Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Worcester Salt Co.

Second Circuit

Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Worcester Salt Co.

221 F. 66, 137 C.C.A. 16, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 1295

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedFebruary 9, 1915

DocketNo. 152

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 221 F. 66 (Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Worcester Salt Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Diamond Crystal Salt Co. v. Worcester Salt Co., 221 F. 66, 137 C.C.A. 16, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 1295 (2d Cir. 1915).

Pincite

Opinion

WARD, Circuit Judge.

[1] We do not think it necessary to add much to the careful opinion of -Judge Learned Hand in this case. It makes no difference what the word “Shaker” in connection with salt originally meant; that is, whether is was salt to be used in a shaker or salt made by the religious sect known as Shakers. It is a descriptive word, which has been shown to have obtained a secondary meaning as salt made by the complainant.

[2] We do not agree that protection of this trade-name shall be restricted, as it has been by the decree of the court below, to that part of the United States north of the thirty-eighth parallel and east of the [67]*67102d meridian. There have been cases where a trade-name has been protected only in limited territory, but the proofs show that the salt business of both parties to this suit is nation-wide.

[3] Although there is no decision of the Supreme Court giving to a complainant who has been guilty of untrue or misleading advertising a locus penitentiae, as has been given to the complainant, there are some decisions in the lower courts to this effect. Moxie Case (C. C.) 153 Fed. 487; W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Turner-Looker Co., 204 Fed. 553, 123 C. C. A. 79. There is in this case no untruthfulness or deception in the name itself, but only in part of the complainant’s advertising. We think it entirely equitable that the bill should be dismissed, not absolutely, but without prejudice to the right of the complainant hereafter to file a new bill, if it shall have shown that all untruthful advertising to the effect that its salt is absolutely pure and free from any gypsum has been abandoned.

The decree, modified by striking out the territorial limitation, is affirmed.

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WARD, Circuit Judge.

[1] We do not think it necessary to add much to the careful opinion of -Judge Learned Hand in this case. It makes no difference what the word “Shaker” in connection with salt originally meant; that is, whether is was salt to be used in a shaker or salt made by the religious sect known as Shakers. It is a descriptive word, which has been shown to have obtained a secondary meaning as salt made by the complainant.

[2] We do not agree that protection of this trade-name shall be restricted, as it has been by the decree of the court below, to that part of the United States north of the thirty-eighth parallel and east of the [67]*67102d meridian. There have been cases where a trade-name has been protected only in limited territory, but the proofs show that the salt business of both parties to this suit is nation-wide.

[3] Although there is no decision of the Supreme Court giving to a complainant who has been guilty of untrue or misleading advertising a locus penitentiae, as has been given to the complainant, there are some decisions in the lower courts to this effect. Moxie Case (C. C.) 153 Fed. 487; W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Turner-Looker Co., 204 Fed. 553, 123 C. C. A. 79. There is in this case no untruthfulness or deception in the name itself, but only in part of the complainant’s advertising. We think it entirely equitable that the bill should be dismissed, not absolutely, but without prejudice to the right of the complainant hereafter to file a new bill, if it shall have shown that all untruthful advertising to the effect that its salt is absolutely pure and free from any gypsum has been abandoned.

The decree, modified by striking out the territorial limitation, is affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

221 F. 66, 137 C.C.A. 16, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 1295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diamond-crystal-salt-co-v-worcester-salt-co-ca2-1915.

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