Diamond Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Limbach

1993 Ohio 4
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 7, 1993
Docket1992-1514
StatusPublished

This text of 1993 Ohio 4 (Diamond Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Limbach) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diamond Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Limbach, 1993 Ohio 4 (Ohio 1993).

Opinion

OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO The full texts of the opinions of the Supreme Court of Ohio are being transmitted electronically beginning May 27, 1992, pursuant to a pilot project implemented by Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer. Please call any errors to the attention of the Reporter's Office of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Attention: Walter S. Kobalka, Reporter, or Deborah J. Barrett, Administrative Assistant. Tel.: (614) 466-4961; in Ohio 1-800-826-9010. Your comments on this pilot project are also welcome. NOTE: Corrections may be made by the Supreme Court to the full texts of the opinions after they have been released electronically to the public. The reader is therefore advised to check the bound volumes of Ohio St.3d published by West Publishing Company for the final versions of these opinions. The advance sheets to Ohio St.3d will also contain the volume and page numbers where the opinions will be found in the bound volumes of the Ohio Official Reports.

Diamond Financial Holdings, Inc., Appellee v. Limbach, Tax Commr., Appellant. [Cite as Diamond Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Limbach (1993), Ohio St.3d .] Taxation -- Franchise tax -- Amount of tax due on net worth basis determined, how -- Application of business-done factor in determining net worth base. (No. 92-1514 -- Submitted May 25, 1993 -- Decided September 8, 1993.) Appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 88-J-1150. The Tax Commissioner, appellant, contests the Board of Tax Appeals' ("BTA's") finding that Diamond Financial Holdings, Inc. ("Diamond"), appellee, was a quiescent holding company. This finding removed one-half of Diamond's net worth from the franchise tax base. Diamond, a wholly owned subsidiary of Dana Corporation, wholly owned the stock of several financial, insurance and leasing companies, some of which wholly owned other companies of these types. For tax year 1984, Diamond received dividends from its subsidiaries, which Diamond passed on to Dana. Diamond also received interest income from the subsidiaries, which paid for loans Diamond had obtained for the subsidiaries. Diamond obtained the loans because it could combine the subsidiaries' balance sheets and apply greater leverage with the banks. Diamond could also unify the subsidiaries' borrowing efforts. Diamond passed the interest income, which represented Diamond's cost to borrow, onto the lenders. Occasionally, Diamond also received reimbursements from subsidiaries for costs Diamond had paid. Until March 31, 1983, nominal employees of Diamond operated the subsidiaries. On April 1, 1983, Diamond transferred these employees and the property they used from its books to the subsidiaries' books. However, the property remained in place, and the employees reported to the same location as before and performed the same work. For tax year 1984, Diamond, since it had no net income, paid the franchise tax on the net worth basis. Claiming to be a quiescent holding company under Nationwide Corp. v. Schneider (1966), 7 Ohio St. 2d 59, 36 O.O. 2d 48, 218 N.E. 2d 611, it had applied its property factor to one-half of its net worth, with which it calculated its tax base, but did not calculate or apply a business-done factor to the other one-half of its net worth to add a business-done amount to the tax base. The commissioner audited Diamond's return. She calculated a business-done factor, applied this factor to the unincluded one-half of Diamond's net worth, and added the result to the tax base. This action produced greater tax liability. Diamond appealed to the BTA, and the BTA reversed the commissioner's order. The BTA found that Diamond did not engage in any independent business activity for itself as of January 1, 1984 and that, consequently, Diamond was not "doing business" on January 1, 1984. The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue and Roger F. Day, for appellee. Lee I. Fisher, Attorney General, Richard C. Farrin and Steven L. Zisser, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

Per Curiam. Under R.C. 5733.01(A), the franchise tax is charged against a domestic corporation organized for profit "for the privilege of exercising its franchise during the calendar year in which such amount is payable," and against a foreign corporation "for the privilege of doing business in this state, owning or using a part or all of its capital or property in this state, or holding a certificate of compliance with the laws of this state authorizing it to do business in this state during the calendar year in which such amount is payable." According to R.C. 5733.01(B): "A corporation is subject to the tax imposed by this chapter for each calendar year that it is so organized, doing business, owning or using a part or all of its capital or property, or holding a certificate of compliance on the first day of January of that calendar year." R.C. 5733.04(F) defines "tax year" as "the calendar year in and for which the tax provided by this chapter is required to be paid." R.C. 5733.04(E) defines "taxable year" as: "[T]he year or portion thereof upon the net income of which the value of the taxpayer's issued and outstanding shares of stock is determined or the year at the end of which the total value of the corporation is determined." R.C. 5733.05 directs the determination of the value of a corporation's issued and outstanding stock. Under division (A), the net worth basis, the commissioner, after ascertaining the net worth of the corporation, determines the base on which the tax is computed under R.C. 5733.06 as follows: "[D]ivide into two equal parts the value as determined in division (A) of this section of the issued and outstanding shares of stock of each corporation filing such report. Take one part and multiply it by a fraction whose numerator is the net book value of all the corporation's property owned or used by it in this state, and whose denominator is the net book value of all its property wherever situated * * *. Take the other part and multiply it by a fraction whose numerator is the value of the business done, measured by sales of tangible personal property, by the corporation in this state during the year preceding the date of the commencement of its current annual accounting period, and whose denominator is the total value of its business, measured by sales of tangible personal property, during said year wherever transacted. "* * * "In the case of corporations whose business does not consist of the making of sales of tangible personal property and to which the sales numerator and denominator cannot apply, but which business consists of such activities as receiving commissions, rents, interests, dividends or distributions, and fees, the fraction shall be determined by allocating such business activities in and out of this state according to their situs." (Emphasis added.) The commissioner then applies the rates specified in R.C. 5733.06 to the tax base to charge the tax. The commissioner collects the higher amount calculated on the net worth or net income basis. In Proposition of Law Nos. One and Two, the commissioner argues that whether a corporation was "doing business" for the "business-done" factor of R.C. 5733.05(A) for a tax year must be based on the corporation's activities during the year preceding the tax year, its taxable year. Furthermore, the commissioner maintains that Diamond was doing business for tax year 1984 because its employees managed the affairs of the subsidiaries until March 31, 1983 of the taxable year preceding tax year 1984. Diamond responds that whether a corporation is a quiescent holding company may be determined by its corporate structure and activities as they existed both prior to and after January 1 of the tax year for which it claims that status.

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