Diamond T. Motor Trucks v. Heck

13 So. 2d 512, 1943 La. App. LEXIS 320
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMay 24, 1943
DocketNo. 17836.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 13 So. 2d 512 (Diamond T. Motor Trucks v. Heck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diamond T. Motor Trucks v. Heck, 13 So. 2d 512, 1943 La. App. LEXIS 320 (La. Ct. App. 1943).

Opinions

This is a suit for the balance alleged to be due on the purchase of a motor truck and for various automobile parts and accessories which plaintiff corporation alleges it sold to defendant. The total amount sued for is $208.04. The original petition was filed on September 9th, 1941, judgment being sought against Mike Heck, Sr. It is alleged in that petition that the said Heck *Page 513 is engaged in business under the trade name "Mike Heck Delivery Service."

On September 19th, 1941, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended petition in which it averred that it had erroneously made Mike Heck Sr., defendant under the belief that he, individually, owned and operated the business but that it had discovered that the correct defendant should have been the corporation bearing the name "Mike Heck Delivery Service, Inc."

In the supplemental petition plaintiff repeated verbatim the allegations of the original petition and prayed that the judgment which it sought be rendered against the said corporation instead of against Mike Heck, Sr., individually, as originally prayed for.

Both citations and both petitions were served on the same day, September 22d 1941. Service of the original petition was made on Mike Heck Sr., individually, and service of the amended petition was made on the corporation at its place of business, through "Mike Heck, Sr., Pres."

On October 24th, 1941, Mike Heck answered the original petition denying all of the allegations. The corporation excepted to the amended petition on the ground "that respondent cannot be made a party to this suit by supplemental and amended petition." Together with that exception the said corporation, as required by the rules of the First City Court, filed answer in which it denied all of the allegations made by plaintiff.

When the matter was called for trial in the City Court, counsel for defendant corporation stated the contention of the exceptor as follows: "* * * respondent cannot be made a party to this suit by supplemental and amended petition. We contend that if you bring a suit against an individual, you cannot join another."

This exception was overruled, the judge a quo giving the following reasons:

"In this case, the suit was filed on September 9, 1941 by the plaintiff against Mike Heck Sr., doing business as Mike Heck's Delivery Service. The citation was served on the said defendant on September 22, 1941. No exceptions or answer was filed by the said defendant and no issue was joined up to September 19, 1941 whereupon the said plaintiff discovered that the defendant was doing business, not under a trade name but was doing business as a corporation known as Mike Heck's Delivery Service, Inc., whereupon the said supplemental petition was served on the defendant corporation on September 22, 1941 which was the same day that the citation was served on the defendant under the original petition and which citation was null and void and of no effect for the reason that the plaintiff had already filed his supplemental petition before service of the original petition, thereby waiving any and all rights he may have had under the original petition and it was not until October 24, 1941 when the defendant answered the original petition and then as President of the corporation and accepted and answered the supplemental petition.

"The court is of the opinion that since there was no issue joined, and, furthermore, the amendment does not alter the substance of the original demand, the exceptions of the defendant are therefore overruled."

After a trial on the merits, there was judgment for plaintiff against defendant corporation as prayed for and the corporation has appealed.

Whether such an amendment as that which is objected to here, in which there is substituted a new defendant for the defendant named in the original petition, may be filed depends upon whether, at the time of the filing of the amendment, issue has been joined. After issue has been joined, a plaintiff, even with leave of court, may file an amendment only if it "does not alter the substance of his demand by making it different from the one originally brought." C.P. art. 419.

Such a change as that made here may not be made if issue has been joined. Elfer v. Mintz et al., La.App., 7 So.2d 416; Levin v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., La.App., 2 So.2d 99; Garland v. Keen, 18 La. App. 652, 139 So. 54; Rex Credit Co. v. Alana et al., La.App., 145 So. 19; Curacel v. Coulon, 2 Mart., O.S., 143.

On the other hand, in Self v. Great Atlantic § Pacific Tea Co.,178 La. 240, 151 So. 193, 194, the Supreme Court held that a new and different defendant may be substituted for the one originally named if, at the time of the filing of the amendment, issue has not been joined. So that the question to be considered, as we have already said, is whether, at the time of the filing of the amendment, issue had been joined. In determining whether there has been a joinder of issue we must be guided *Page 514 by Articles 357 and 358 of our Code of Practice. These articles read as follows:

"357. Cause at issue, when. — The cause is at issue when the defendant has answered, either by confessing or denying the facts set forth in the petition, or by pleading such dilatory or peremptory exceptions as he is bound to plead in limine litis, pursuant to the provisions of this Code.

"358. Declinatory exception without answer to merits. — When the defendant pleads some declinatory exception, without answering to the merits, there is no issue joined."

In the Self case the Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the only appearance which had been filed by the defendant was a declinatory exception which, according to Article 358, does not join issue. The court held that since issue had not been joined the supplemental petition might be filed. There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company, was a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey, and was engaged in business in Louisiana. As a matter of fact, there were two separate and distinct corporations bearing the same name "Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company"; one was organized under the laws of New Jersey and one under the laws of Arizona. The New Jersey corporation did no business in Louisiana and it was that corporation which was named as defendant in the first petition. It filed an exception or plea to the jurisdiction ratione personae contending that since it was not domiciled in Louisiana and did no business here, it could not be sued here. Plaintiff then filed a supplemental petition and served this, together with a new citation and a copy of the original petition, on the other Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company, which was organized under the laws of Arizona, and which was engaged in business in Louisiana, and service was made on that corporation at its principal place of business in Louisiana. That corporation then filed an exception or plea to the jurisdiction and also a motion to strike out the supplemental petition "on the ground that a new party defendant, and hence a new suit, could not be ingrafted upon a pending suit * * *."

When the matter came before the Supreme Court, the only question presented was whether or not the plaintiff should have been permitted to amend its petition under the circumstances set forth and to substitute as defendant a new and different corporation which had not been named in the original petition. The Supreme Court said:

"Our opinion is that the judge was right in allowing the supplemental petition to be filed in this case, because it was filed before issue was joined.

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13 So. 2d 512, 1943 La. App. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diamond-t-motor-trucks-v-heck-lactapp-1943.