiff alleges that the wipes arrived late and in unusable condition. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff asserts $49,568 in damages to replace the damaged wipes. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.) Plaintiff also alleges that due to the moldy and unusable wipes, Plaintiff’s “relationship with Safeguard has been irreparably harmed, leading to a loss of over $500,000 of profits.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff contends that prior to this transaction with THH, it “enjoyed a stellar reputation with Safeguard” but that “Safeguard now refuses to do business with Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 28.) While attorney fees recoverable by statute or contract may be included in determining the amount in controversy, see Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 1998), the complaint does not include any such allegations. In its Notice, Defendants merely cite this total amount—$549,568—to demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Notice at 2.) But a conclusory allegation “neither overcomes the ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction, nor satisfies [the defendant]’s burden of setting forth, in the removal CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

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petition itself, the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds” the applicable dollar value. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). In removal of a civil action based on diversity, “the sum demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) (emphasis added).

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Related

Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka
599 F.3d 1102 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Delores Lewis v. Verizon Communications, Inc.
627 F.3d 395 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd.
704 F.2d 1088 (Ninth Circuit, 1983)
Surber v. Reliance National Indemnity Co.
110 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (N.D. California, 2000)
Zuckman v. Monster Beverage Corporation
958 F. Supp. 2d 293 (District of Columbia, 2013)
April Scarlott v. Nissan North America, Inc
771 F.3d 883 (Fifth Circuit, 2014)
Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia
142 F.3d 1150 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Strotek Corp. v. Air Transport Ass'n of America
300 F.3d 1129 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
California ex rel Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc.
375 F.3d 831 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
Diamondstar Entertainment Holdings, LLC v. THH LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diamondstar-entertainment-holdings-llc-v-thh-llc-cacd-2021.